Will of generals prevails over general will in Zimbabwe
DEMOCRATS need to know the difference between the general will and the will of the general – particularly when we look at events across our northern border and what they mean for our politics.
More than a few voices have hailed Zimbabwe’s unofficial coup as a great step towards democracy because it ended Robert Mugabe’s presidency. This misreads what is afoot. As in South Africa, the reason for the error is an obsession with individual leaders rather than the realities which produce them.
Zimbabwe’s generals have not removed Mugabe to establish democracy – the establishment that rules that country has decided he has outlived his usefulness to them.
The military is not a neutral guardian of public safety: it has been, since independence, an important part of the ruling bloc.
There is evidence that the generals, not Mugabe, have been effectively running the country for a decade.
Ironically, when he wanted to step down a few years ago, the generals would not let him because they needed a civilian face.
We can explain how power is wielded in Zimbabwe and how the coup has unfolded, if we recall that the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) is not meant to recognise coups that unseat civilian governments.
Military governments would probably be politically isolated in the region.
If the military wants to rule, it must do so through civilians.
This is why the generals insisted they were not staging a coup and why they have not simply removed Mugabe and replaced him with their chosen successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa.
They need to convince Sadc that this is a constitutional change, which is why they have had to rely on resolutions by the governing party and the threat of impeachment to make sure that the coup seems constitutional.
All this means that, despite the fact that the military allowed people to express themselves in the streets, we are not looking at the end of the old power structure and the beginning of the “new dawn” which one cabinet minister promised.
As in Egypt, a civilian ruler who has become inconvenient to the military is being replaced by one who is not.
And, as in Egypt, the stakes are high for the military leaders: they are wealthy men who have a strong economic stake in continuing to call the shots.
So whatever form the new government takes, the change will – again, as in Egypt – be tolerated by the military only if it shores up their power and privilege.
If that means a government with opposition members – including an opposition prime minister – the generals will allow that.
After all, they coped with this in the past.
What it does not mean is a shift of power to the Zimbabwean people.
It is, sadly, far more likely that the coup will lead to a new round of violence against the people than to a power shift – the generals might allow demonstrations that suit them but, if popular pressure for a say builds, it will probably be met with the same force as before.
If getting rid of Mugabe will not change Zimbabwe, there is no reason for democrats to support the coup.
Some coups have helped usher in democracy — a 1974 Portuguese coup began a wave that brought democracy not only to that country but to many others.
But this happens very rarely and only when the coup is led by middle-ranking officers rebelling against their superiors, who are always part of the establishment.
In Zimbabwe, the coup is the work of the power holders, not an officer’s rebellion against them.
So why do some of us see the generals as saviours?
Because they assume that the problem is Mugabe, not the power structure of which he is part, and so any method is justified to get rid of him.
If we recognise that the problem is really elites who rule over the people by force rather than serving them, then the coup becomes not an antidote but more of the same.
There is an obvious parallel with our politics.
Some of us believe that the problem is purely Jacob Zuma, not economic and political elites who look after themselves at the expense of everyone else.
And so the underlying realities that produced Zuma are ignored and any method is said to be justified to get rid of him, even if it means once again deciding for people rather than listening to them.
A secret ballot in parliament, which allows members of the elite who are meant to represent the people to hide their votes from them – and could allow people with money to buy MPs – is seen as a solution because it might remove Zuma and is not seen as what it really is: the continuation of the habits that created the mess.
In both countries, the answer is not to rely on one section of the elite to remove another. Still less is it allowing those elites to break democratic rules if that gets them what they want.
It is strengthening the ability of people to shape their own destinies and fighting for rules that enable them to do that.