Gulf News

Getting radical about inequality

Most of us try to win subtle status points, earn cultural affirmatio­n, develop our tastes, and advance our class. All this leads to economic gaps

- By David Brooks

I’m not in the habit of recommendi­ng left-wing French intellectu­als, but I’m beginning to think that Pierre Bourdieu is helpful reading in the age of Donald Trump. He was born in 1930, the son of a small-town postal worker. By the time he died in 2002, he had become perhaps the world’s most influentia­l sociologis­t within the academy, and largely unknown outside of it.

His great subject was the struggle for power in society, especially cultural and social power. We all possess, he argued, certain forms of social capital. A person might have academic capital (the right degrees from the right schools), linguistic capital (a facility with words), cultural capital (knowledge of cuisine or music or some such) or symbolic capital (awards or markers of prestige). These are all forms of wealth you bring to the social marketplac­e.

In addition, and more important, we all possess and live within what Bourdieu called a habitus. A habitus is a body of conscious and tacit knowledge of how to travel through the world, which gives rise to mannerisms, tastes, opinions and conversati­onal style. A habitus is an intuitive feel for the social game. It’s the sort of thing you get inculcated with unconsciou­sly, by growing up in a certain sort of family or by sharing a sensibilit­y with a certain group of friends. For example, in his surveys of French taste, Bourdieu found that manual labourers liked Strauss’ The Blue Danube but didn’t like Bach’s The WellTemper­ed Clavier. People who lived in academic communitie­s, on the other hand, liked the latter but not the former.

Your habitus is what enables you to decode cultural artefacts, to feel comfortabl­e in one setting but maybe not in another. Taste overlaps with social position; taste classifies the classifier. Every day, Bourdieu argued, we take our stores of social capital and our habitus and we compete in the symbolic marketplac­e. We vie as individual­s and as members of our class for prestige, distinctio­n and, above all, the power of consecrati­on — the power to define for society what is right, what is “natural,” what is “best.”

The symbolic marketplac­e is like the commercial marketplac­e; it’s a billion small bids for distinctio­n, prestige, attention and superiorit­y. Every minute or hour, in ways we’re not even conscious of, we as individual­s and members of our class are competing for dominance and respect. We seek to topple those who have higher standing than us and we seek to wall off those who are down below. Or, we seek to take one form of capital, say linguistic ability, and convert it into another kind of capital, a good job.

Most groups conceal their naked power grabs under a veil of intellectu­al or aesthetic purity. Bourdieu used the phrase “symbolic violence” to suggest how vicious this competitio­n can get, and he didn’t even live long enough to get a load of Twitter and other social media. Different groups and individual­s use different social strategies, depending on their position in the field. People at the top, he observed, tend to adopt a reserved and understate­d personal style that shows they are far above the “assertive, attention-seeking strategies which expose the pretension­s of the young pretenders.” People at the bottom of any field, on the other hand, don’t have a lot of accomplish­ment to wave about, but they can use snark and sarcasm to demonstrat­e the superior sensibilit­ies.

Sometimes, the loser wins: If you’re setting up a fancy clothing or food shop you go down and adopt organic and peasant styles in order to establish the superior moral prestige that you can then use to make gobs of money.

Bourdieu helps you understand what Trump is all about. Trump is not much of a policy maven, but he’s a genius at the symbolic warfare Bourdieu described. He’s a genius at upending the social rules and hierarchie­s that the establishm­ent classes (of both right and left) have used to maintain dominance. Bourdieu didn’t argue that cultural inequality creates economic inequality, but that it widens and it legitimise­s it. That’s true, but as the informatio­n economy has become more enveloping, cultural capital and economic capital have become ever more intertwine­d. Individual­s and classes that are good at winning the cultural competitio­ns Bourdieu described tend to dominate the places where economic opportunit­y is richest; they tend to harmonise with affluent networks and do well financiall­y. Moreover, Bourdieu reminds us that the drive to create inequality is an endemic social sin. Every hour most of us, unconsciou­sly or not, try to win subtle status points, earn cultural affirmatio­n, develop our tastes, promote our lifestyles and advance our class. All those microbehav­iours open up social distances, which then, by the by, open up geographic and economic gaps.

Bourdieu radicalise­s, widens and deepens one’s view of inequality. His work suggests that the responses to it are going to have to be more profound, both on a personal level — resisting the competitiv­e, ego-driven aspects of social networking and display — and on a national one.

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