Kurdish factor bodes well for Iraqi federalism’s future

After a prolonged period of political paralysis and civic unrest, Iraq has suddenly got a double dose of opportunity to pull off a complete turnaround. Earlier this month, Iraqi legislators appointed a senior Kurdish politician as the new president, who in turn named a respected technocrat to be the next prime minister. Now, a comfortable win for a single party in elections in Iraqi Kurdistan is set to put an end to the crippling uncertainty that arose from Baghdad’s crackdown on the semiautonomous region in response to the referendum of September 2017.

With the KDP — the force behind the failed independence bid — winning 45 seats in the Kurdish Region’s parliament, followed by the PUK with 21, the political picture couldn’t have become clearer. Kurds may have paid a price for leader Masoud Barzani’s self-rule gamble, but they trust him to continue leading the dialogue with Baghdad and mending ties with regional powers.

There is no doubt a surreal feel to this month’s political developments, given that barely a year ago the government of Haider Al Abadi sent Iranbacked paramilitaries to seize disputed areas in Kirkuk from the control of Peshmerga forces, cut off the budget of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and put an embargo on flights from Kurdistan’s airports.

At the time, with the task of ousting Daesh from Mosul, Falluja and Tikrit among other places far from finished, it seemed Iraq was on the brink of another man-made crisis. A year on, although the Kurdistan Region is still hobbled by the punitive policies, it has been able to make a comeback of sorts.

After declaring the referendum illegal, Abadi succeeded in coercing the KRG to accept the Iraqi Supreme Court’s annulment of the vote’s pro-independence outcome, much to the satisfaction of Iran, Turkey and Syria. But he failed to win the hearts of Kurds, who want the ongoing national dialogue to resolve the disputes holding back Kurdistan’s progress at a much faster pace.

That being said, the establishment of a truly federal and pluralistic democracy is just one of the many unfulfilled promises of the 2005 Iraqi constitution. Adel Abdul Mahdi, the prime minister-designate, will soon face an uphill battle with the problems handed down by his predecessors.

High unemployment, power cuts, poor public services and a crumbling infrastructure blight many parts of Iraq, notably Basra. In the north, vast expanses of the country devastated by war have not seen any reconstruction since their recapture by government forces and allied paramilitaries. Even as the spectre of a comeback by Daesh looms in the absence of security and development, the unchecked proliferation of religious militias is leading to deadly attacks on women who dare to defy society’s conservative norms.

In tackling this daunting array of challenges, the socially progressive Kurds could be a valuable ally for the federal government on the basis of their long experience with the privations of war, the hostility of both compatriots and neighbours, and the adversities of political geography.

For Barzani, who resigned as KRG’s president in the wake of the referendum debacle, the failure to turn the Kurds’ dream of self-determination into reality should not deter him from returning to prominence.

As one of modern Iraq’s tallest leaders, Barzani should be able to guide the new leadership in navigating treacherous political waters while staying focused on responsive administration and national reconstruction.

Indeed, there could be no better mentor for Abdul Mahdi than the Kurdish elder statesman in charting an independent middle path between competing foreign powers and rebuilding commercial relations with both governments and private corporations.

Although Barzani and Iraqi President Salih belong to rival Kurdish parties, they have a duty to bury their differences and act in the best interests of the country. Furthermore, the respect they command at an international level should be utilised to boost Iraq’s chances of attracting aid, investment and technical assistance.

As far as Kurdistan’s affairs are concerned, the next regional government is certainly going to have its plate full. Persuading the federal government to

Without unfettered access to banking facilities, the Kurds will not be able to make much headway

lift the post-referendum restrictions is still a work in progress. Without access to banking facilities and free movement of money, the Kurds will not be able to make much headway in tapping their region’s full economic potential.

Then there are the thorny issues of resumption of oil exports and control of Kirkuk’s contested oil fields, which have been held in abeyance until a measure of trust and power equilibrium is established between Baghdad and Erbil. Beyond even these are the matters of the presence of Iran-backed paramilitary fighters in Kirkuk and nearby areas, the sporadic violations of Iraqi sovereignty by Turkish and Iranian security forces, and disputes over control of vital border crossings and transit routes.

The hope is that the latest political developments have brought closure to the broken relationship between Erbil and Baghdad. But there is plenty of unfinished business all the same.