Three questionable years under NCPO rule ‘‘
May 22 will mark the third anniversary of the 2014 coup that saw the country switch to authoritarian mode under the stewardship of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. Even with a new constitution now in place, the regime is relentlessly maintaining its tight control into a fourth and final year — that is if a general election is called in accordance with the timetable of the charter.
From its inception, the NCPO has taken a different route from that of its predecessors and brothers in arms who toppled the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2006. At that time, the constitution was quickly drafted, the referendum passed, and then came the election. The whole process took little more than a year after the power takeover.
There is a perception that the 2006 coup was a “waste”. The coup leaders and the elite failed to get rid of Thaksin as intended; granted, the head of the Shinawatra clan is not an average politician who submits easily like others have done in the past. The military and its backers planned and executed the 2014 coup with more precision and a calculated strategy of staying long enough in power to consolidate it and purge Thaksin and his supporters once and for all.
Why is Thaksin so hard to get rid of? We can say the tycoon-cum-politician built his political base upon popular programmes. Together with his independent wealth, he is his own man, so to say. Past prime ministers did not have such a wide support base. When overthrown in a coup, they accepted their fate and spent time abroad quietly — some for life.
Thaksin, however, continued to be a nuisance (for the regime). In absentia, the parties he backed won elections in 2007 and again in 2012, which saw Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra, who was a political novice, come to power as another popular leader.
Thus, the architects of the 2014 putsch extended the rhetoric of military intervention, not only to stop violent clashes in the streets, as in 2006, but to achieve “reform” and “reconciliation” — both are “longterm” goals that cannot be completed overnight. So, three years on — has the NCPO been successful in its endeavours?
With a heavy-handed approach and the licence granted by Section 44, Gen Prayut is able to halt violent conflicts of a political nature. The Bangkok elite and a large number of urban middle class are satisfied as they believe life can now go on as normal.
A decade of political infighting has dampened the spirit of democracy that arose with the May 1992 uprising and the constitution of 1997. Sadly, it appears they are now willing to live under dictatorial rule.
Meanwhile, the regime continues to use propaganda to make its point. It relies on the politics of fear — fear of returning to political chaos and violence when the military leaves the political scene. The regime puts the blame on politicians, and those prone to corruption must be prevented from returning to power — or if they do, they must be “supervised”.
But the regime’s peace plan comes at a cost. Freedom of speech has been impaired, and there are reports of widespread human rights abuses. Without empowered critics and elected parliamentary representatives, the system of checks and balances has malfunctioned.
Moreover, the regime is able to ram through controversial projects like the recent submarine procurement plan, or sweep certain high-profile scandals under the rug, such as the construction of Rajabhakti Park.
Now it is busy laying a foundation to extend its legacy and power to control by passing new legislation. The digital media law, which seeks to limit internet freedom, was passed recently, while the media control bill is still going through the process of being scrutinised.
Moreover, there are concerns that the constitution and the organic laws being drafted, for instance, those on the upcoming general election and political parties, have major reservations that compromise democratic values.
The NCPO’s moves to achieve reconciliation are also far from being impressive, as only feeble attempts have been made, with the regime dominating the agenda. Anyone with a different opinion is categorised as a threat to national security.
But reconciliation means more than inviting political parties to a forum and taking notes, which are then summarised in a way that reflects the regime’s own interpretation. It needs to involve all stakeholders. Listening and exchanging views are essential to the process.
But the regime does not allow that. Deeply mired in political paranoia, it often tends to act in an unacceptable way. A case in point is those families who lost love ones in the May 2010 crackdown on political protesters but are banned from organizing memorial events.
Justice must be applied equally on all sides. When deaths and injuries result from political clashes, the leaders must be held to account.
This includes military leaders, as the armed forces were used against the protesters. They cannot try to dodge responsibility by saying they were not a party to the conflict.
Truth, not lies, is the basis for reconciliation.
The reform agenda has been drafted by groups of people who supported the coup and the regime. This explains why the recent attempt to establish a new petroleum agency faces strong resistance. The regime must realise that a workable public policy needs genuine public participation.
The programmes it wields mainly benefit big business — the chief supporters or constituents of the regime — prompting the public to decry what it sees as a growing sense of inequality. In light of this, any welfare schemes it has introduced seem like leftovers, or scraps of a meal.
Is the policy to clear street food vendors from Bangkok’s sidewalks a way to drive consumers into convenience stores owned by conglomerates?
Why bet heavily on the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) when the Eastern Seaboard is already bustling with investment?
A skewed economic policy not only aggravates inequality, it also creates more resentment that causes regions to drift further apart.
No wonder the regime is worried the election will see another landslide for the Pheu Thai Party. Thaksin may be out of sight but he is not out of mind.
A decade of political infighting has dampened the spirit of democracy.
Suranand Vejjajiva was secretary-general to the prime minister during the Yingluck Shinawatra government and is now a political analyst.