The battle for Mosul

THE ASSAULT on Mosul in Iraq has been telegraphed well in advance and has now commenced broadly on the date that politicians and military commanders in countries involved in the operation have been publicly talking about. This is relevant because it shows that the need to surprise the enemy was not a factor of paramount importance.

Islamic State had been well aware that, after the recapture of Tikrit, Ramadi and Falluja from their shrinking caliphate, Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and the loss of which was such a humiliation for the Baghdad government, would be the next target.

The most Islamic State can do at this stage is try to inflict as much damage on the approaching forces as possible. Whether it takes weeks or is all over in days, Mosul will be seized back. The size of the Iraqi and Peshmerga forces, and the Western firepower on the ground and air, will prove too much for Islamic State. But the real problem for this mission will start when that happens. The reason Islamic State was able to make such a rapid advance in the west and north of Iraq was because it exploited the anger and resentment felt by the Sunni population at their treatment at the hands of the Shia-dominated government of Nour al-Maliki.

The US and Britain, responsible for the disastrous invasion of Iraq, continued to support Maliki after the end of the subsequent occupation. Washington and London could be charged with being oblivious to the divisive sectarian policies being carried out by the government it sponsored, or knowing and not foreseeing what this may bring. These bitter sectarian scars have not healed, and that is where the danger lies with Mosul. Shia militias were accused of killings, abductions and lootings by Sunni communities in Ramadi and Falluja after these cities were retaken.

The Turks also want a say in what happens in Mosul, with Turkey’s President Erdogan declaring that “no one can prevent us from participating”.

Meanwhile, no cohesive and realistic plans are in place for power-sharing between various communities – something Mosul will badly need after Islamic State is driven out.