Iran in the dumps, its best hope is direct talks with the US
Regime in Tehran may have an exaggerated opinion of its popularity but frequent eruptions of unrest suggest otherwise
Talk about living in a parallel universe.
Donald Trump wants Iran to renegotiate the 2015 nuclear agreement and end its perceived interference in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon if it wants to avoid painful economic sanctions.
In response, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, says all negotiations are off the table while Donald Trump is the president of the US and threatens to set aside the deal “if it is no longer in the national interest”.
Now come reports, apparently planted by Iranian officials, that Tehran has given ballistic missiles to its Shia proxies in Iraq and is developing the capacity to build more there.
What could explain the surreal mix of muddled thinking and aggressive behaviour when all that Iran’s rulers need to do is signal their readiness for direct talks with the US administration?
To be fair to Khamenei and his inner circle, they are not entirely to blame for their current disoriented state.
The European Union has been keeping alive Tehran’s hopes of preserving the nuclear agreement, abandoned by Trump in May, with moves essentially to protect European companies having dealings with Iran from financial losses.
Playing good cop to Trump’s bad cop, the EU has even approved €18 million ($20.6 million) out of a planned €50 million aid package for Iran, with the stated aim of compensating for the impact of the US sanctions that began taking effect in stages starting from August 6.
Stripped of all the happy talk, however, positive perceptions of Iran in Western Europe are unlikely to rub off on American legislators, still less on the White House, which is perhaps more receptive to arguments for regime change in Tehran.
Iran’s rulers have also been overly optimistic that China, Japan, South Korea and India will keep buying Iranian oil even if that means putting themselves in the crosshairs of a tariffs-happy Trump administration.
In any case, both foes and friends of the US find themselves grappling with trade wars, economic protectionism and a high dollar, leaving Iran with very few countries it can count on to come publicly to its defence.
Looking at the bright side, bluster is not the only tool at Iran’s disposal in dealing with the new rounds of American sanctions, which are threatening to wreak havoc on an already battered economy.
They can take a good look at the pragmatism of the Kurds in neighbouring Iraq, who have quietly made a comeback after the sudden loss of territory and influence following the independence referendum of September 2017.
The political leaders of the Kurdistan region have a clear idea of the level of hostility of the governments in Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara to ethnic Kurds’ self-administration aspirations.
But what they understand all too well is that in matters of international relations, discretion is preferable to braggadocio.
The Kurdish factions, who are usually at loggerheads with each other, have succeeded to a large extent in mending fences with the Baghdad government and different Iraqi political blocs, as well as with the leaders in Tehran and Ankara.
What the Kurds needed in their ties with their vengeful compatriots and neighbours, the Iranians need in their dealings with the Americans: trust and good faith.
The easiest way for the Iranians to go about it is by agreeing to sit down with Trump administration officials and discuss the demands, rather than reject them theatrically just to please their most loyal supporters.
Not only should the Iranians grab the opportunity for direct talks, they should also consider the worst-case scenarios — that Trump will not leave the White House in disgrace after facing impeachment and his administration will not ease pressure on strategic rivals any time soon.
In the long run, though, Iran’s rulers should listen to their own people, whose message has repeatedly fallen on deaf ears: The armed forces are overstretched, the economy is in tatters and the country has fallen way behind its neighbours in terms of social progress.
The clerical regime may have an exaggerated opinion of its popularity, but the frequent eruptions of unrest among the Shia populations of Iran and Iraq are a clear indication that the people believed to be its core constituency are fed up with broken promises.
In the coming days, Iran’s leaders can keep trying to deflect public attention from the incoming US sanctions with appeals to national pride and the rhetoric of religious slogans.
Or they can give power politics a quiet burial and pivot to a soft-power strategy rooted in Iran’s rich cultural heritage and dual Persian and Islamic identities.
Admittedly, reports on the impact of the US sanctions on the lives of ordinary people in Iran don’t make for pleasant reading.
The mood across the country is one of gloom and doom; the predictions for the economy in the near term are dire; and the case for young people and families to consider leaving Iran is compelling.
The question naturally arises whether Iran’s rulers, despite their latest threats of escalating the crisis, will ultimately act in the best interests of the people.
After all, this is not 1979, the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The time for living in a parallel universe is long over.
Not only should the Iranians grab the opportunity for direct talks, they should also consider the worst-case scenarios — that Trump will not leave the White House in disgrace after facing impeachment and his administration will not ease pressure on strategic rivals any time soon