Lessons from Iraq War, after 15 years
For the US in particular, one of the most important truths to realise is that military interventions aimed at regime change will almost always lead to disaster
It has been exactly 15 years since the start of one of the most fateful episodes of the early 21st century: The Iraq War. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the French newspaper Le Monde had famously declared, “Nous sommes tous Américains” (“We are all Americans”), and even predicted that Russia would become America’s main ally. But the then United States president George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 blew that prospect to smithereens.
We now know that the war, in addition to causing many of the Middle East’s current troubles, marked the beginning of the end of America’s post-Cold War hegemony. We also know that, though it was sold as part of the “war on terror” rhetoric, the groundwork for the invasion had been laid well before 9/11. As early as January 1998, the neoconservative Project for a New American Century had sent a letter to the then US president Bill Clinton, urging him to topple Iraqi president Saddam Hussain. And, after winning the presidency in 2000, Bush declared Iraq one of his top two security priorities.
In all likelihood, the Middle East would have been spared a great deal of suffering had the US acted with more caution and rigour, as Hans Blix — the head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission — had advised. In May 2003, while aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, Bush delivered a speech in front of a banner declaring “Mission Accomplished”. But if the mission was to free Iraq from terror, reconstruct the country, and enhance security at all levels, then it was an absolute failure.
It is generally agreed that the war in Iraq caused many more problems than it resolved. Prominent US politicians who supported the 2003 invasion — including many Republicans — now admit that it was a mistake, as do a majority of Americans. But, while the 2003 invasion was a profoundly misguided policy, both in form and in substance, the chaos that consumed Iraq and the rest of the region stem from additional mistakes made by US policymakers after Saddam had been removed from power.
Above all, there was the Bush administration’s “de-Baathification” policy, which sought to eliminate every vestige of Saddam’s neo-Baathist regime. After being excluded from the reconstruction process, many Sunnis turned to militant sectarianism. De-Baathification also led to the dismantling of the Iraqi army. Thousands of military personnel, suddenly deprived of income and status, found new hope in the incipient Salafist insurgency, led by Al Qaida in Iraq, the precursor to Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).
Some ex-Baathists ended up in US detention centres, where abusive practises were widespread. While interned in centers like Camp Bucca in Southeastern Iraq, ex-Baathists and Salafists commingled, and the military experience of the former fused with the ideological extremism of the latter. By the time Daesh proclaimed its “caliphate” in 2014, an estimated 17 of its 25 principal commanders — including the group’s leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi — had spent time in US detention centres between 2004 and 2011.
Remaining on the sidelines
Meanwhile, sectarianism was creating havoc in Iraq’s Shiite-led government. In 2010, the incumbent prime minister, Nouri Al Maliki, was re-elected, though his State of Law Coalition had won fewer seats than the more moderate Iraqi National Movement, led by Ayad Allawi. The administration of former US president Barack Obama could have weighed in to help Allawi form a government, but chose to remain on the sidelines, allowing Al Maliki — Iran’s preferred choice — to hold onto power. Al Maliki’s policies became increasingly personalistic, clientelistic, and polarising, fuelling Salafist terrorism, which had sustained several blows prior to the 2010 election.
Looking ahead, the hope is that Iraq’s general election in May will deliver a government that is committed to ruling through consensus, maintaining stability, and defending the country’s institutions. Moreover, the next government will have to reach out to Iraq’s independenceminded Kurds and find a satisfactory way to integrate them into the
For the US, in particular, one of the most important lessons of the past 15 years is that military interventions aimed at regime change will almost always lead to disaster, especially in the absence of a sensible plan for what comes next. The Iraq War showed that the cost of unilaterally forsaking diplomatic channels can be enormous.
One hopes that the Trump administration — particularly the incoming Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo — will heed these lessons as tensions with Iran heat up. Iran’s growing regional influence owes much to America’s mistakes in Iraq, starting with the abandonment of diplomacy. A similar US approach to Iran would lead to another generation — or more — of turmoil in the Middle East. political process.
Javier Solana was EU high representative for Foreign and Security Policy, secretarygeneral of Nato and foreign minister of Spain. He is currently president of the ESADE Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and distinguished fellow at the Brookings Institution.