More American malls could slip up on their debt exposures
With online vendors pulling in more business, many malls are woefully short of cash
The dramatic shift to online shopping that has crushed US department stores in recent years now threatens the investors who a decade ago funded the vast expanse of brick-andmortar emporiums that many Americans no longer visit.
Weak September core retail sales, which strip out auto and gasoline sales, provide a window into the pain the holders of mall debt face in coming months as retailers with a physical presence keep discounting to stave off lagging sales. Some $128 billion (Dh470 billion) of commercial real estate loans — more than one-quarter of which went to finance malls a decade ago — are due to refinance between now and the end of 2017, according to Morningstar Credit Ratings.
Wells Fargo estimates that about $38 billion of these loans were taken out by retailers, bundled into commercial mortgagebacked securities (CMBS) and sold to institutional investors. Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and other underwriters now reckon about half of all CMBS maturing in 2017 could struggle to get financing on current terms. Commercial mortgage debt often only pays off the interest and the principal must be refinanced.
Online shopping
The blame lies with online shopping and widespread discounting, which have shrunk profit margins and increased store closures, such as Aeropostale’s bankruptcy filing in May, making it harder for mall operators to meet their debt obligations.
Between the end of 2009 and this July, e-commerce doubled its share of the retail pie and while overall sales have risen a cumulative 31 per cent, department store sales have plunged 17 per cent, according to Commerce Department data.
According to Howard Davidowitz, chairman of Davidowitz & Associates Inc, which has provided consulting and investment banking services for the retail industry since 1981, half the 1,100 US regional malls will close over the next decade. A surplus of stores are fighting for survival as the ubiquitous discount signs attest, he said. “When there is too much, and we have too much, then the only differentiator is price. That’s why they’re all going into bankruptcy and closing these stores,” Davidowitz said.
The crunch in the CMBS market means holders of non-performing debt, such as pensions or hedge funds, stand to lose money.
The mall owners, mostly real estate investment trusts (REITs), have avoided major losses because they can often shed their debt through an easy foreclosure process. “You have a lot of volume that won’t be able to refi,” said Ann Hambly, chief executive of 1st Service Solutions, which works with borrowers when CMBS loans need to be restructured.
Cumulative losses from mostly 10-year CMBS loans issued in 2005 through 2007 already reach $32.6 billion, a big jump from the average $1.23 billion incurred annually in the prior decade, according to Wells Fargo.
The CMBS industry is bracing for losses to spike as loan servicers struggle to extract any value from problematic malls, particularly those based in less affluent areas. In January, for example, investors recouped just 4 per cent of a $136 million CMBS loan from 2006 on the Citadel Mall in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Investor worries about exposure to struggling malls and retailers intensified in August when Macy’s said it would close 100 stores, prompting increased hedging and widening spreads on the junk-rated bonds made up of riskier commercial mortgages. Adding to the stress, new rules, set to be introduced on December 24, will make it costlier for banks to sell CMBS debt. The rules require banks to hold at least 5 per cent of each new deal they create, or find a qualified investor to assume the risk.
This has already roughly halved new CMBS issuance in 2016.