What the UK should really do with Russia
There needs to be a clear and firm commitment to a strategic goal on the part of London rather than cobbling together a knee-jerk reaction
London’s initial, tepid response to the attempted assassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter has been overtaken by the unprecedented international round of expulsions of Russian spy-diplomats. Overall, however, the debate — which has continued with calls for Britain to bring more pressure to bear on Moscow — has been dominated by tactical questions of political feasibility. This is understandable but means that Britain has leapfrogged the most fundamental one: Precisely, what is it that it wants? Objectives must determine tactics, not the other way around.
As things stand, discussions about sanctioning Russia confuse three broad goals.
Is the main goal deterrence? To punish Russia with a display of retaliatory resolution intended to demonstrate to Russian President Vladimir Putin that the costs of further adventurism outweigh any possible advantages?
In that case, the aim ought to be a broad barrage of measures, some of which have serious implications and others of which may be essentially symbolic. Actions including further diplomatic expulsions, pushing for a boycott of the World Cup, and designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism are unlikely to have a substantive practical impact on Russia, but they demonstrate a will to resist. That is crucial, as, until now, Putin’s calculation appears to have been that the West’s objective strengths — military, economic, political, soft power — were rendered largely irrelevant by the absence of the will to use them. Demonstrably closing that “will gap” is a powerful element in deterrence.
Of course, in the short term the Russians will respond in kind. Indeed, based on their usual track record, they will escalate. Ultimately, though, this must simply be weathered as the price of defiance.
Britain actually already has a solid array of legal instruments at the authorities’ disposal. What it needs is greater political will to apply them. These kinds of cases are notoriously complex and lengthy, consuming the time of specialists without offering any guarantees of success.
Half the job done
Chasing Russian money and the influence it buys out of London but seeing it find comfortable new homes in Paris, Frankfurt, and New York is only half the job done and will do little to chasten Moscow. Although it will be difficult to persuade others to turn away tempting business, the unexpected support Britain is receiving from European Union partners in particular suggests this may be an opportune moment to convince them that in its experience this money is too toxic to be safe and that this is a Western, not just a British, problem.
The thought that Britain would actually be returning capital into Putin’s grasp may be an uncomfortable one. After all, a third possible policy goal would be actively to seek to undermine the regime in Moscow. Overt efforts at regime change would be dangerous and likely counterproductive, but London may feel that it should not pass up opportunities to weaken the Kremlin, in the hope that this may tame its appetite for playing confrontational geopolitics.
While exerting pressure on the Russian elite, London can also hit Moscow in the wallet where it truly hurts: The state’s capacity to continue to raise money and service existing obligations by issuing sovereign debt that is then bought in the West.
There are advantages and dangers in all three approaches. Giving dirty Russian money a pass in the name of undermining Putinism is perhaps the most polluting and risky one, but it is an idea modern Machiavellians involved in behind-the-scenes policy discussions find appealing. Seeking to cleanse Britain of Russian kleptocratic influence is an admirable and overdue goal but does little to deter future aggression. Likewise, a tough escalation of the political pushback against Putin will inevitably mean more flak from Moscow.
But the point is that there needs to be a clear, explicit, firm commitment to a strategic goal. Rather than consider what Britain can do (and do easily and cheaply, at that) and then cobble a strategy around those measures, it needs to finally decide what it wants and let that drive the process.
Mark Galeotti is a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Affairs Prague and a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations.