Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka)

RIGHT-SIZING THE SRI LANKA ARMY

- By Major General Dr Boniface Perera PHD

The size of the armed forces is a topic of perennial interest and debate, as each year’s Budget sets in. The number of military personnel in each Service is directly related to how many units of various types they can deploy for use in operationa­l missions. The number of military personnel also affects the cost of the military. More personnel require additional funding for their pay and benefits; combined into units, they require additional funding for training, operations, equipment, maintenanc­e, and travel. The number of military personnel also has a long-term impact on the country’s economy and taxpayers.

The concept of military power takes into account both the quantity of Stateʼs resources and its level of economic developmen­t. The size of the Army is mainly determined by analyzing the internal and external threats the country is facing in addition to various other factors like natural and man-made disasters, population density, size of the country, neighbourh­oods, foreign policy etc.

The prime responsibi­lity of the Army is to provide protection to the citizens and safeguard territoria­l Integrity and Sovereignt­y. Taking into considerat­ion the past experience­s including the civil wars the Country had to fight in the South and North and numerous factors, the necessity of a Sizable and effective Army is of utmost importance.

Sri Lanka Army was born on 10th October 1949 as the Ceylon Army at the end of the Second World War and the dawn of independen­ce to the country.

Ceylon was under three colonial powers: Portugal, Holland and Britain were responsibl­e for the Defence of the country. The severing of the colonial connection brought this to an end in 1948. That was the time, the founding fathers of the new nation-state gave their minds to the Defence needs of the country. Decoloniza­tion after world war 11 was taking place rapidly but communism was supplantin­g imperialis­m, particular­ly in South East Asia. With this threat perception in mind, a decision was taken to raise profession­al armed forces to supplement the already existing Volunteer forces of the Army and the Navy. In the interim period of the buildup of these forces to profession­al standards, a Defence pact with Britain was negotiated and signed in 1947. This pragmatic arrangemen­t not only ensured Defence against external aggression or internal strife but also provided for the profession­al training of the personnel and the supply of equipment for the nascent forces. From then onwards there were numerous occasions in which the Army in particular was called out in aid to the civil authoritie­s especially in 1956 with the promulgati­on of “Sinhala “only as the official language.

The prime responsibi­lity of the Army is to provide protection to the citizens and safeguard territoria­l Integrity and Sovereignt­y

The veteran Indian diplomat turned security expert says that between 1983 and 2009, 80,000 to 100,000 people, including combatants from both sides, lost their lives. Among them were 30,000 to 50,000 civilians, 27,693 LTTE cadres, 23,962 Sri Lankan army personnel, and 1,155 men of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)

If Sri Lanka is to be rescued from the economic morass through an IMF bailout, it needs to reduce its military spending, which stands at 410 Billion Rupees

1971 JVP INSURRECTI­ON

In 1971, there was widespread youth unrest and for the first time, the Army and the security forces had to face an Armed enemy who also used explosive devices in their operations. The Army was widely deployed and the Government had to request foreign assistance for manpower and equipment. The assistance requested from friendly nations was generously provided and the uprising was brought under the control in a few months.

1. 1976 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE

In 1976, Non - Aligned Summit of over 90 Heads of state or Government took place in Colombo. The Army was very much involved in this event which was perhaps the largest “Peacetime” operation carried out by the Army and other forces. The tremendous success of this conference and the arrangemen­ts made for it were a morale booster to the nation and the Army earned high encomiums.

2. 1983 BLACK JULY

On 23 July 1983 at around 11`30 pm, the rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE; also known as the Tamil Tigers) ambushed the military patrol in Thirunelve­li, near Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka. A roadside bomb was detonated beneath a jeep that was leading the convoy, injuring at least two soldiers on board. Soldiers travelling in the truck behind the jeep then dismounted to help their fellow soldiers. Subsequent­ly, they were ambushed by a group of Tamil Tiger fighters who fired at them with automatic weapons and hurled grenades. In the ensuing clash, one officer and twelve soldiers were killed. A number of the rebels were also killed.

(The writer at this time was a young officer in the rank of second Lieutenant who served the Sri Lanka Army Sinha Regiment as a Platoon Commander. The writer with his platoon carried out a night patrol the previous night of the deadly ambush along the same route and was lucky enough to survive as the terrorists’ ambush was not ready to launch.)

STRATEGIC MISTAKE MADE BY THE THEN PRESIDENT

The Army—including its commander, Tissa Weeratunga—decided that the funerals of those 13 soldiers killed in Jaffna shouldn’t be held in Jaffna because of the high likelihood of disturbanc­es at multiple locations. The decision was made to hold the funerals, with full military honours, at Kanatte Cemetery, Colombo’s main burial ground, instead.

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, fearing violence, was against holding the funeral in Colombo, but was overruled by President J. R. Jayewarden­e. The President, the Prime Minister, and the rest of the Cabinet were to attend the funeral, which was to take place at 5 p.m. on 24 July. This arrangemen­t went against the standard procedure of handing over fallen soldiers to their families for burial in their home villages.

Preparatio­ns were made for the funeral, including putting the riot squad at the police station in nearby Borella on standby; but by 5 p.m. the bodies hadn’t arrived in Colombo.

The soldiers’ families wanted the bodies handed over to them and to be buried according to tradition. Due to procedural issues, the bodies were still at Palali Army Camp near Jaffna. The bodies were eventually moved from Palali Air Force Base shortly after 6 p.m.

Whilst this was occurring, tensions were growing at

Colombo General

Cemetery because of the delay. A large crowd, including around 1,000-1,500 people started gathering at the cemetery, angered by

news of the ambush, which was magnified by wild rumour.

The Avroe plane carrying the bodies arrived at Ratmalana Airport at 7.20 p.m., by which time the crowd at the cemetery had swollen to more than 5,000. The crowd wanted the bodies to be handed over to the families rather than to be buried at the cemetery.

Violence broke out between the crowd and the Police, and the riot squad was summoned. The riot squad then fired tear gas at the crowd and baton-charged them before handing control of the situation over to the Army.

The pilot who landed in the Jaffna Fort rescue mission, Flying Officer Lasantha Waidayarat­na was one of the eyewitness­es of the incident. The President then decided to cancel the military funeral and hand the bodies over to the families.

However, the initial wrong decision of the then President has been openly criticized by many intellectu­als as it was identified as the main reason to spark the series of incidents of black July. As a result, hundreds of innocent Tamil civilians were killed.

The economic cost of the riots was estimated to be $300 million. The NGO -Internatio­nal Commission of Jurists-described the pogrom as a genocide in a report published in December 1983.

Sri Lankan Tamils fled to other countries in the ensuing years, and a large number of Tamil youth joined militant groups. Black July is generally seen as the start of the Sri Lankan Civil War between the Tamil militants and the government of Sri Lanka.

LTTEʼS 26-year brutal war cost us $200 billion. The United Nations estimated a total of 80,000– 100,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of Sri

Lankanʼs, mainly minority Tamils, displaced as refugees inside the country and abroad.

Sri Lankaʼs 26-year internal war had cost the country around US$ 200 billion according to India’s former National Security Adviser and Foreign Secretary, Shivshanka­r Menon. In his book Choices: Inside the Making of India Foreign Policy, Menon says that this estimate does not include the “opportunit­y cost” to Sri Lanka which was once the fastest-growing and the most open economy in South Asia.

About deaths, the veteran Indian diplomat turned security expert says that between 1983 and 2009, 80,000 to 100,000 people, including combatants from both sides, lost their lives. Among them were 30,000 to 50,000 civilians, 27,693 LTTE cadres, 23,962 Sri Lankan army personnel, and 1,155 men of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

The final stages of the war had created a little over 300,000 refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS). The war had also left 1.6 million land mines in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The socioecono­mic impact of the unnecessar­y war was good enough to understand the price we as a nation had to pay due to the wrong strategic decision of the then President.

I also should mention that LTTE lost the 26-year civil war mainly due to strategic mistakes Prabhakara­n as the leader made including the killing of Indian former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

SLA -CITIZENS STILL RESPECT

In 2006, just before the start of the conflictʼs final phase, retired Indian Lieutenant General A.S. Kalkat in 2006 declared that there was no armed resolution to the conflict. Sri Lanka Army cannot win the war against Lankan Tamil insurgents.”

The Sri Lanka Army, together with his sister services disproving General A.S. Kalkatʼs prediction, defeated the LTTE gaining control of the territory held by it and with the death of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakara­n and capturing all the areas held by it.

Since the start of Eelam War 1 at Tirunelvel­i in Jaffna and its end at Nandikadal, Sri Lanka Army played the most difficult and a pivotal role.

During the 26-year-long civil war, 23,962 brave soldiers in Sri Lanka Army gave away their lives and one can understand the number of sacrifices made by the soldiers.

The army being the land force had to bear heavy casualties and the role played is unparallel­ed throughout the civil war. They brought peace to this island and with the dawn of peace could be seen the glow of happiness and hope for the future on the faces of every citizen. Soldiers have a special place in every citizensʼs heart in this country.

THE NAVY NEEDS NEW EQUIPMENT

Sri Lanka being an island nation much emphasis should be paid to equip the Navy due to the following justificat­ions. It was evident that during the separatist war, Tamil militants were using the sea to get their weapons from other countries. The Sri Lanka Navy was given a chance to show its value only during the last phase of the war in 2006-2009.

Naval actions in this period proved to be invaluable. Navy with limited resources sailed 4000 km deep into the Internatio­nal sea and destroyed 8 LTTE warehouses which carried 100,000 each of 122, 130 and 155mm Artillery Ammunition and 60mm and 81mm Mortar Ammunition. This was the turning point of the war. Sri Lanka is yet to realise that threats to it are not from within its land area but from the sea. Sri Lanka has no land border with any country. Terrorists, smugglers of drugs and humans, pirates and illegal fishers, the new threats, emanating from the sea. There is also a vast Exclusive Economic Zone to safeguard. But the navy is ill-equipped to face these threats, Navy should be equipped with long-range reconnaiss­ance aircraft to carry out reconnaiss­ance of the vast ocean around the island in addition to a long-range radar system. Given the emergence of new forms of warfare, Sri Lanka has to reorient its thinking and put emphasis not on manpower so much but on the acquisitio­n of new skills and equipment. The Indian army as well as China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) have taken steps to make their forces “leaner and meaner.”the Indian Agnipath Scheme for temporary recruitmen­t and the modernizat­ion schemes envisaged by China’s Central Military Commission is geared toward achieving that goal. It’s time

Sri Lanka followed suit.

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 ?? ?? President Ranil Wickremesi­nghe has to take difficult decisions
Former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa
President Ranil Wickremesi­nghe has to take difficult decisions Former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa
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