Time for Tsai to show Taiwan how she intends to lead
In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen led Taiwan’s main opposition Democratic Progressive Party to a stunning defeat by incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party.
Tsai not only lost her presidential bid, but DPP candidates took so few seats in concurrently held legislative election that they were unable to mount an effective opposition as the KMT once again took power. A lot can change in four years. With the 2016 election approaching, Tsai is the clear frontrunner, with the KMT struggling at the polls and many predicting she will become Taiwan’s first democratically elected female president.
There are reasons for the DPP’s success, first among them the remarkable decline in popularity of the ruling party during Ma’s second term in office.
Taiwan’s poor economic performance invariably favours opposition parties over incumbents, an effect made worse by KMT efforts to improve relations with China, which many blame for job losses and growing inequality in Taiwan.
Demographics too favour the independence-minded DPP, with young people more often siding with the party, thus eroding traditional areas of KMT support in central and northern Taiwan.
Even Ma’s historic meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping has failed to boost approval ratings.
Yet to dwell on KMT failings the past four years ignores DPP achievements, in leadership and in the party as a whole.
Prospective voters find particularly appealing Tsai’s moderate views on Taiwan’s questionable nation status and her pragmatic approach to policy. Both set her apart from former DPP leader Chen Shuibian, who many regarded as an ideologue and “troublemaker”.
Moderate does not mean timid, however, a quality many saw in Tsai leading up to the 2012 debacle, and one that is entirely unsuitable in the often rough-and-tumble world of Taiwanese politics, not to mention cross-strait relations.
Demonstrating plenty of fight last year during demonstrations against the Ma administration’s China-friendly policies, Tsai backed young protesters, fashioning herself in the process as the righteous protector of a free and democratic Taiwan.
In many ways more impressive has been Tsai’s ability to manage a historically volatile DPP, creating a sense of unity where once there was only division.
Using a combination of backroom cajoling and leadership by example, Tsai has caused her moderate allies to fall in behind her, while hardcore elements hold their tongues on sovereignty.
While Tsai is adept in managing a number of tricky problems, none has gone away, and three could easily return.
First is party unity. Division in the DPP stems from the independent nature of those attracted to the party. This nature accentuates ideological differences within the party, particularly those involving the Republic of China Constitution, which many say undermines Taiwan sovereignty.
Without recognising the existence of the ROC, many question how the DPP could have a cross-strait relationship of any kind with China.
Given the passions surrounding sovereignty, then, there is nothing to say those who for the sake of unity have remained quiet will continue to do so, especially after the election.
The second possible flare-up before the election concerns Tsai’s cross-strait policy, which has been little more than to say she will maintain the “status quo”.
Asked what that means or how she plans to put it into practice, Tsai is vague.
In her defence, some say that it would be a mistake to say too much about the DPP’s traditional Achilles’ heel and that it would be better to keep options open.
Yet despite reassurances, some fear a Tsai victory would mean returning to the kind of cross-strait gridlock that was seen when the DPP ruled Taiwan from 2000 to 2008.
As well, public trust in the DPP is thin and could evaporate at any moment. At the heart of the distrust is not just a history of factionalism or less-than-clear plan to sustain the cross-strait “status quo”.
Rather, it lies in the party’s continued resistance to the “1992 consensus” under which representatives of Taiwan and China agreed that there was only “one China”, but each side can interpret in its own way what that means.
Tsai and the DPP do not recognise the “1992 consensus”, which Ma’s KMT and the Communist Party of China consider the political foundation for cross-strait talks.
“If the foundation is undermined, the ground will shake,” Xi has warned, referring to the 1992 consensus.
While setting a bottom line may be only a tactical manoeuvre, some call it a strategic mistake.
“It backs Beijing into a corner that having laid out the choice for Taiwan, it then has to act on the basis of its warnings and threats,” said Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.
Instead of assuming what Tsai will say or do, Bush advises Beijing to “listen to her words and watch her deeds” following her inauguration when she assumes responsibility for the people of Taiwan.
Of course, a DPP victory in January’s election is not inevitable, and certainly a landslide is not assured.
But assuming opinion polls are even half right, it may be time for the DPP and China to start thinking about how to deal with each other.
Prospective voters like Tsai’s moderate views on Taiwan’s questionable nation
status and her pragmatic approach to policy. Both set her apart from former DPP leader Chen Shui-bian, who many regarded as
a “troublemaker”