Pakistan is winning its war against terror, actually
Though worrisome patterns of extremism still remain in the country, security forces have expanded their counter-militancy operations against a wider range of sectarian militant groups and the results are showing
The feeders for many militant organisations are sectarian groups posing as legitimate political parties and they cannot be wiped out kinetically. This challenge will require counter narratives, counter radical is at ion and a range of social, political and economic reforms.
During the separate visits of the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif to Washington in recent months, observers dismissed the prospect of meaningful changes in Pakistan’s security policies or in the United States-Pakistan relationship. On the surface, they may not be wrong, but in seeking major breakthroughs or transformations, incremental yet consequential choices are often overlooked.
The recent revelations that the San Bernardino shooters had extremist ties to Pakistan might appear to confirm the narrative that Pakistan is consumed by a downward spiral of extremist violence. But over the past year, Pakistan has quietly made some important, costly, and under-appreciated strides in its countermilitancy efforts. Individually, none is groundbreaking, but together they point in a more promising direction for Pakistani society, regional stability and the US-Pakistan relationship.
Even independent assessments identify progress, albeit slow, on the government’s National Action Plan, which was formulated in January to crack down on terrorism. Thousands of incendiary clerics have been arrested for preaching sectarian hatred and distributing banned literature ...
Military targeting in tribal regions:
First, the Pakistani army has pursued more comprehensive military operations in the tribal areas than initially expected. Though it has not directly targeted the Haqqani Network as the US hoped, Pakistan has actively targeted a wide array of militant groups, not just the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the leader of the TTP based in North Waziristan and a long-time tactical ally of the government, may have only been displaced to Afghanistan during the early phases of the military’s operation, but the Pakistani Army has made his life difficult. It reportedly targeted him, sidelined him operationally from his organisation and then eliminated some of his remaining commanders in air strikes last autumn. Once a potential prospect for reconciliation, Khan Syed Sajna, a former leader of the TTP in South Waziristan, was targeted by a Pakistan Army intent on accepting only unconditional surrenders. Sajna was consequently killed in a US drone strike late last month.
The state has also cracked down on potential TTP splinter groups like Jamat-ul Ahrar and the Sheheryar Mehsud, both of which have recently carried out attacks against a provincial government official and a Christian church.
Quietly expanded target sets may have resulted from lessons learned, deliberate strategy, mission creep or failed efforts to flip breakaway factions. But the result is that Pakistan is more directly targeting the Taliban.
Kinetic operations against former assets:
Pakistani security forces have expanded their counter-militancy operations against a wider range of sectarian militant groups. Pakistan adopted a strategy of leadership-targeting or “decapitation” against the once formidable Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a sectarian militant group with strong links to the Sunni political group, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat. Over the past year, the LeJ leadership — once described as “untouchable” and “invincible” — has been systematically wiped out in a series of extra-judicial killings, possibly because it was drifting towards Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).
In February, the death of Usman Saifullah Kurd — the mastermind behind attacks on hundreds of Hazaras and Shiites over the past decade — “[broke] the back” of LeJ in Balochistan. Several months later, a major police raid killed its leader, Malek Ishaq, his two sons and 11 other militants. Other LeJ militants were captured during targeted raids based on specific intelligence in October. And a third leader, Haroon Bhatti, was arrested in late October and then killed in an encounter with Lahore Police, two weeks ago. As a retaliatory response to Ishaq’s killing, Punjab home minister Shuja Khanzada, a retired army colonel, was assassinated in a suicide bombing along with 16 others.
Despite this, the state proved willing to stomach the consequences of the fight and showed that it was willing to take on powerful and influential groups like the LeJ.
A substantial amount of recent research suggests that leadership-targeting can be effective and yield security improvements under certain conditions. Security officials anticipate substantial fragmentation of the targeted group “after elimination of first, second, third and fourth line [of] leadership”.
This decapitation campaign already seems to be correlating with a significant drop in sectarian violence. Since 2012, annual sectarian incidents and casualties are down by about 50 per cent or more nationwide, and by approximately 75 per cent in Balochistan, where LeJ’s violence has wreaked considerable havoc.
The counter-sectarian campaign could expand beyond LeJ. The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) estimates that the state has conducted 20 major search operations that have netted nearly 100 key leaders from the militant-linked Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat party. Chipping away at sectarian groups is important, because they feed other militant organisations like Al Qaida, TTP, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Denial of social space:
Islamabad has augmented the military’s kinetic actions by denying extremist and militant groups the social space they have utilised and operated in for decades. It has begun to seriously enforce regulations on hate speech, on the misuse of mosque loudspeakers or amplifiers to prevent public incitement and on weapons sales. Tempering sectarian mobilisation with these tools was not new, but its enforcement is.
Even independent assessments identify progress, albeit slow, on the government’s National Action Plan, which was formulated in January to crack down on terrorism. Thousands of incendiary clerics have been arrested for preaching sectarian hatred and distributing banned literature; some have even been successfully prosecuted. Shops have been closed and materials confiscated for hate speech inciting violence. The glorification of terrorism has been banned.
This may be producing a deterrent effect. Some observers point out that Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat has not been able to hold a conference in an urban area for the past eight months. Religious seminaries, their curriculum and ties to foreign organisations and funders are increasingly scrutinised.
Dozens of unregistered or suspect seminaries have been raided or forced to close. Meetings of civilian, military and madrassa educational board leaders also offer a path for structural reform. The Federal Investigation Agency has exposed millions of dollars in domestic financing of terrorism, interdicted some foreign financing and enlisted help from international partners to choke the flow of funds to extremist organisations. The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the conviction of Mumtaz Qadri for the January assassination of former Punjab governor Salman Taseer sent an important signal and affirmed the right to criticise misuses of the blasphemy law (though not the law itself).
Finally, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority prohibited media coverage of banned organisations, specifically LeT and Jamaat-ud-Dawa, though there appears to be confusion and bureaucratic infighting over this judgement. Even critics of government shortcomings acknowledge “the space for pro-extremist mindset has gradually shrunk”.
Shortcomings and the future:
Pakistan’s decision to tackle militant and extremist organisations once considered too valuable or too dangerous is encouraging, but those expecting the resolve against groups like LeJ to snowball into actions against groups like the Haqqani Network and LeT should not hold their breath. State counter-militancy efforts are still constrained by fears of loss of control, violent retribution since LeT’s military strength is, in terms of magnitude, greater than LeJ’s, potential electoral costs in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s electoral heartland in central Punjab and loss of these groups’ utility in achieving foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Even if Pakistan narrowly focuses on its problem of sectarian militancy, it has a long way to go. Worrisome patterns of extremism still remain — most recently evinced by reports that Tashfeen Malek, one of the shooters in the San Bernardino terrorist massacre, may have had links to radical groups in Pakistan. Sectarian mob violence still continues, Daesh is feared to be making inroads and many of the thousands of unregistered madrassas retain nontransparent financing and regressive curricula.
Additionally, the limits of the state’s capabilities — or willpower — may be exposed in an emerging showdown at Islamabad’s Lal Masjid. Maulana Abdul Aziz Gazi — a known security threat who retains links to the Taliban and expresses support for Daesh — resumed delivering Friday sermons and appears poised to resurrect a movement for Sharia.
The feeders for many militant organisations are sectarian groups posing as legitimate political parties and they cannot be wiped out kinetically. This challenge will require counter-narratives, counter radical is at ion and a range of social, political and economic reforms. As noted analyst Hum aYousuf argues: “Pakistan’s war against violent extremism will not be won in the battlefields, but in classrooms, madrassas, mosques, the offices of bureaucrats and at police stations.”