Saleh’s death should not derail reconciliation efforts in Yemen

Had Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh been killed five days ago, the Saudi-led coalition and the legitimate government would have been blamed for his murder. But Saleh was killed by the Houthis, after he had terminated his alliance with them. By killing Saleh, the Houthis have practically become rivals of all of Yemen’s components. Saleh was their only alleged patriotic card and their political front before the Yemenis and the world.

The war map in Yemen had dramatically changed the night he delivered a televised speech, announcing his acceptance of the reconciliation. His assassination will not stop the change he brought in.

The question now is whether the late president can manage the battle from his grave by allying with the legitimate government and confronting the Houthis. In other words, will his influence, institutions, and men who have been loyal to him, his instructions and ideas still carry on?

We know all attempts to remove Saleh have failed in the past. He was forced to quit following popular protests, yet he continued to be a leader. After the assassination attempt at Al Nahdayn mosque, everyone feared the worst. He spent months in a military hospital in Riyadh for burn treatment, and survived.

Saleh surprised everyone after he returned, ruled Sanaa, and managed political and military battles. This is why the Houthis finally decided to kill him; not because he turned against them but because he’s capable of destroying their political project.

A few days ago, he altered the equation when he ended his alliance with the Houthis and cut the number of the legitimate government’s enemies to half, shrinking areas controlled by the armed insurgency.

Saleh abandoned the enemy camp and joined the allies, who would have expedited Houthis’ defeat and ended the war. But Saleh’s murder was meant to reshuffle the deck and stop the reconciliation project.

As long as we realise that Saleh’s assassination is aimed at thwarting the reconciliation, we must work to ensure its success.

What the late president did in the last four days of his life is the most important development since the war began three years ago. It will boost operations against the Houthis and besiege them in their areas north of Yemen. That’s if Saleh army’s commanders decide to participate in the fighting alongside ranks of the Yemeni army.

In the past few days, Saleh tried to liberate the capital, which has been occupied by the insurgents since 2014, when Houthis seized the headquarters of the First Division and the remaining military and security institutions were defeated without much resistance.

Questions today revolve around the expanse of power of the Houthis in Sanaa, with rumours claiming they are the strongest party and that any attempt to get them out would cause a bloody war between the two sides in the city’s historic streets. It was difficult to figure out the truth but assassinating the former president proved that the Houthis are an influential power.

In the past, Sanaa was Saleh’s stronghold and the Houthis could only enter and occupy after his approval. But ever since they entered the capital, they seized arms’ warehouses, bought loyalties and laid plans for the day when they clash with their ally Saleh, and perhaps assassinate him and take control of the capital. The new reality is critical, dangerous, and requires Yemeni army and the coalition forces to enter Sanaa and work with Saleh’s forces that are in shock. The people of Sanaa and forces of late Saleh have a great interest in going to war to restore their city from Houthis.

In his televised speech, the late president had called for lifting the siege, including resuming military and civil navigation at the airport for the first time since the beginning of the war and reopening of crossings for aid convoys and trade activity. It is not possible to do so after Saleh’s assassination without entering into a new alliance with Saleh’s forces and deterring the

The new reality is critical, dangerous, and requires Yemeni army and the coalition forces to enter Sanaa and work with Saleh’s forces who are in shock

Houthis in Sanaa. If the reconciled parties agree on managing Sanaa, it will be reconstructed faster and will restore its role as the administrative capital of the country, after most governmental institutions had been moved to Aden as a temporary alternative capital.

People of Sanaa, leaders of the General People’s Congress and commanders of Saleh’s forces must realise the importance of change, which Saleh adopted and was killed for. They must defend his decision and the project.

What about the savage wolves, that is Houthis? They succeeded in getting rid of Saleh, their new enemy, and disrupting his plan. Yet, practically, they’re not the decision makers in this big war.

Their hope to influence the shape of the governing political system is over. The Houthis went from being partners in governance to murderers of Saleh. This is a crime they cannot justify, and by losing Saleh, they have become nothing more than Iran’s militias against Yemenis.