Why Iran cannot be expected to end its streak of terror
For Western politicians and publics who pine for the old days of the Obama era and see US President Donald Trump as the standardbearer of a new world disorder, there are probably few governments that reflexively elicit as much sympathy at present as the one in Tehran.
And with its carefully telegraphed withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, backed up with threats to slap sanctions on countries that don’t halt oil imports from Iran by November 4, the Trump administration has certainly done its bit to confer on Tehran the halo of a victim of US unilaterism.
It may therefore seem counterintuitive to argue against this backdrop that many of the Middle East’s deepest wounds will fester until Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his inner circle have an inexplicable change of heart, or Iran’s sinking currency and economic troubles trigger off a spontaneous regime change.
But facts are facts.
At issue is not simply this decade’s horrific war crimes in Syria in which the Iran-aligned Assad regime is implicated, or the previous decade’s unsolved attacks in Lebanon that targeted mostly politicians and intellectuals critical of Syria and Iran.
In the Arab world, Tehran’s projection of power through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies is so pervasive and wellorganised, anybody who thinks a piecemeal approach will work for the region’s many flashpoints is asking for a blunt reality check.
Take Iraq, for instance. In May the country held its fourth parliamentary elections since the US-led invasion that removed Saddam Hussein from power in 2003.
The slender hope that the outcome would lead to a rollback of Iranian influence and reassertion of Iraqi national identity has been dashed, however, by the formation of two political alliances, neither of which seems inclusive enough — despite the official rhetoric — to gain the trust of the Sunni, Kurdish and other minorities.
Even though the once populist Shia preacher Muqtada Al Sadr ran on an anti-corruption platform, the fractured verdict has prompted him to join forces with both Haider Al Abadi, the prime minister, and Hadi Al Amiri, who heads an avowedly sectarian party and has described Qassem Suleimani, the mastermind of Iran’s military operations in the Middle East, as “my dearest friend”.
Even if Tehran did not dictate outright the post-election horse-trading, it would be disingenuous to claim the regime’s long arm did not apply pressure tactics on victorious Iraqi factions honed over decades in another showpiece of foreign interference, Lebanon.
Like Iraq, Lebanon held its parliamentary elections in May with high public expectations of a break from established political movements matched only by the determination of Iran’s biggest allies, Hezbollah and Amal, to cement their grip on power.
And cement their grip they did, gaining control through alliances of convenience of more than half the seats in parliament at the expense of their main rival, the party led by Lebanon’s Sunni prime minister, Saad Hariri.
Not only have the election results put an end to all talk of an imminent turnaround in Lebanon’s fortunes, they also have boosted Hezbollah’s ability to fend off domestic challenges on strategic matters, to say nothing of Iran’s long shadow.
Then there is Iran’s plunge into a game of brinkmanship with Israel’s hawks by sending auxiliaries, including Hezbollah units and Iraqi militias, to Syria’s Golan frontier, as if the ongoing battles in that country were not destabilising enough.
As for the conflict in Yemen, where Houthi rebels belonging to the minority Zaydi Shia group overplayed their hand and provoked a tough military response led by Saud Arabia, Tehran has studiously maintained a position of plausible deniability. Yet, instead of using its clout to nudge the rebels towards the negotiating table, Iran had been seemingly content with their reckless firing of missiles at densely populated Saudi cities and attempts to draw out the battle for Hodeidah port, at least until the UN began its push for a political settlement.
None of this is to argue that the US or any other power should foment an uprising or plot regime change in Iran, one of the world’s leading oil suppliers with an 80 million-plus population.
The cost in blood and treasure of the Bush administration’s intervention in Iraq continues to be a powerful cautionary tale despite the passage of time.
Still, until real political or ideological change comes to Tehran (with or without the aid of Trump’s coercive diplomacy), peace and stability are likely to remain theoretical concepts in a vast area stretching from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea.
What is guaranteed instead is pointless conflicts and pressure on young people to seek an elusive better future in foreign lands.