World needs a Franco-German alliance
At a time of rising despotism and populism around the globe, Europe must stand alongside its two main powers
On paper, the ritual was faithfully respected. The German chancellor’s fourth term begins as it should, with a mandatory first foreign visit to Paris. And this time, the conditions for a relaunch of the Franco-German alliance do indeed seem auspicious. A semblance of balance has been restored between Berlin and Paris: Germany still reigning economically, while France returns to the world stage, driven by the energy and charisma of its new young president. To put it in sports terms, Germany and France are back on the same playing field.
Our cautious optimism for the state of the alliance also rests on the worsening condition of the international and regional situation. In the time of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping, and the rise of European populism — from Hungary to Poland, to Italy — there appears to be no other choice than to turn to Germany and France. “Europe is no longer a choice, as it might have been two years ago. It is a historical necessity,” to quote one of the last living witnesses and great actors in the European project, former French diplomat Georges Berthoin. He had the privilege of working alongside Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman on the founding of the continental union. Europe as a united continent is able to set limits for President Putin’s Russia, to propose and defend an alternative project from that of President Xi of China, and to represent a liberal democracy, respectful of both humanity and the planet.
Paradoxically, today, non-Europeans are without a doubt more open to hearing this message than many Europeans themselves. Because the misunderstanding may begin in the very heart of the European duo itself: The Franco-German couple. Emmanuel Macron’s France has an ambitious and legitimate European recovery project, from the strengthening of the single-currency Eurozone. Is Merkel’s Germany ready to join this French project?
I was in Frankfurt last week, where my German interlocutors were far from convinced. I put forward a classic argument: At the beginning of her fourth term, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has nothing to lose. What counts for her now is her legacy. Will she be perceived as the chancellor who held her own, and who then showed vision and courage in rallying behind the French project? Another scenario was opposed by many of my German counterparts, including some close to Merkel. “The chancellor is Lutheran, daughter of a pastor, she has promised before God to defend her office and the responsibilities that come with it. She is not ready to cede an ounce of her powers in favour of an integration process that she does not wholly believe.”
Populists at the doorstep of power
What is certain, in such a context of uncertainty, is that Europe cannot resolve and strengthen the Eurozone powered solely by the Franco-German tandem. As legitimate and central as this priority is, it cannot let us forget an essential principle: The growing separation between the citizens, and the European dream. For the first time in one of the great founding countries of the European project, populists are at the doorstep of power in Italy. And they are particularly hard populists, in the case of the Matteo Salvini’s League party.
One of the major reasons for the collapse of classical parties was, of course, the mass influx of refugees along the country’s coastline. If Europe really wants to revive itself, it can only do so through these conditions of solidarity and rigidity. These principles are perfectly applicable today in the crisis shaking relations between Britain and Russia, regardless of the fact that the United Kingdom has chosen to leave the European Union by way of the Brexit referendum. If London can prove that Moscow was behind the chemical attack that took place a few weeks ago in the town of Salisbury, the only dignified and responsible response is to support it in full. Putin’s Russia is testing all of Europe.
A firm stance must also apply to all those in the European Union who are deliberately violating the values that structure the “club of liberal democracies”. They cannot at the same time benefit from the economic assistance of the richest, while operating outside its system of values. Neither passivity nor indifference are options. All of this must happen without the United States. At a time of rising despotism and populism, Europe must stand alongside Germany and France.
As many as 17 European Union member-states — joined by Norway, Ukraine, Macedonia and Albania — announced they would expel a total of 50 alleged Russian spies in a coordinated response to the chemical weapon poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia.
European reactions are what matters the most. The EU has become anathema to Russia for many reasons, not least because it embodies a set of norms that run counter to the very nature of his regime, and because as an economic bloc it can in theory exert leverage on Russia, as none of its other international interlocutors can.
Unsurprisingly, the spate of expulsions did not involve all EU states; Greece and Austria were conspicuously absent. But the nature of the support — which encompasses countries that are either candidates for membership or strategically interested in rapprochement with the EU (Ukraine) — arguably said more about European convergence that it did about divergence. Interestingly, Hungary, a country whose leader Viktor Orban has a notorious track record of pandering to Putin, immediately joined the fray. Nor are these announcements the end of the story: European officials say more measures are yet to come.
The key point is that no European government has expressed any doubt about Britain’s assessment that Russia was responsible. As such, this was nothing like the 2003 debate over the presence, or not, of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. That involved significant dissent: France and Germany never took the bait.
Though British intelligence briefings made available to European partners had an undeniable impact, diplomats were struck that Britain initially refrained from reaching out to the EU as a whole — and attributed this to the awkwardness created precisely by Brexit. Instead, British diplomacy worked at a bilateral level, engaging in particular with eastern European and Baltic states whose hostility towards Russia is well-known.
In the end, three factors leading to a strong common EU statement and the withdrawal of the bloc’s ambassador in Moscow were crucial. First, British weakness came to be seen as a vulnerability that was shared, not something anyone could possibly gain from in dealing with Russia. Moscow had targeted Britain because it was Europe’s frailest part, the country whose isolation could most conveniently be exposed. Anyone doubting this ought to pay attention to the way Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman reacted to the recent expulsions: This was, said Maria Zakharova, “a conspiracy of anti-Russian solidarity imposed by the British” on EU countries.
Secondly, Franco-German resolve was decisive, according to European sources. French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Theresa May met ahead of last week’s EU summit, to parade their unity. Later, when all 28 member states’ leaders gathered, Macron pushed vehemently for the strongest possible collective response. France had long seen itself as playing a leading role in denouncing chemical weapons use in Syria by the Bashar Al Assad regime, Russia’s ally.
Risk of exposure
But the third and perhaps the principal explanation for Europe’s decisiveness was that EU member-states saw a clear new threshold had been crossed. Unlike the 2006 killing of Alexander Litvinenko in London by Russian agents (who’d dropped polonium in his tea), the use of Novichok was seen as an indiscriminate attack on innocent civilians — not just a targeted assassination. May highlighted this fact, when she confirmed that 130 people were at risk of exposure. Novichok is reportedly the most deadly nerve agent ever produced, five to eight times more lethal than VX. Entire buildings and squares in Salisbury have to be decontaminated.
This put Salisbury into an entirely different category from previous Russia-connected eliminations of dissidents: In a category closer to terrorism. Novichok, to that extent, was a unifier for Europe — a matter of all for one, one for all. And yet the comfort to be drawn from this is limited. After Crimea, war in Ukraine, nuclear sabre-rattling and cyber-attacks, Russia’s behaviour has taken on an entirely new and baffling degree of recklessness — one that can put anyone in danger. And while they pulled together, European officials noted again the absurdity of Brexit, with Britain’s self-inflicted loss of influence and ensuing vulnerability plain for all to see.
Putin is set to enter the Arab world from its widest doors. His latest presidential win, making it his fourth, and another six-yearterm in office, will surely capitalise on the policies he built in the region since Russia decided to intervene in Syria to tip the balance of power in favour of the Bashar Al Assad regime in 2015. Now he will build further on these policies and seek to place Russia at the centre of Middle East politics.
Irrespective of when the war ends, Moscow is almost set to stay in Syria due to various factors including economic ones (entry of Russian oil companies etc). Besides, the “geo-political strategic” prize, gateway to the Middle East”, is far too high and with no one to challenge it, Russia will not be prepared to leave Syria anytime soon.
Let us bear in mind that Putin has been propping up his country to be the next great-power player in the region. He is likely to make this long-term commitment in the light of the perceived American and European weakness, making Putin not one for U-turns. Crimea proved that, and his eye is on Syria and Middle East.
The master KGB-officer-turned-President, in power for 18 years, wants to make Russia great again by rolling the dice. In the first 14 years of his reign, he stayed put, then in 2014 he laid his hand on Crimea, snatching it from Ukraine and regardless of international sanctions, he kept it. A year later, he intervened in Syria despite a global uproar.
Penchant for risk-taking
Clearly, Putin played his cards right, taking advantage of the “American fatigue” in post-war Iraq that cost it much material and human losses that subsequently led to former United States president Barack Obama’s handsoff approach in the region. With a penchant for risk-taking, Putin decided to take a full-throttle approach and jumped into the Syrian quagmire, seeing it as Russia’s best card to gain long-lost influence in the Middle East. Through Putin’s military alliances and spending, nodand-wink tactics, political manoeuvring, and of course, brinkmanship, the situation changed in Syria.
He also read the global political situation astutely and took advantage of what was at play, daintily helped by the changing international scenario. It is noteworthy that local, regional and international players are no longer dancing to the tunes of superpowers; they are making their own decisions.
After the Syrian intervention, Putin became more perceptive. With the “security card” in the bag, and through his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, he sought to pursue a more pliable strategy of extending the Russian hand to different players in the Middle East (not through the “carrot-and-stick” approach since Moscow has few financial carrots to dangle), but what can only be called political opportunism. Because of the political quicksands in Syria, Putin got virtually everyone on board including his erstwhile opponent, Turkey, Iran which is practically embedded there, and a triggerhappy Israel.
Plus he tried to “woo” the rest of the Arab world. He is reaching out to Russia’s traditional ally, Egypt, where there is now talk about nuclear cooperation, showing just how far the situation has changed between the two states despite Egypt’s proWest alignment. Also, Putin extended his friendship to Saudi Arabia in spite of the latest war in Yemen as Russia tried to play a hand in healing the latest rift between Qatar and the Gulf countries.
Irrespective of when the war ends, Moscow is almost set to stay in Syria due to various factors including economic ones ... Besides, the ‘geopolitical strategic’ prize, gateway to the Middle East, is far too high.
Putin’s final term in office, which has now been extended till 2024, is set to see a series of hectic political manoeuvres in the Arab world that aim to build on the ‘foreign policy achievements’ made in his last term.
Shifting sands
All this suggests that Putin has never had it so good with regard to Russia’s policy in the Arab world. But the Russian president is a shrewd man, he knows how to make his moves. Right now, the Arab world — with its strategic location, its energy resources and political allies — is very important for Moscow. Putin wants to make gains in the shifting sands; an example of which is Libya, where the situation is still very fluid. Moscow is nonetheless attempting to gain a toehold there.
His final term in office, which has now been extended till 2024, is set to see a series of hectic political manoeuvres in the Arab world that aim to build on the “foreign policy achievements” made in his last term by gaining greater “regional grounds”. His first trip abroad after the election win is surely going to be Sudan, where President Omar Al Bashir has extended an invitation to Putin to visit the country. Russia is a major supplier of arms to Sudan, coupled with growing bilateral and economic cooperation particularly in gold mining. That should point to the direction where Russia wants to go. Surely, Sudan will set the ball rolling to other political adventures in the region while snapping the bud out of the continuing Syria flare-up.
Marwan Asmar is a commentator based in Amman. He has long worked in journalism and has a PhD in Political Science from Leeds University in the UK.