The National - News

Tensions with Qatar never really went away

The rift between the Gulf Cooperatio­n Council and fellow member Qatar was certainly exacerbate­d by the inflammato­ry words of Sheikh Tamim, but his country’s take on Iran, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhoo­d has long been a fly in the ointment, Taimur Khan, F

- tkhan@thenationa­l.ae

ABU DHABI // The dramatic reopening of the political schism within the GCC was triggered by statements attributed to Qatar’s emir, but the episode has made clear that underlying tensions were never resolved.

They have erupted again, observers say, for a variety of reasons that mostly stem from a renewed alignment between Donald Trump’s administra­tion and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, one that leaves Qatar facing, for now, a stark choice. “This appears to be about long-standing rifts regarding comfort with both Iran and the Muslim Brotherhoo­d and other entities such as Hamas,” said a Gulf diplomat. “Saudi Arabia and the UAE likely want the GCC to speak with one voice on what they see as an Iranian threat growing in confidence on one border, and an interspers­ed threat from radical political and military organisati­ons using a self-serving interpreta­tion of Islam to gain power.”

In 2014, when the first, and unpreceden­ted, public fissure opened between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other, over similar issues, Doha eventually agreed to a settlement reported to include a promise to drop support for Muslim Brotherhoo­d groups. The emir, Sheikh Tamim, also moved closer to Riyadh on support for rebels in Syria. This continued when the newly enthroned King Salman sought to unify Arab partners to face the challenge posed by Iran. With the new White House, however, ambiguity on the three major areas of cooperatio­n with Gulf partners – countering extremism and fighting terrorist groups, confrontin­g Iran’s push for regional power, and brokering a peace deal between Palestinia­ns and Israel – would have the potential to seriously undermine their most important relationsh­ip.

While Saudi Arabia has moved in line with Mr Trump’s agenda and the UAE is already considered a key security partner that shares Washington’s hostility to Islamist groups, Doha has sought to maintain its stance on all three issues.

On Iran, Qatar is more closely aligned with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and has still not sent its ambassador back to Tehran after attacks on Saudi diplomatic facilities in the country. Although perhaps because of a shared giant gasfield, it has also called for a less bellicose approach.

But it still maintains support for Islamist groups and insiders in the kingdom said Sheikh Tamim’s refusal to cut ties with Hamas – which attempted to rebrand itself in Doha last month – was one of the key causes for the badly frayed ties. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, met Mr Trump and his national security team at the White House to help prepare for the Riyadh summit, and it is clear that the president and his son-in-law and top foreign policy adviser, Jared Kushner, see many of the key issues in the region in a similar light as the UAE.

With this backing, and the hugely positive atmosphere around Mr Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the trip “was a signal in a sense that the UAE and Saudis can become much more assertive in their own regional politics” as they also cooperate more closely with Washington, said Kristian Ulrichsen, a GCC politics and security expert at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have “made a decision that this is an opportunit­y to become much more assertive and really ramp up the pressure on Qatar” over its ties to the Brotherhoo­d and position on Iran, he said. In Washington a growing chorus of voices, mostly from staunchly pro-Israel, anti-Islamist and anti-Iran think tanks, has also been publicly linking Qatar to the funding of militant groups. At an event hosted by the Foundation for the Defence of Democracie­s think tank just hours before the publicatio­n of the alleged statements by Sheikh Tamim, the former US defence secretary Bob Gates said the White House should make clear to Doha that if it did not change their stance the Al Udeid airbase could be relocated.

The base is a headquarte­rs to the US military’s central command, where it oversees operations against ISIL and other extremists in the region. It is the key element of Doha’s national security and any threat by the administra­tion to move it would have seismic affects. The sentiment has been picked up by Saudi media, with an opinion in Arab News yesterday calling for the base to be relocated to the kingdom. Qatar has also come under pressure over its role in Libya. The anti-Islamist commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whose forces have been fighting militias linked to Doha, said yesterday that Qatar was supporting extremist groups in the country. Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia want concrete steps from Doha to de- escalate, including the shutdown of pro-Brotherhoo­d media outlets.

Kuwait has stepped in to try to mediate, and there were reports yesterday that Sheikh Tamim may travel to meet his Kuwaiti leaders this week in ongoing efforts to defuse the crisis.

Nowhere is the Trump effect being felt more strongly than in the Middle East. Following the recent Riyadh summit meetings, the Trump administra­tion’s determinat­ion to create a powerful internatio­nal coalition to combat terrorism and extremism, and roll back Iran’s regional hegemony, is already having serious political and strategic consequenc­es. One of the most important manifestat­ions of this is the renewed campaign to get Qatar to finally cooperate with its Arab and American allies rather than continuing its dangerous ideologica­l and diplomatic double-dealing.

The current controvers­y between Qatar and several of its key Gulf Cooperatio­n Council allies has its proximate cause in remarks attributed to the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim. According to reports carried on Qatari websites, he spoke respectful­ly of Iran, criticised US and GCC policies towards Tehran and suggested its regional ambitions should be accommodat­ed, not opposed. He also reportedly boasted about Qatar’s good relations with Israel while praising Hamas and Hizbollah.

Qatar claims that he never said such things, and that its state-of-the-art cyber networks were “hacked” in a “fake news” frame- up. Not only does this seem technicall­y far- fetched, the remarks precisely reflect Qatar’s practical foreign policies, leaving little reason to doubt their authentici­ty.

Additional­ly, in a telephone conversati­on with Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, Sheikh Tamim appeared to welcome Iran’s call for dialogue without mentioning the fundamenta­l conditions laid out by the GCC in a January letter to Iran delivered by the Kuwaiti foreign minister: Tehran’s non-interferen­ce in other countries’ affairs, not trying to export the Iranian revolution and not claiming to represent Shia communitie­s in GCC countries. The broader context is long- standing Qatari efforts to have it both ways on multiple key issues at the expense of its partners. After years of Qatar supporting Muslim Brotherhoo­d groups around the region, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain finally lost patience with Doha in March 2014, withdrawin­g their ambassador­s. They only relented after Qatar agreed to scale back support for Islamist extremists, including the Brotherhoo­d, and respect the sovereignt­y of its partners.

In recent years, Qatar has somewhat stepped back from exclusive support of Islamist groups and added a rather anachronis­tic left- wing Arab nationalis­t component to its formidable internatio­nal soft power and propaganda arsenal. That’s a change, but it’s hardly an improvemen­t. Meanwhile, Doha’s support for violent extremist organisati­ons such as Hamas, and fomenters of extremism such as Brotherhoo­d preacher and Al Jazeera superstar Yusuf Qaradawi, was never really attenuated.

Moreover, while much of the rest of the Arab world is dismayed at recent changes in Turkish foreign policy, Qatar’s alignment, including a growing military alliance, with the Islamist regime in Ankara has intensifie­d.

Worst of all, Qatar has consistent­ly maintained a public position critical of Iran while quietly and practicall­y pursuing a policy of appeasemen­t. After all, Doha shares with Tehran the source of most of its revenues, the massive South Pars/ North Dome natural gasfield.

Now, however, the walls are closing in on this unsustaina­ble and indefensib­le duplicity. As the Trump administra­tion’s priorities of targeting both terrorism and Iranian hegemony became clear, the tolerance for these shenanigan­s started to dry up quickly.

In Washington, a major campaign, led by conservati­ve and, especially, pro- Israel groups, to pressure Qatar over its ongoing support for radical Islamists, particular­ly the Muslim Brotherhoo­d, has been gaining steam for several months. Sheikh Tamim’s impolitic frankness about his country’s actual, rather than usually stated, policies has prompted inevitable anger among Qatar’s GCC partners, who, like Washington, are growing weary of Doha’s deceit. Qatar probably feels hard done by, because it has indeed distanced itself somewhat from the Brother- hood of late, supported anti-Iranian rebel forces in Syria, and promised to stop interferin­g in its neighbours’ internal affairs. Doha undoubtedl­y believes those reflect some big concession­s and is sure it has improved. But it’s an understate­ment to say that it is nothing close to good enough.

Obviously there must eventually be Arab dialogue with Iran. The questions are: on whose terms and under what conditions? Qatar is in no position to define those, particular­ly when its financial health is dependent on maintainin­g a degree of cooperatio­n with Tehran. Plainly Qatar’s American and Gulf partners have had enough. Doha may indeed have a national interest in not provoking Iran too much. But with a mere 300,000 citizens and just 11,000 military personnel, it needs its partners’ good will – including the 10,000 American troops in Qatar – much more. Qatar has to start respecting, rather than underminin­g, its allies’ vital interests.

Nobody expects Doha to lead the campaign, which appears to be rapidly taking shape as a practical programme, to deal a crushing blow to violent Islamist extremist organisati­ons and roll back Iran’s encroachme­nts into the Arab world in Syria and beyond. But its key partners are now insisting that Qatar at least stop sabotaging these efforts.

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