US exit from Syria could give Iran more leverage

Apart from defeating Daesh, American troops haven’t really played a critical role in the Syrian war. However, their withdrawal would make it easier for the Iranian regime to complete ‘the final chapter’ of its full takeover of Syria, and control over Iraq and Lebanon. In a speech in Ohio on Thursday, United States President Donald Trump surprised his audience when he said: “We will pull out our forces from Syria,” and “We will leave if we eliminate the remaining Daesh enclaves.”

Meanwhile, assessing the situation in Syria the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said that if Bashar Al Assad were to remain as president of the country he should not be under the control of the Iranians. Assad should get rid of them. The American presence blocks the establishment of a direct route from Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria, the crown prince said.

The situation in Syria today looks precarious with the presence of many foreign forces. The Russians have built bases in the areas under the regime’s influence. The US has limited its presence in Syria to fighting Daesh, without interfering in the war between Syrians themselves. Israel is concerned that Iran and its militias might threaten its security.

Turkey also has interests in Syria as it chases the Kurds far from its borders. And despite the losses of the Free Syrian Army, some of its factions remain established in their regions, disappointing a lot of people who had declared its death. As for terrorist organisations such as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham, i.e. the former Al-Qaeda related Al-Nusra Front, they have been defeated and distracted but not completely eradicated.

Thus, Assad remains established relying on two powers: Iranian forces on the ground and the Russian forces in the air.

It is hard for most people with a conscience in the Arab world to accept that Bashar Al Assad should remain in power after all that he has done.

In an interview with the Time magazine, Crown Prince Mohammed talked about the situation as it really is: Assad’s presence is a reality, he said, but he called on him not to be a proxy for Iran and its militias.

However, there are two pertinent questions that arise. Is Assad truly capable of ridding Syria of the Iranians? Even if he does, would he be able to survive without their aid?

In order to control Syria, Iran has lost thousands of its fighters and its militias’ fighters, and wasted billions of dollars. If Qasem Soleimani and his Iranian forces and militias were pulled out of Syria, it would reduce their influence in Lebanon and Iraq, too.

Withdrawing from Syria would have repercussions on Iranian life, as Tehran has been, for four years, justifying the war as a necessary measure to protect the regime itself. For the Iranian regime, indeed, it is a matter of survival. This might not be an exaggeration in the light of the recurring popular uprisings in the streets of Iran’s main cities.

Secondly, even if we think for a moment that Assad would be able to order Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan and other militias to leave Syria, and use the United Nations and other major powers to help him implement such an order, the crucial question remains if the Syrian regime would survive without them?

I doubt that. The majority of those who fought the armed opposition in eastern Ghouta, in greater Damascus, were either from Iran and/or Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraq, with the support of Russian air forces.

Hence, if Assad’s forces were incapable on their own of managing and executing a battle raging in the capital’s outskirts, how would they manage

Withdrawing from Syria would have repercussions on Iranian life, as Tehran has been, for four years, justifying the war as a necessary measure to protect the regime itself. For the Iranian regime, it is a matter of survival indeed.

and protect a big state such as Syria, which has inherited hostilities and vengeance from the war of the past seven years?

Let us not forget that the majority of the other security and armed forces of the regime have been decimated in the war by internal divisions, human losses, and escape abroad.

Even if Assad wanted to turn a new page and everyone agreed to stop the bloodshed, no one would believe any promise of the withdrawal of Tehran’s forces.

They would stall forever, especially now that they have dug trenches and bases, showing their intention to stay in Syria. For starters, the situation might require an international solution that officially regards the Iranian forces in Syria as an “occupation force,” and orders them out.