U-turns by Russia and Turkey turn up the heat on Syrian opposition

Last month, in less than a week, two dominant players in the Syrian conflict took steps that could fundamentally shape its course and outcome.

On January 20, Turkey’s deputy prime minister Mehmet Simsek said because “the facts on the ground have changed dramatically”, his country could “no longer insist on a settlement without Bashar Al Assad”. This is a stunning U-turn from Ankara, which had insisted since the start of the conflict that the Syrian president had to go.

Several days later, at the Astana talks, Russia revealed a draft constitution for Syria that it had prepared. Among other things, it proposed removing “Arab” from the official name of the Syrian Arab Republic. Russian state news agency Sputnik reported that the motivation behind the name change was “to appeal to ethnic minorities such as Kurds and Turkmen”.

This proposal is unlikely to sit well with Moscow’s ally, Mr Al Assad, whose pan-Arab nationalist Baath party has ruled Syria with an iron fist for almost 55 years, and has systematically discriminated against the country’s non-Arab Kurdish and Turkmen communities.

This came weeks after the biggest of a string of losses by the Syrian opposition since Russia’s direct entry into the war: east Aleppo. But Ankara’s tone toward Mr Al Assad had been steadily sof- tening since its rapprochement with Russia last summer. Meanwhile, Moscow’s proposed name change probably stems from two concerns, neither of them newfound sympathy for Kurdish or Turkmen rights.

First, Russia probably wants to quell Kurdish separatist sentiment. Second, Moscow may be aiming to allay Turkish anger over the mistreatment and targeting of ethnic Turkmen by the Assad regime and its allies.

These recent moves by Moscow and Ankara seem primarily motivated by their desire to further build on their rapprochement. After all, they are not merely reacting to developments in Syria over which they had little or no control. Turkey can be partly blamed for the devastating loss of east Aleppo, and Russia contributed to the very Kurdish separatism it now wants to reverse.

As far back as July last year, five months before the fall of east Aleppo, Turkish prime minister Binali Yildirim expressed the need to “go back to normal relations” with Syria. Coming just weeks after Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow, the timing could not have been a coincidence.

This immediately triggered fears – that have since been realised – among the Syrian opposition and its regional backers that Turkey would effectively relinquish its championship of the revolution as the price to pay to mend fences with Russia.

The following month, Ankara – which had previously chastised the approach of going after ISIL while leaving the Assad regime untouched – did exactly that, launching a ground campaign against ISIL and Kurdish forces in northern Syria with the help of Turkish-trained rebel forces that have since left the regime and its allies alone, even when besieged rebels in nearby east Aleppo were pleading for help.

For domestic reasons, Ankara made a tactical decision to focus on ISIL and the Kurds. But by diverting Syrian rebel manpower to that end, it has hindered the armed uprising against Mr Al Assad at the worst possible time for the opposition. Meanwhile, Russia ramped up military support for Syrian Kurds after it directly intervened in September 2015. An office representing the autonomous Syrian-Kurdish region of Rojava was even opened in Moscow.

Russia’s aim was two-fold: to form an effective front against Syrian rebels, and as a thorn in the side of its then-enemy Ankara. This calculus changed once Moscow and Ankara made up. A bargain was probably made whereby Turkey would go easy on Mr Al Assad in return for Russia dropping Syria’s Kurds. Indeed, they are excluded from the current ceasefire, as they were from the Astana talks, both brokered by Moscow and Ankara.

Russia contributed to strengthening Syrian Kurds militarily and thereby cementing their autonomy. It may be convenient for Moscow to abandon them now, but it emboldened a military force and nationalist aspirations that will now be difficult to put down. Dropping the word “Arab” from Syria’s official name will hardly suffice after the territorial and political gains made, and in light of increased support so far from the Trump administration.

The shifting status quo poses significant challenges for both Turkey and Russia, but it is one shaped by them, not forced on them.

There is likely to be growing unease that Syria is serving as the medium through which Ankara and Moscow manage their bilateral relations, regardless of the consequences inside Syria.

‘ Russia’s aim was two-fold: to form an effective front against Syrian rebels, and as a thorn in the side of its then-enemy Ankara