Cautious pessimism for UN plan for Libyan stability
On the eve of the Arab Spring’s 10th anniversary, the atmosphere in Libya’s Tripoli was completely different from the mood in Tunisia or Egypt. In the city’s Martyrs’ Square, Libyan youth waving flags gathered to honor the historic day. The roads around the city were lit up with firecrackers and cultural performances were put on across the square.
However, the celebration was confined to Tripoli in the west, while Benghazi in the east was calm and quiet, depicting the political division the country has faced over the last decade.
A BRIEF BACKGROUND
The post-Moammar Gadhafi political trajectory in Libya is largely being determined by deepening primordial tribal, regional and ethnic divides. The division still remains unabridged.
The National Transitional Council (NTC) formed as an interim authority amid the civil war was itself a divided house where Gadhafi’s early defectors and the old victims of his rule were against one another. The General National Congress (GNC) formed the first parliament in July 2012 but did not last long and a fresh election was held two years later.
The parliament was named the House of Representatives. The GNC members refused to endorse it, forcing it to flee to Tobruk in the east. Consequently, Tripoli in the west fell to the GNC. Thus, Libya was split into two administrations: The Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based GNC.
What further changed the dynamic of Libyan politics was the arrival of a new domestic actor in July 2014: putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar.
Stability and peace never managed to prevail in Libya. Perhaps, toppling Gadhafi was easier than establishing political order in the postGadhafi era.
It was a period of militarization in which different tribal factions and radical forces mobilized – an era thought to have set in motion Libya’s political path over the last decade.
New demands for federalism emerged and the division between the east and west of the country further deepened.
Gradually, a military war developed between the Haftar forces and those loyal to Abdelhakim Belhaj, a veteran commander and known Libyan dissident, turning the country into a battleground.
Putschist Gen. Haftar and his forces took control of the capital Tripoli in April 2019 and soon the first major initiative was taken by the U.N. to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table. A political agreement, also known as the Skhirat declaration, was signed on Dec. 17, 2015.
The agreement called for the creation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Fayez Sarraj was named the prime minister.
The deal, however, collapsed as the National Salvation Government (NSG) in Tripoli blocked the process, stopping Sarraj from taking charge in the city.
At the beginning of January 2020, a fresh initiative was introduced by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. All leading world leaders gathered and a resolution was passed in which it was agreed no external forces would intervene in the country, calling for a cease-fire and arms embargo against Libya; however, nothing came into effect.
Similarly, the dialogue in the Moroccan city of Bouznika in September 2020 and cease-fire talks in Geneva in October 2020 both failed to alter the political trajectory on the ground.
WHAT IS THE CURRENT DEAL?
It all began in October 2020 when the U.N. Special Mission in Libya invited 74 members, including 17 women, representing different backgrounds to form the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF).
After a prolonged discussion over which
mechanism to use in electing a new executive authority, it was decided that there would be a three-member presidency council and one interim prime minister, who would govern the country until the next election, which is set to be held on Dec. 24, 2021.
A constitutional referendum would be held before the elections. This entire proposal was put to vote on Jan. 19, 2021, and of the LPDF members, 51 voted in favor while 19 voted against it and the rest abstained. Later, voting took place to select the executive council and Abdul-Hamid Mohammed Dbeibeh was elected as interim prime minister, while Mohammed Menfi was chosen to head the threemember
presidency council.
Dbeibeh promised that he would strengthen the principles of the constitution and work in consultation with other groups and the elected presidency council. Under the U.N.-led agreement, Dbeibeh’s interim government and the presidency council would work toward political reconciliation and bring different factions to the negotiation table.
However, one should not forget that a similar U.N.-led plan was approved in 2017 in which it was decided that an election would be held in 2018 to no avail.
As far as how successful the plan will be, it seems difficult because many fundamental questions were not raised at the U.N.-led renegotiations, including who will control the army and issuing responsibility for past crimes.
Many have already accused the LPDF of being a selective club given that it does not have a single member of the Amazigh or Tuareg minorities. Moreover, the new executive body does not represent the military or political spectrum of the country and their authority is likely to be challenged.
Dbeibeh is a controversial figure given his past association with the Gadhafi regime and has been accused of having illegally made huge profits as head of many corporate houses in the past. The success of the plan would also depend upon how much cooperation Haftar extends to the new initiative.
Similarly, the role of regional powers would be very significant in the success or failure of the plan. Although the U.S., Germany, the U.K., France and Italy have all welcomed the new move, it is worth reiterating that the same countries had also welcomed the Berlin resolution for a cease-fire but many of them continued to support opposing factions in Libya.
The new U.N. peace plan suffers from many deficits and perhaps it overlooks the fact that election or creation of any institution would not lead to any solution until the fundamental issues are resolved. It seems difficult to believe a country, which was unable to achieve peace and stability despite the series of agreements, will manage to conduct both legislative and presidential elections in less than one year from now.
It can be said that 2021 will be a challenging year for Libyans and, unfortunately, the country’s fate once again lies in the hands who have driven the nation to chaos and anarchy.
It would take a miracle for Libya to return to normal in a short period of time.
Turkey’s transformation into a liberal democracy has certainly accelerated following the conclusion of World War II as then Turkish leaders wanted to get Western support to bolster Turkey’s ability to hold off the Soviet challenge from the north.
Stated somewhat differently, the internal transformation of Turkey’s political regime, as well as the congruent revolutions in Turkey’s social and economic structure in line with liberal democratic norms and capitalism, owes a great part of its existence to the security needs and perceptions of the ruling elites.
When Turkey’s security needs are combined with the ideological aspirations of the winners of the great war to bring into existence a liberal international order, Turkey’s membership in NATO and efforts to become a part of the European integration process followed. A new world was to come into existence and Turkey threw in its lot with the West.
Are we now on the threshold of a similar moment in history as the recently elected Joe Biden administration seems determined to restore the liberal international order and to form a league of liberal democratic countries in such a way to contain China’s rise and help defeat the growing appeal of illiberal authoritarianism across the world in recent years?
BIDEN’S GLOBAL STANCE
On many occasions, the last of which being the Munich Security Conference, Biden underlined that America is now back and determined to take up the leadership mantle of the liberal international order and unite its allies and partners across the globe, in particular Europe and East Asia, around common values and security considerations.
The U.S. is by far the most powerful country in the world and it is quite normal for other countries to adjust their political positions and priorities to the emerging realities in Washington. This seems to partially account for Turkey’s recent efforts to improve its relations with the U.S. and the EU as well as revitalize the dormant liberal democratic reforms at home.
Disregarding the success of such efforts in yielding positive results, what matters is that Turkish rulers are now taking some initiatives to get along well with the West and ensure Turkey’s long-term interests. Such interests do not suggest, though, Turkey subscribes to the idea that we are now on the eve of a new Cold War fought on political, economic and ideological grounds, and Turkey would do well to fully align itself with the West against the so-called China-Russia axis.
SIX POINTS TO ANALYZE
First, Turkey does not feel threatened by Russia, China or any other illiberal authoritarian country in its neighborhood.
Relative to the depth and scope of its economic engagement with Western countries, the volume of Turkey’s trade with China and Russia is still quite limited.
Despite the fact that Turkey’s trade relations with China and Russia are quite skewed in favor of the latter, the prospects of China or Russia punishing Turkey through its internal and international orientation remain quite limited. Indeed, both of these countries, in particular China, offers Turkey immense opportunities to develop its economy.
Second, Turkish, Russian and Chinese leaders seem to have succeeded in establishing a working formula to conduct their relations with one another, in otherwords, compartmentalization.
Even though they are not on the same page concerning each and every issue relating to their national interests, they seem to have developed the habit of putting their clashing interests on the back burner if they sensed an opportunity to gain benefits from cooperation.
The recent history of Turkish-Russian relations is full of such instances.
Third, Turkey’s relations with China and Russia are not colored by any ideological flavor.
Even though they all share a strong state tradition, centralized administrative practices, patriarchal societal values, a penchant for a harmonious society built on common traditional values and neo-imperial dreams, they all take utmost care not to get involved in their internal affairs and play the game of regime change.
Devoid of ideological glances, they engage each other on pragmatic concerns and common interests. This does in no way, however, suggest that Turkey, Russia and China are all members of a club of authoritarian countries and view the world from a common ideological lens. Compared to Russia and China, the liberal democratic values are much more entrenched in Turkish society and a quite sizeable portion of Turkish people continue to see Turkey’s place within the West.
Turkey’s decades-old Westernization/Europeanization process at home and strong institutional links to the Western international community through NATO and the EU abroad set Turkey apart from China and Russia and provide Turkey with credible leverage in its relations with non-Western countries.
Fourth, recent years have demonstrated that the degree of skepticism against the West in general and the U.S., in particular, has notably increased across Turkish society.
Most Turkish people believe that the U.S. is behind the failed coup attempt by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) in the summer of 2016.
Besides, Western actors have not only harshly criticized Turkey for its policies in the Middle East, Caucasus, North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean, but also put Turkey’s territorial security in grave danger by supporting
PKK terrorist units in Syria and contributing to the erosion of territorial integrity of Turkey’s neighbors to the south.
Fifth, absent a strong U.S. commitment to Turkey’s territorial security through NATO and growing European criticisms of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies make it difficult for Turkish leaders to put their bet on the latest version of Biden’s liberal international project and side with the West in a new Cold War-like confrontation against China and Russia.
Sixth, as of today, there is not any waterproof Western community speaking with one voice on global challenges. Let alone internal differences within the EU, there exist important differences between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean as to how to deal with Russia and China.
Worse, not only a “Trumpian” president, if not Donald Trump himself, might come back to White House after four years, but it is also a gargantuan challenge for the Biden administration to help revive the credibility of U.S. commitment in the eyes of its traditional allies across the globe.
The key challenge facing America’s traditional allies is what if another president embarks on a new foreign policy vision four years later completely antithetical to Biden’s worldview today. Can they trust the U.S. that Washington will sure come to their aid in case of emergency? Why should not they adopt a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy orientation in today’s multipolar order and benefit from closer economic engagement with China? Why should they choose one side against the other in today’s highly integrated and networkedbased international environment?
While the U.S. economic recovery on the one hand and the growing imperative of defeating global challenges such as the pandemic, climate change, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational terrorism require a strong degree of cooperation among key global actors in a multilateral fashion, would it be legitimate for the U.S. to force countries across the globe to choose its side and view the world from an ideological perspective?
Like many middle powers, Turkey does not want to find itself in the middle of a new Cold War between the U.S. and China.
Indeed, Turkey’s economic and security interests cannot be satisfactorily achieved should Turkey and its traditional Western allies remain on a collision course.
The need to improve relations cannot be higher and more palpable than today. Yet, doing so in the context of a new Cold War fought at many fronts and on many grounds between the West and the East would serve no one.