Election that broke the spell of Chavez

By voting so overwhelmingly for the opposition, Venezuelans have started a process of rebalancing the country’s asymmetrical system of audits

Last Sunday, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect their new national parliament, and the results were devastating for President Nicolas Maduro. The opposition has claimed to have won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly; though results are still coming in. What’s clear enough, however, is that the opposition has managed to take control of an important political institution for the first time in 16 years.

This marks a major shift. Since 1998, when the then-newcomer Hugo Chavez swept to victory, the trend has run strongly in favour of his United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Under different names, the party has continuously expanded its control over political institutions, gradually transforming Venezuela into a semi-autocratic state. First it changed the Venezuelan Constitution to former president Chavez’s liking. Then it took control of all branches of government, including Congress, the Supreme Court, the colossal state-owned oil company, the entire military, and the election regulation body. By 2004, chavismo started to take control of non-governmental organisations and private lands and began to eye public universities.

Until Chavez died in 2013, most Venezuelans didn’t seem to care that they were sacrificing liberal democracy. Chavez managed to conquer their hearts with his belligerent rhetoric and lavish social spending. So what if chavismo was taking control of all institutions, Chavez’s supporters argued. At least, they said, he was reversing two decades of economic contraction by using oil rents to generate the most impressive consumption boom in the history of Latin America. As a result, Chavez won almost every election he organised. His successor, Maduro, won as well (albeit by smaller margins). Both expanded the powers of the state to new levels.

Chavez’s opponents have not had it easy. One might expect them to have been helped by the country’s worsening economic collapse, but instead they have faced extraordinary obstacles. To understand why it has been so difficult for them to win, one must understand the nature of the beast they’ve been up against. In his brilliant new book, The Politics of Uncertainty, Andreas Schedler explains that electoral autocracies — countries where the government allows elections but uses its dominance of key institutions to tilt the balance heavily in its favour — face permanent uncertainty. Because these elections are not accurate gauges of public opinion, and because dissent is discouraged through various legal and illegal methods, such regimes can never be sure about their true levels of public support.

The chavista regime followed this formula to the letter. Under Chavez, institutional manipulation took the form of what one might call “asymmetrical auditing”. The authorities ensured that state institutions would be exempt from any kind of audit, scrutiny, or limit, while subjecting non-state institutions to an inordinate amount of audits and controls.

Widespread shock

Maduro brought the asymmetrical institutional framework to a new extreme. The impunity of state officials grew. One of the biggest corruption scandals revealed that close relatives of the president and his wife received not only important government posts, but also diplomatic passports, which they then used to traffic drugs. This produced widespread shock — but no investigations followed.

Meanwhile, Maduro expanded government auditing into new spheres of civic life. Not just business leaders, but also prominent oppositionists and media companies were placed under investigation, brought to trial on false charges and stripped of their property. Under Maduro, more than 70 political prisoners have been sent to jail, including a former presidential candidate (Manuel Rosales), the leader of the largest opposition party (Leopoldo Lopez), and the elected mayor of Caracas (Antonio Ledezma). Tax audits on all opposition candidates were increased. Sometimes on very little evidence, these audits were used to justify stiff penalties, such as fines on firms and outright bans on politicians from running for office (Maria Corina Machado). By voting so overwhelmingly for the opposition, Venezuelans have started a process of rebalancing the country’s asymmetrical system of audits. For the first time since chavismo came to power, they are demanding that the powers-to-be verify that ministers do their jobs fairly, that the budget is spent according to established rules, that the president follow the law, and that the law reflect the wishes of more than just one man and his cronies.

What we are witnessing is an uprising against asymmetrical information. Venezuelans have taken to heart Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen’s dictum that the beauty of democracy is its ability to “generate information”, not just about what voters want, but also about what states do. The fact that the opposition won in even traditional bastions of chavismo hows how widespread this movement has become.

Despite this achievement, it’s important to note that the December 6 election also showed that millions of Venezuelans still like chavismo. Many chavistas still miss their deceased leader and others are afraid of what the opposition could do to them. But there is another powerful reason: In the Venezuelan welfare state, you receive state benefits based on the degree of your loyalty to the state.

In short, Maduro has become the leader of a state that faces zero checks on its own power even as it relentlessly audits non-state actors. This state responds to increasing uncertainty about its political power by closing off more and more of its activities to public scrutiny. It creates (and tolerates) economic ruin by misguided policies, such as price controls, while offering privatised consumption goods and subsidies in return for political loyalties.

In the end, however, as we have seen, the desire for information and democracy has trumped the regime’s ability to purchase votes. And remarkably, this revolution for information has been quite peaceful.

Maduro has become the leader of a state that faces zero checks on its own power even as it relentlessly audits non-state actors. This state responds to increasing uncertainty about its political power by closing off more and more of its activities to public scrutiny.

Javier Corrales is a professor of political science at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts.

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