Raqqa victory could lead to more regional tensions
The end of the caliphate has opened fresh sectarian, ethnic and political fault lines
On October 17, elements of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) paraded through Paradise Square of Raqqa town, declaring the end of the control of Daesh over its ‘capital’ in Syria. This followed the earlier capture of Mosul — Daesh’s capital in Iraq — by Iraqi forces in June. While there are still some pockets of Daesh resistance in Raqqa and parts of Iraq, the group’s ‘caliphate’ has ceased to exist, just three years after it had been proclaimed from the pulpit of the mosque in Mosul by its self-styled caliph, Abū Bakr Al Baghdadi.
At its peak two years ago, the caliphate had territory the size of Britain and a population of nine million, similar to that of Jordan. Daesh had controlled Raqqa for three years, gaining notoriety for its grisly beheadings displayed on social media and its harsh regime of compulsion and control over the personal conduct of the men and women in its domain. Fearing the violent outreach of this menace, the US worked assiduously to put together a global coalition of over 70 countries and train and mobilise local armed forces in Iraq and Syria, under the title ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’.
In Iraq, it rejuvenated the national army, which was backed by the Iransupported Shia force, the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), and elite special forces, both Iraqi and American. In Syria, the US opted to develop a composite army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, that was largely made up of Kurdish militants.
These two forces have decimated the structures of the caliphate and killed or dispersed most of its fighters. Mustafa Al Said, writing in the Egyptian Al Ahram, has said: “As the time draws near for turning the last page on Daesh, gusting winds of change are blowing on the region.”
The main area of concern is that the outlook for Syria remains uncertain. Russia, in association with Iran and Turkey, is establishing “de-escalation zones” in different parts of the country as part of the peace process sponsored by them. But several parts of the country will remain areas of intense competition, emerging from the interests of contending regional players.
The most serious problem is the Kurdish attempt to consolidate its “Rojava”, the western homeland at the Syrian-Turkish border, in which it intends to include the freshly liberated town of Raqqa and possibly even Deir ez-Zour, near the border with Iraq. This is being fiercely opposed by Turkey and the Assad government in Damascus.
Russia started out in Syria in late 2015. Since then, its role has expanded, and Russia is now at the heart of all political and diplomatic activity in the region
In both Iraq and Syria, the Kurds are planning to play the Iran card to obtain US backing for their territorial ambitions: they are pointing out that thwarting their ambitions simply benefits Iran by further consolidating its influence in both Iraq and Syria. With President Trump having just announced a “comprehensive Iran strategy” that seeks to reduce Iran’s influence across the Middle East, the Kurds believe they are on solid ground.
But the Kurds could be disappointed: many observers believe that the Trump strategy on Iran is long on rhetoric, but woefully short on operational capacity; with the US reluctant to expand its military footprint in the quagmire of Middle Eastern politics, Iran, with its regional allies, Turkey, Syria and Iraq, and the support of battlehardened militia, Hezbollah and the PMUs, sees itself quite well-placed to hold its own in the region.
Of course, if the US president is encouraged to robustly confront Iran, then the prospects of a larger confrontation become real, with even the possibility of military conflict.
This could take place in Syria, where the Iran-backed government troops are positioned in the south of Raqqa and are also racing towards Deir ezZour, which SDF elements, with their US mentors, are also seeking to take over.
Sections of the US Congress are also seeking a larger, better defined US role in the region; thus, Senator McCain, has said: “For far too long, the United States has approached the Middle East through the narrow vantage point of counterterrorism. What we need instead is a comprehensive strategy that takes all regional factors into account.” This raises the question of the likely Russian role in the scenario.
Russia started out in Syria in late 2015 as the solid military and political ally of the Assad regime to prevent externally-sponsored regime change in Damascus. Since then, its role has expanded, and Russia is now at the heart of all political and diplomatic activity in the region: President Vladimir Putin is the principal interlocutor for all regional leaders, including from Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and most recently Saudi Arabia.
What is thus emerging after the fall of Raqqa is a major re-alignment of the regional balance of power, with the US confronting Russia, which is allied with Turkey and Iran, the latter buttressed by its own militant allies.
However, the unfolding scenario may not actually be so clear-cut. The Saudi outreach to Moscow with the visit of King Salman to Moscow in October and the conclusion of defence, energy, economic and technological agreements between them, suggests that Saudi confidence in the US administration’s capacity to deliver on its promises remains low. In contrast, Putin is seen across the region as one who stands by his allies and delivers on his commitments.
This means a lot to all the major regional players: the kingdom needs Russian help to extricate itself from its Yemen and Syrian imbroglios; Turkey wants to ensure that Kurdish aspirations are checked; Iran wishes to see Assad in power and its influence in Iraq and Syria undiminished, while Israel wants Iran and Hezbollah contained in Syria.
Developments in Syria will reveal how these competing interests of regional players are reconciled by Russia.
The outlook for Middle East stability will thus be determined by Russia’s ability to deliver on its commitments and the ability of US and Russia to work together as equal partners. The alternative scenario is for the US to assert its traditional hegemonic role in regional affairs in competition with Russia and to confront Iran, even if it means a direct conflict or, more realistically, enhanced sanctions and heightened pressures to promote regime change, a vision that enthuses the US right-wing most robustly. — TheWire.in