Countries must ensure that Daesh does not rise again

At a time when it still controlled large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, the Daesh released a video entitled “Structure of the Caliphate,” which detailed the structure of administration and the geographic organisation of its state project. In that video, it claimed the existence of 35 wilayas (provinces): 19 inside Syria and Iraq, and 16 elsewhere. Today, the number of wilayas claimed in propaganda appears to have reduced dramatically in number. For example, Daesh propaganda portrays Syria and Iraq as consisting of just two provinces: a Wilayat al-Sham and Wilayat al-Iraq respectively. In Libya, three provinces seem to have been similarly condensed; there now appears to be just one province in the country that covers three regions.

Other wilayas still exist as they were when they were first announced in 2014 and 2015: West Africa, Sinai, Algeria, Khorasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and Yemen, which still exists as multiple provinces for now. Meanwhile, two areas where IS has been claiming military operations have now been elevated to the status of provinces: Somalia and East Asia.

These apparent shifts reflect in part the overall collapse of Daesh as a state project, which was previously its central claim to fame, and the evolution of a global insurgency. In places where its propaganda displays a seemingly simplified provincial structure, the common thread is that they were areas in which Daesh once exercised significant control of territory with regular photo series and videos advertising governance implementation.

Viewed in this light, Daesh as a state project in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere is mostly a failure. Yet how successful one views it as a global insurgency and terrorist force in some regions depends on the criteria one sets. For example, in the Sinai area, it is the most powerful insurgent force fighting Egypt’s security forces and easily eclipses any Al Qaeda-aligned rivals such as Jamaat Jund Al Islam. And yet, years of insurgency have not given rise to formal control of territory in the Sinai to implement governance, but rather only something that has proven a continual headache for the Egyptian government.

Similarly, the Khorasan province can be viewed as a mixed bag in terms of results, depending on the angles one explores.

Daesh has managed to carve out a small enclave of territory in the east of Afghanistan, siphon off some disillusioned elements of the Taliban, and carry out many deadly suicide bombings targeting the Afghan capital of Kabul. Even so, its overall position in Afghanistan still does not compare with that of its “nationalist” rival.

In other areas, Daesh activity seems to be almost completely dormant, most notably in Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Previously, Daesh was particularly keen to make its mark in the latter considering that it is home to the two holiest sites in Islam of Mekkah and Medina. Saudi Arabia’s security services have proven largely successful in clamping down on the Daesh terrorist threat.

Despite the portrayed simplification of the provincial structure in Iraq and Syria and shift in its overall image, one should still remember that that there is a central leadership for Daesh and that this leadership is based in Iraq and Syria. Thus, there is a command-and-control structure between “Daesh central” and the provinces outside of Syria and Iraq.

As is the case with Al Qaeda and its affiliates though, there are issues surrounding how effective that command-and-control really is. The clearest case-in-point is the West Africa province. Previously Jamaat Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wa al-Jihad (also known as Boko Haram) under Abubakar Shekau, an allegiance pledge was given to Daesh in March 2015, creating a West Africa province with Shekau as its governor. The move seemed to be an apt propaganda victory for Daesh at the time.

By August 2016 though, that territorial control had gone and Shekau was removed as governor. The result is that while one still has the Daesh West Africa affiliate, there is also the rival movement led by Shekau and his followers, with whom the Daesh West Africa affiliate has clashed multiple times.

Only recently has the story of the inside trouble in the West Africa affiliate come to light. The bigger picture then is that Daesh still ‘exists’ on the global level despite the general collapse of the state project, something that should come as no surprise. But it will never rise again to the level of success it had in 2014-2015. However, it can still be of nuisance value and create insurgency problems globally for some time. T here has been a lot of confusion since the Aadhaar came into existence in India. I appreciate the Supreme Court for the historical judgement which puts an end to all uncertainties. The judgement gives a clear picture as to where and when the Aadhaar needs to be submitted.

As per the ruling, Aadhaar must be linked with the Permanent Account Number — PAN. It is a mandatory document for filing income tax returns and a must for availing welfare schemes and government subsidies.

However, as per the law passed by the Indian Parliament, the Aadhaar, a 12-digit unique identification number can be issued only to resident citizens of India. This means Non Resident Indians are not eligible to obtain the Aadhaar.

In the application form of Aadhaar there is a clear affidavit stating: “I confirm that I have been residing in India for at least 182 days on the preceding 12 months and information provided by me to UIDAI is my own and is true, correct and accurate.” Hence, it is a criminal offence on the part of an NRI to give a false affidavit to get a government document.

On January 8, 2016, the Union Minister of External Affairs, Sushama Swaraj, had announced in a public forum that the Modi government was planning to provide the Aadhaar to NRIs. On January 8, 2017, I reminded the honourable minister of the promise. But action is still pending. Hundreds of countries have issued similar biometric identification cards to its citizens. But why is India restricting this unique identification to only its resident citizens?

Thousands of Indians living abroad are filing income tax returns and most have movable and immovable properties in India. And for their registration and payment Aadhaar is mandatory. We are not permanent residents of any other country. So I appeal to the government of India to amend the present clause to include all Indian citizens.

Years of insurgency have not given rise to formal control of territory in the Sinai to implement governance, but rather only something that has proven a continual headache for the Egyptian government