Mugabe captured leadership in 1980
IF we think that state capture is unique to South Africa, then let me introduce to you the founder, father and grandfather of state capture in Africa.
Many political commentators have tried to claim that Robert Mugabe started out right, but lost it somewhere along the line for whatever reason.
Referring to Mugabe as a liberator is an affront to every man who fought in the Rhodesian bush war from 1972 to 1979, whether they fought for the Rhodesian Security Forces, for Zanla or for Zipra.
Nelson Mandela was a liberator, because he led a country to democracy in peacetime, but in times of war, a liberator is always a soldier, never a politician. Mugabe was not a soldier. In countless cross-border raids into both Mozambique and Zambia, our enemy and targets were always military leaders like Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo from Zanla, or Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku from Zipra.
No one even knew who Mugabe was, but by the end of hostilities, he had managed to convince a naive international community that he was one of the leaders.
His Zanu-PF political party was only formed at the end of the war and was never involved in the liberation struggle, so who were the true liberators of Zimbabwe?
The Rhodesian bush war was ended by the 1979 Lancaster House conference which was essentially a meeting of the three leaders, Abel Muzorewa, the president of the newly created Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo, the political leader of Zapu, and Mugabe, the political leader of Zanu-PF.
The real clout lay with the de facto leaders of a country still at war: the commander of the incumbent army, General Peter Walls, Dabengwa and Tongogara .
Mugabe was the most radical of the political contingent, requesting all sorts of concessions and when they were not met, he walked out.
He was of the opinion that the Rhodesian army was ready to capitulate, so felt that a military victory was preferable to a negotiated settlement. But that was never going to happen. Mugabe was not a soldier and had little understanding of the war and where the real power lay.
Tongogara, as the leader of the military wing of Zanu-PF, was much more reserved in his demands, because he was a soldier and had been at the front since the start of hostilities in December 1972.
He knew the strength of the Rhodesian Army and knew that it was certainly not going to capitulate – far from it, it was ready to stage a full-scale mutiny against any unacceptable political outcome if its military leaders called for it.
Tongogara’s calmness at the negotiating table was what influenced the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian delegation to make enough concessions until a workable agreement was reached.
At that stage he was destined to become the first black president of Zimbabwe, because he had the support of the Zanla army and therefore of most of the country’s black population.
Mugabe was sent back to the negotiating table by then Mozambican president Samora Machel, who threatened to withdraw his support if the talks broke down.
Mugabe complied with the conditions and signed with all the other signatories.
This about-turn by Mugabe had repercussions that no one could foresee, the result of which adversely affected the future of Zimbabwe for nearly 40 years: the repercussions were born out of the wrong man becoming president of Zimbabwe [Mugabe was prime minister until 1987 when he became president].
Two days after the ceasefire, Tongogara was killed in a motor accident, leaving the door open for Mugabe to run unopposed in the elections of February 1980.
The Rhodesia Police special branch confirmed that Tongogara had been [allegedly] assassinated, but this fact could not be publicly announced because an investigation was never carried out.
When Mugabe won the election in early 1980 and moved back to Zimbabwe to take the reins, his eyes were opened as to how much in control the Rhodesian Army were.
It was then that he changed his attitude from one of a brash revolutionary to one of a gentleman ready to introduce reconciliation.
His wise appointment of Walls as head of the new army as part of his “hand of reconciliation” offer saved him.
Mugabe knew nothing of the enemy, because he never spent one single day at the front. Many commentators say that he was a strategist, organising the war from a distance.
Only with the consent of the Rhodesian security forces, through their willingness to honour agreements, was his Zanu-PF party able to govern in peace.
The Rhodesian security forces eventually lost the war economically after political pressure from both South Africa and the West.
On April 17 1980, Mugabe became the new prime minister of Zimbabwe when his Zanu-PF party won a majority of the parliamentary seats.
A few days before the voting, Mugabe publicly stated that if Zanu-PF lost the election, it would go back to war, thus he held a sword over the heads of a nation of newly enfranchised, war-battered rural peasants.
Tongogara, the true leader of the liberation struggle, was no longer there to counter this intimidatory statement.
The country was therefore voting to end a war, not to introduce a popular government.
Mugabe continually boasted of having a degree in violence, but he always relied on someone else to carry out his dirty work.
This violence was how he was able to stay in power for 37 years.
That is how real, holistic, long-lasting state capture is achieved.