COULD THERE REALLY BE A METHOD IN TRUMP’S KOREA MADNESS?
Stand-off with Kim Jong-un appears insane, but do its roots lie in Game Theory? Robert Matthews reports
In his response to the threat posed by North Korea, US president Donald Trump has achieved a worldwide consensus.
From German chancellor Angela Merkel to China’s president Xi Jinping, politicians across the spectrum have reached one conclusion – Mr Trump’s methods are borderline insane.
Yet among political scientists, his frighteningly off-hand tweets and rubbish talk are prompting discussion of an even more bizarre possibility. Perhaps there is Nobel prize-winning method behind the apparent madness.
Given his impatience with pointy-heads, it is unlikely Mr Trump is familiar with the works of the late Prof Thomas Schelling, the American foreign policy expert who in 2005 won the Nobel memorial prize in economics for his work on conflict and co-operation.
But it is possible that Trump discovered for himself the concept that made Schelling famous. After all, it can be found in the works of Niccolo Machiavelli, author of that notorious 16th century guide to political strategy, The Prince.
The Italian diplomat to whom Trump has often been likened, put it bluntly: “It is a very wise thing to simulate craziness at the right time.”
And according to Schelling, the right time can be when you are in a high-stakes conflict, such as a nuclear stand-off.
His disturbing advocacy of what he called “rational irrationality” has its origins in Game Theory, a mathematical bag of tricks invented in the 1920s to find the best strategies for playing card games.
By the 1950s, its possible applications to far more serious “games” had attracted the interest of US think tanks and the Pentagon.
Brilliant theorists such as Schelling and John Nash (the subject of the 2001 Oscar-winning film A Beautiful Mind) analysed a host of situations where adversaries had to work out optimal outcomes without knowing what the other side was planning.
The most infamous was the game of “chicken”, in which two drivers head for the edge of a cliff, with the winner being the one who bails out last.
Clearly, the best collective outcome is for both drivers to do the same thing and “chicken out” at the same moment. But for each driver, the winning strategy is to drive on and hope the other bails first.
The problem, of course, lies in ensuring that the other driver does so before you both go over the cliff. But how can that be guaranteed?
Early Game Theory was based on the idea that ultimately, everyone is rational and wants the best outcome, but not at any price. So although you might not know exactly what the other player is planning, you can at least count on them being rational.
But theorists such as Schelling realised this could be flipped into a new way to win games such as chicken: convince your opponent you’re insane. No longer sure you’re rational, they will opt to play safe and bail before you do. In 1960, Schelling published
The Strategy of Conflict, in which he applied these kinds of insights to real-life conflicts and negotiations.
And in one scenario, he described how to improve a negotiating position in playing chicken by tearing off the steering wheel and waving it at the opposition to show you’re no longer in control of events.
However, Schelling came to have second thoughts about “rational irrationality” when it was put into practice by perhaps the only US president to match Trump for divisiveness – Richard Nixon.
Coming to power in 1968, Nixon set about trying to secure “Peace with honour” in Vietnam. The problem was that everyone knew the US had no hope of winning, so a way was needed to dissuade North Vietnam from pressing on.
Nixon believed the answer lay in creating the impression that he was obsessed with achieving his goal and would risk everything to achieve it.
The result was intense air attacks on North Vietnam, culminating in the notorious Christmas bombings of 1972.
The raids sparked international outrage and headlines condemned them as “Savage and senseless”. Even so, by early January 1973 Nixon’s policy appeared to have been vindicated, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords.
But what he called his Madman Theory achieved neither peace nor honour. The accords were broken by both sides and South Vietnam fell into Communist hands – precisely what the US had sought to prevent.
Schelling and other theorists sought to distance themselves from Nixon’s strategy. In fact, Nixon seems to have taken his cue from studies of other world leaders faced with tough decisions.
In his memoirs, he mentions how one had taught him “the importance of being unpredictable when dealing with the Communists”. The advice had come from Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea.
Can the Madman Theory work with North Korea? Some would argue all bets are off, as this time there are madmen on both sides.
Either way, president Trump may be about to test the idea literally to destruction.
Early Game Theory was based on the idea that, ultimately, everyone is rational and wants the best outcome, but not at any price