Weekend Argus (Saturday Edition)
Greg Mills
MIGHT Africa stand to profit from a Donald Trump presidency? His election victory was informed by a visceral instinct about the unhappiness of middleAmerica, the desire to choose an outsider over the ultimate insider, establishment figure. The result said something about who was hurting in America, and their appetite for change.
Will this mean the same, promised sea-change in the US’s international relations? Whereas Hillary Clinton promised continuity in foreign as domestic affairs Trump promises, again, to shake things up.
European concerns are clear, since for the past 70 years Europe has increasingly farmed out its security to Washington. An inward looking administration, which Trump has promised, given his quest to “make America great again” and apparent aversion to alliances, could see greater responsibility for Europe and its own funding for defence. For the US contribution to Nato to be weakened at a time when Russia is once again flexing its military strength, heightens the risk of a strategic miscalculation. Similar challenges could apply to East Asia.
Still, a Trump presidency will not completely vaporise a clear and persistent rivalry with Russia and China, or make the North Korean dilemma go away. But the change of direction hinted at by Trump’s campaign might not make the world a less safe place.
To the contrary, for example, an improved relationship with Russia, which Trump has promised, might actually change things for the better and defuse the growing tension. After all, all the conferences on Syria and hand-wringing over Aleppo have saved few if any lives.
And, frankly, the Obama presidency has been disappointing, at least in foreign policy terms.
“Under Obama,” says one observer, “you have had a State Department with big hands and a small map and a Pentagon with small hands and a big map.” In other words, the Obama administration lacked the finer details and will to make things happen. It can be argued his administration has been surprisingly inward looking; withdrawing from overseas conflicts and a reluctance to engage elsewhere.
If a Clinton administration promised continuity, Africa would likely have featured a long way down the list of priorities, just as it has disappointingly done since the start of Obama’s presidency, despite the president’s Kenyan roots.
Over the last eight years US Africa policy has largely been a continuation of (Bill) Clinton (in the form of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, Agoa) and Bush II (the PEPFAR Aids spending, and the Millennium Challenge money for major projects in “reformist” countries). There has been more fluff (the African Leader’s summit) and the Young African Leaders Initiative (which has brought 2 000 young Africans to the US on short visits) and some new money (through Power Africa), but at the same time growing American indifference to African challenges of democratisation and governance. Under Obama, despite early rhetoric, USAid funding for democracy and governance programmes in Africa (regardless of what one thinks about the effectiveness of such spending) decreased by 45 percent from the Bush II levels.
Despite a continuation of operational US military engagement through Africom, overall, Obama’s US Africa policy has been minimalist, and to a fault.
Tough diplomacy has been notable by its absence. Signals against increasing authoritarianism including constitution tampering, media shut- downs and election fiddling have been muted. The excuse provided for such minimalism is that the US does not want to go back to the days of aid conditionality; the effect has been that democracy is sacrificed to short-term security imperatives and the avoidance of any African electoral violence.
It’s cautionary to worry about what forces might be sanctioned and empowered by any new establishment. It is also correct to see the opportunity in change.