The Last Stand

Syria’s rebels face a final showdown with the regime in Idlib. Global peace at stake

The Syrian war has reached a critical, and potentially catastrophic stage. After weeks of troop movements and counter-movements, Syrian regime forces and their Russian backers began a bombing campaign in Idlib province – one of the last major holdout of rebel groups. Idlib, which has been a de-escalation zone monitored by the Turkish army, is now on the verge of all-out war. What makes this battle so dangerous is the complexity of the geopolitical terrain. Not only is Idlib ringed by Turkish military “observation posts”, those posts themselves are shadowed by Russian posts and, in some cases, Iranian as well. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has warned that an assault on Idlib would be a “massacre” while his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, has threatened consequences if civilians are harmed. Could this be the last battle in Syria’s 7-year long civil war, or the beginning of a much deadlier conflict?

►Is there a risk this war could escalate into a regional conflict?

In a situation of conflict, it is sometimes the case that the various parties, none of which want to escalate it to a higher level, will end up doing so because all sides make misjudgements on what the others are going to do and how much each side is willing to accommodate others. One might talk about World War I as an example of a war that no one wanted but because of misjudgments of motives, war broke out after what ostensibly was an isolated incident, i.e. the murder of Archduke Ferdinand of Austro-Hungary in Sarajevo. When I think about this and look at Syria, I feel concerned that we may be in a similar situation. There are too many parties involved, each pursuing different agendas. Each party is trying to make judgments about the motivations and possible actions of the others and how it can achieve its goals by imposing its preferences on them. So room for making mistakes is rather large. I don’t think anyone of the major actors involved has the intention of escalating this conflict; everyone has limited goals. The Americans want to drive Daesh out; they want to help their local partners the YPG achieve some of its aspirations, i.e. the recognition of a geographically based autonomous status for the Kurds. Russia wants to ensure that Assad regime not only remains in place but also dependent on Russian support. On top of that, they do not want the YPG to become dependent exclusively on the U.S., and therefore feel pressured to be receptive to some of their aspirations. Then, when you look at Iran, it just wants to retain a foothold in Syria and for the government of Syria to remain in place. In Turkey’s case, there a number of things it doesn’t want: it doesn’t want Assad to stay, it doesn’t want a wave of additional migration into Turkey, it doesn’t want the YPG to acquire an important role in Syrian politics. Then you have other countries - Israel, Jordan and Lebanon – each with its own interests. In short, each country is driven by a mixed bag of motives. And when you have so many actors involved pursuing so many goals, it becomes very likely that complications will arise.

►It seems like Syria as a nation is not the central issue here. It’s the position it occupies geopolitically.

Exactly, Syria has become the testing ground where different actors with interests in the region are trying to achieve their broader goals. We could expand the earlier analysis by adding Iraq into this. One might suggest, for example, that the Iranian goal is to consolidate its influence in Iraq and then extend it to Syria by making the regime reliant on Iranian support. This would give the Iranians an opportunity to project their power into the Mediterranean and also challenge the powerful regional position of Israel. In the process, Iran would also be challenging American desires to continue as a major actor in the region. Obviously, one has to take into consideration other factors such as the oil production not just in Syria, but also natural gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. And what often gets ignored in this is China, which has some indefinite plans to have one terminal of its new Silk Road in Syria or in Lebanon. This is a region where also the Chinese want to expand their influence which the Europeans will then try to counter. What happens in Syria and who establishes a dominant position there, appear to be rather critical to a lot of actors from a variety of perspectives. It’s not just security, it’s also economics.

►How much of what’s happening in Syria can be explained by the reshaping of the world order since the end of the Cold War?

Clearly it’s a part of it, likely a major part. When you look at the competition in Syria, you clearly see the attempt of the Russians to establish a strong foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. By establishing this, they will also be able to challenge the traditional influence of the Americans in the region. The fact that there are also disagreements between Turkey and the U.S. makes this all the more interesting because the Turkish political leadership has complained that the world system of governance no longer reflects global realities. We all know that China is trying to become a major actor and it seems that the Russians and the Chinese are engaged in a temporary cooperative framework, though not particularly well spelled out. Nevertheless, both seem to have an interest in reducing the American presence in the area and Russia in particular is also trying to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe in terms of the Western defense system.

►If World War III is the worst case scenario, what is the best case scenario, realist-cally?

That’s a very difficult question to answer. I believe that it is currently not possible to reach a conclusive agreement. There will likely be a set of temporary agreements to avoid an escalation while the various actors try to jockey for more solid power positions. The struggle will probably continue for a while. When we talk about Syria, we should remember that each party has a number of domestic clients to protect among which the Assad government is only one. There are the Kurds, there a number of organizations including the forces Turkey has been backing such as the Free Syrian army, etc. None of these are going to fully disappear. To the extent that the Assad government is not willing to accommodate the expectations of these groups, any peace formula agreed upon will be brittle and temporary.

►So basically a simmering conflict that will flare up at times, die down at times, and so on?

Exactly. That would be my prediction.