Bangkok Post

Mediterran­ean drills boost China’s reach

- NOAH FELDMAN Noah Feldman is a professor of constituti­onal and internatio­nal law at Harvard University and the author of six books, most recently ‘Cool War: The Future of Global Competitio­n’.

Why is China announcing joint naval exercises with Russia in the Mediterran­ean, so far from home? There’s a global answer connected to the new cool war and China’s interest in responding to US initiative­s in the Pacific. But there’s also a more revealing local answer arriving from the nature of China’s growing involvemen­t in the Middle East and North Africa.

The global geopolitic­al explanatio­n for the exercises, expected this month, is certainly interestin­g and distinctiv­e. China’s military and security aims are primarily focused on the Pacific, and it can’t reasonably hope to compete with the US or European powers in their own backyards.

Yet China gains symbolic value from presenting itself as an increasing­ly global power. A naval exercise in the Mediterran­ean is the kind of thing great powers do. The announceme­nt is therefore useful to communicat­e China’s seriousnes­s and commitment to this rise. It may be even more valuable within China, where President Xi Jinping is nurturing an increasing­ly nationalis­t strain of pride under the slogan of the “Chinese dream”. Seen in this light, the Chinese-Russian exercises also look like a symbolic response to US efforts to strengthen security relationsh­ips with China’s Asian neighbours.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent visit to Washington is a case in point. Mr Abe has begun a genuine discussion within Japan about whether to amend the pacifist constituti­on, transformi­ng the country’s self-defence force into something more like a standard military. The impetus for this change is China’s increasing security threat to its Asian neighbours — and a nagging uncertaint­y on the part of Japanese about whether the US would go to war to defend Japan. Mr Abe’s visit is part of an attempt by the Barack Obama administra­tion to reassure the Japanese, but also to implicitly to lend credibilit­y to Mr Abe’s defence initiative­s.

It’s worth noticing that this military positionin­g on both sides, even if symbolic, coexists with close economic cooperatio­n between China and both Japan and the US if this seems unusual, that’s because it is: The chief feature of the cool war is the coexistenc­e of strategic competitio­n and economic cooperatio­n.

One reason China can get away with a little minor sabre rattling in the Mediterran­ean — alongside Russia — is that it won’t affect China’s economic partnershi­ps with anyone, including the US or European powers. That’s just the way the new cool war game is played. Yet this geopolitic­al angle doesn’t necessaril­y explain why the Mediterran­ean. Naval exercises almost anywhere could’ve expressed the same thing because China’s naval assets in the Mediterran­ean aren’t particular­ly significan­t.

The better explanatio­n for why the Mediterran­ean is much more local. China has twice in recent years had to send its ships to rescue and evacuate significan­t numbers of Chinese workers who fell into danger as a result of regional instabilit­y. The first time was in Libya, where 35,800 Chinese workers had to be evacuated after the 2011 uprising and subsequent bombing campaign to bring down Moammar Gadhafi. The second time was in late March and early April, when Chinese ships helped offload several hundred Chinese workers from Yemen as the situation there further deteriorat­ed and Saudi air strikes escalated.

These episodes brought home China’s evolving role in the Middle East and North Africa. So far, Chinese policy makers have shown no interest in inheriting the traditiona­l US role of maintainin­g hegemony in the Middle East to create stability and facilitate the flow of oil. However, China has to some degree included the Middle East in its strategy of building infrastruc­ture projects in less-developed countries and establishi­ng substantia­l settlement­s of Chinese workers there.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the point of this strategy is to build government-to-government relationsh­ips and keep steady the flow of raw materials that China needs to grow economical­ly.

Chinese political influence is primarily an adjunct to business interests. In Libya, the strategy accounted for the Chinese presence. A comparable number of Chinese workers probably still exists in Algeria and there are Chinese workers elsewhere in the region, although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain.

Over time, China’s increasing presence in the region will shift China’s interest in the Mediterran­ean. Large business investment­s will drive a national interest in, you guessed it, stability.

Instabilit­y is what caused China to have to evacuate workers, which is the local reason China now has a naval presence in the Mediterran­ean.

 ?? REUTERS ?? Soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army stand on the deck before a fleet sets out for Yemen to help evacuate foreign nationals during an explosion of political violence there.
REUTERS Soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army stand on the deck before a fleet sets out for Yemen to help evacuate foreign nationals during an explosion of political violence there.

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