Iran, N. Korea expose massive nuclear failure

Syria’s Bashar Al Assad is begging for a trip to Pyongyang as Donald Trump prepares for a summit with Kim Jong-un. Hollywood would reject such a script as outlandish, yet the scenario offers a reminder of the connections among Syria, Iran and North Korea — and some justification for different treatment by the current US administration. The US president expresses hope of signing a denuclearisation agreement with North Korea after tearing up the US agreement with Iran, inspiring easy comments on the irrationality of Trump’s foreign policies. Breaking the convergence between North Korea and Iran may prove essential.

The relationship between Iran and North Korean proliferation is deep. The parallel between the two nations is real, with mutual help and cover at critical junctures, along with a converging connection to Syria, and separating the proliferators makes sense. This was true in 2017, when Iran announced resumption of its long-range missile programme, a decision publicly floated at the height of the international standoff with North Korea over its missile launches and nuclear tests. During this period, according to a UN report, two North Korean ships delivered crates to Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre, the same chemical weapons-research centre destroyed by a joint US-France-UK strike in April — a detail adding intriguing context to Assad’s plan to visit Pyongyang.

North Korean–Iranian ties go back to the first Gulf War. In the early 1990s, North Korea considered supplying mid-range ballistic missiles to Syria. Syria signed a scientific agreement with North Korea, in 2002 undertaking a covert nuclear reactor project provided by North Korea. Iran signed its own deal with North Korea in 2012; cooperation was apparent before and after the Joint Cooperation Plan of Action was signed in 2015.

The comparison stops there. Iran recovered some financial resources with the 2015 agreement, while North Korea has endured biting sanctions. Iran is only a threshold nuclear power while North Korea, after decades of efforts starting with Soviet help in 1955, is a nuclear weapon state. Iran was close to the design and supplies for a nuclear weapon. Given North Korea’s proliferation record towards Pakistan and the Middle East, as noted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, little prevents North Korea from sharing designs for nuclear warheads or selling missile parts. The nation carried out missile sales in the past, repeatedly expecting compensation to stop the practice.

Like a jigsaw puzzle, Iran and North Korea expose gaping holes in nonproliferation policies. First is the permanent failure to ban development of ballistic capabilities along with nuclear weapons. No UN resolution on

North Korea or Iraq has formally declared testing of ballistic missiles as illegal, though several pushed for a halt. Famously, the Iran agreement did not include such a prohibition. By contrast, North Korea did sign an agreement covering missile launches, then argued that satellite launches were not included. The spectacle of Iran developing more ballistic missiles or a nuclear submarine, when it’s supposed to desist from nuclear weapons, is a farce played on agreement signatories.

By happenstance or design, Trump’s initiatives build on the differences between Iran and North Korea. For Iran, the missile issue is paramount. The allied US-France-UK strikes on Syria and devastating Israeli hits on underground structures deliver the message that Iran’s missile sites could also be hit. Nuclear weapons without missiles are relics, the line apparently taken by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo whereas National Security Adviser John Bolton demands immediate, complete denuclearization.

Regime change for Iran — through a domestic process — remains a tempting option for the US. With or without the 2015 agreement, Iran remains bound by IAEA inspections, forced to choose between staying within international law or going rogue. Trump removed most incentives for Iran to comply and must bank on regional allies — Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt — to contain Iran. He must also hope that Europeans, despite anger over US withdrawal, persuade Iran to abide by the agreement.

Withdrawing from a UN-sanctioned agreement is a loss for the international system, since Iran did not demonstrably cheat. Yet Iran used the agreement to expand regional influence and pursue a ballistic race. Overextended Iran must make choices.

So much security depends on US policy staying power. If US policy on Iran stays erratic, or becomes so on North Korea, that will embolden adversaries to a degree not seen before. Europe has few alternatives, and ending the Western alliance would be suicidal. Instead, Europe must rise above political debates and push for steady US policies, demonstrating to Iran that compromise on missiles is required, while liaising with regional Asian partners to ensure that negotiations do not neglect fissile materials. —Yale Global

François Godement is director of the European Council on Foreign

Relations’ Asia & China Programme and a senior policy fellow

Given North Korea’s proliferation record towards Pakistan and the Middle East, little prevents it from sharing designs for nuclear warheads or selling missile parts