Is Putin really ‘dizzy with success’?

At a recent awards ceremony at the Kremlin for scientists, artists and public intellectuals, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia couldn’t help but recount his country’s achievements. But he also offered a word of caution. “We still have a lot of unsolved problems and questions,” he said. “It is certainly no time for us to be ‘dizzy with success.’” Don’t be deceived by such expressions of humility. Many Russians view Putin as highly successful — and the president himself very much agrees. His approval rating has reached levels upward of 80% for nearly two years, and few, certainly none at a Kremlin event, are making a public case for redefining or even amending the notion of what constitutes a Moscow leader’s success.

Take the economy. Throughout the years of oil-driven growth, economic performance was a measure of “success.” No longer. Russian officials project that the economy will contract 1% to 1.5% this year, provided oil prices stay within the $35-$40 range per barrel, after having shrunk 3.7% in 2015. Growth isn’t expected to arrive until 2017 — and only if the price of oil averages $52 or more a barrel, by no means a certainty.

The news gets worse. Real incomes are falling for the second year now. The country’s infrastructure is in terrible shape, while investment is going down for the fourth year in a row. People are losing jobs and Russia is losing talent. But even if some people recognize these things as failures, they are not generally viewed as Putin’s responsibility. The outcomes may be unpopular but the decisions that caused them are not. His use of the phrase “dizzy with success” may help explain why. Every Russian knows the slogan: It was the headline of an article written by Joseph Stalin in 1930 for the newspaper Pravda, his messenger of choice. Stalin wrote “Dizzy With Success” at the height of his campaign to turn Soviet farmers into an agricultural proletariat. In less than a year tens of millions of peasants were bayoneted into joining new collective farms. Those who resisted were arrested or exiled. In the year that Stalin was writing about success, more than three million peasants were in revolt. Millions died as a result of deportations or famine. The country’s agricultural economy never fully recovered, but the leader at the top remained popular. Even today Stalin enjoys a staunch — although by no means universal — following among my countrymen.

Stalin was asserting that collectivization was a success except for isolated cases of overzealous bureaucracy. He took credit for establishing a socialized agriculture in just a few months and shifted blame for the many brutalities involved to local authorities and others. Many of those people were later arrested and punished.

My point is not to draw a direct comparison between Stalin and Putin: They are very different leaders living in very different times. I just cannot help noticing that they seem to follow the same playbook for being a successful autocrat. Indeed, if there were a secret manual describing the Kremlin’s art of governance, it would almost certainly include three rules that both men have mastered.

Rule No.1 calls for attributing all victories to oneself — regardless of who or what contributed to the perceived success. A victory in war won by the people at impossible cost has to be ascribed to the leader. Prosperity, even if a gift from Mother Nature or market forces, is an achievement of the ruler.

Rule No.2: Failures must be ascribed to subordinates or external forces. Stalin didn’t invent this trick but he perfected it with brutal efficiency. He created disaster after disaster, but his associates and subjects just kept admiring, or at least fearing, him.

Rule No.3 is the ability to manipulate what used to be called the party line. One day Hitler is an enemy, the next a friend, then later an enemy once again. One day left-wing forces are the party’s enemies, the next day its best friends. Putin has proved adept at all three. He took credit for the oil-driven economic boom (rule No.1). Then when the economy tanked, he has allowed blame to be placed on his ministers, particularly Prime Minister Dmitri A. Medvedev, or pointed a finger at the West (rule No.2).

And he has changed the party line with dizzying agility (rule No.3). One day Russia is a business-friendly economy, the next it is a statist power. One day Russia is busy integrating with the former Soviet republics, the next day it is fighting them. One day Russia proclaims sovereignty sacred, the next day it annexes Crimea, a neighboring country’s territory. The next day it again proclaims sovereignty sacred, to justify propping up the beleaguered regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Syria is one of those success stories for which the czar is enjoying credit while others will have to manage the thorny consequences. Last week, US Secretary of State John Kerry was in Moscow to discuss Syria with Putin. This is the altitude at which the czars fly. Isn’t it neat? This is also how he can stay popular while the nation’s economy is going nowhere.

And this is the flip side of the myth of Putin leadership that in some quarters of Europe and even the United States, other would-be czars seek to emulate.

Stalin and Putin are very different leaders living in very different times. I just cannot help noticing that they seem to follow the same playbook for being a successful autocrat