The US is playing into the hands of the Taleban
Washington’s decision to keep Kabul out of peace talks with the Taleban is being increasingly interpreted as the first step of reversing core US war policy as more pieces of this puzzle fall into place. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani wouldn’t have been too surprised when the Taleban first ruled out negotiations with the government. They always do this, he would have thought, and once the talks get going the US and regional pressure would make the insurgents more flexible. Why else would he stake his re-election on a truce, especially one which would allow Taleban representation in parliament?
But he must have been shocked when the Americans agreed. Surely they noticed, among other Taleban demands for conclusive talks, rejection of the Afghan constitution and dismissal of the sitting government in favour of an interim setup that would, of course, include Taleban officials. And here’s the best part. This setup will then, after a complete US withdrawal of course, oversee the country’s transition to a “true Islamic system” of governance. Yet the Americans chose to talk to the Taleban and keep the government in the dark. Why?
Why, after all, fight a war, bring down a government, prop up another government, keep it together, keep fighting the war, then suddenly ditch the second government in favour of the previous setup, that too on the latter’s terms? Especially after throwing upwards of a trillion dollars at the whole thing. The more the Taleban ridiculed Ghani’s government as a puppet, the more everybody was willing to talk to them and the more the international press reported of the talks “gaining momentum.” Soon the Americans, the Russians, and other nations were negotiating peace with the Taleban, with zero participation of the official government in Kabul.
The Moscow talks in February, which the Americans did not attend, featured an Afghan opposition delegation led by former president Hamid Karzai. Not too long ago, Karzai was to the Taleban what Ghani is now; illegitimate, immaterial proxy, and all that. Yet in Moscow everybody agreed the talks were “very satisfactory” before getting together and offering group prayers led by the Taleban delegation head Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai.
Ghani, clearly in shock at being left out amid talk of an interim setup so close to the national election, naturally rejected any talks that didn’t include him. Yet those doing the heavy talking treated him like a little boy jumping and waving his hands at the back of the room trying to get noticed. Then, out-manoeuvered, feeling abandoned by Washington and fast losing time, he lashed out in early March.
If nothing else, he must have stunned the Americans when he had his National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib accuse US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad of deliberately “de-ligitimising” the Kabul government. Zalmay’s actions, he said, were “weakening the government” and “elevating the Taleban.” And he was facilitating the setup of a caretaker government which he could head as ‘viceroy’.
It was a little over-the-top, but it was just Ghani trying to say that he still mattered. But the Americans didn’t like it one bit, even ruled him out from future US-Afghan government discussions.
All this must have left Ghani wondering if Washington is, after all that has happened, really rolling back its war policy of 17 years. The turn from “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” in the George W. Bush days to desperately seeking negotiations is understandable considering the long and expensive stalemate. But facilitating the Taleban at the expense of the government — a government made and run by the Americans — has got to be the mother of all departures from an original war plan.
The latest from Pakistan wouldn’t have made Ghani sleep any better. Prime Minister Imran Khan lamented calling off a meeting with Taleban representatives at the request of Kabul. At least someone listened to them. But then Imran went on to say that Kabul was “a hurdle in the peace process” because it was “insisting that Taleban should talk to it” before wrapping it up with “Afghan peace process can only be successful if there is a neutral interim government.”
And he didn’t forget to mention how the Americans are happy with the direction things are taking. Is this what Imran meant, Ghani would have thought, when he talked about mending fences? He must also have wondered, since he formed government after an election, what precisely Imran meant by ‘neutral’.
When the Taleban became a formidable insurgency — which is what forced the Americans to seek negotiations — there was the feeling that for all their gains they would never be able to take Kabul. Hence the idea of baiting them with participation in government in return for ending the war. Now, despite their outright rejection of the constitution and clear preference for their own version of sharia law, they seem within reach of being part of the Afghan government just as the Americans leave lock, stock and barrel. A quick truce just because they agree to a two-and-a-half point notto-do list. At a time when they, not the government, have greater military control of the country.
Either the Americans will soon realise that not taking Kabul on board was not very smart, drop the whole idea, and move on with the election and the war. Or in desperation they will let a Trojan Horse into Kabul, as Ghani watches helplessly, before they take their leave.
Why fight a war, bring down a government, prop up another government, keep it together, keep fighting the war, then suddenly ditch the second government in favour of the previous setup, on the latter’s terms?