‘History of bloodshed is on the side of Kurdish independence’
The larger portion of the Kurdish people is expected to vote for independence from Iraq. The strong will of the people of Kurdistan coupled with accumulated grievances throughout history make a powerful moral case for Kurdish selfrule.
The vast majority of Kurds do not feel attached to Iraq nor do they identify themselves as Iraqis. The smaller proportion of Kurds who do feel empathy towards Iraq are those who have benefited significantly from the Iraqi government, who have lived in Baghdad or other non-Kurdish parts of the country, or have mixed Iraqi and Kurdish family backgrounds.
My family faced much hardship under the former dictator Saddam Hussein. My grandfather, who was a prominent Kurdish lawyer and freedom fighter of his time, was executed by the Baath regime. He was taken away from the court of the Kurdish capital of Erbil by Iraqi forces on April 9, 1979.
We waited for years for him to return from captivity. After the 1991 Kurdish uprising against the former regime, my family found documented evidence that he had been executed in 1982 in Kirkuk Khasa prison.
He died fighting for a free Kurdistan and although today’s status quo differs greatly from my grandfather’s time, the people are still deprived of their entitlements, Kurds are still not “equals” with Iraqis. True, nationalism is a concept that is fading away to some extent and matters less to me, having grown up in the West. Nonetheless, I strive to follow in my grandfather’s footsteps and live to see an independent Kurdistan so that I can witness my people obtaining their most basic rights.
On the local level, there is undeniable anger towards the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government for initiating this quest.
But most people agree that we should look beyond partisan grudges and see this as a unifying national event, regardless of who started the process. It is wrong to oppose the legitimate rights of the people solely because of hostility towards the leading party.
The “No” campaign, which is diminishing, would make more sense if it were motivated by some Iraqi-Kurdish unity, but there is no sign of that.
As regards timing, given the hostility that surrounds Kurdistan and the negative influence that neighbouring countries bring to bear on Iraq, there is no ideal time. The Kurdish quest for independence cannot be compared with Brexit or the Scottish independence movement. Few of the war-torn states in the Middle East are as politically developed as western countries. If we concede to Baghdad and the international community now and wait for a bilateral deal with the central Iraqi government – which is backed by the superpowers – we’ll be waiting till the end of time.
Past experience shows it is highly doubtful that any deal with Baghdad will ever last more than a few months, at best, before a new issue comes up. It is equally doubtful that the international community will go against tradition and support Kurdish aspirations over the disastrous sovereign states in the region.
If there is to be any progress, Iraq needs to radically reform its political system and completely abandon the corrupt system left over by the former regime, which was designed to serve Sunni domination of power and today does the same for the Shias, at the expense of all other communities in Iraq, including the Kurds.
International law and a history of bloodshed are on the side of Kurdish independence. There are risks, of course, and Kurdistan is likely to face many critical challenges the day after the referendum. What is certain is that the Erbil-Baghdad relationship needs to be redefined. A safe option for the transition might be a loose confederation – two separate and equal powers under the umbrella of a joint international entity. Independence takes more than a day or two so there needs to be an adequate system of governance, different from the present one. In a confederate system, you can have a common market of goods, services and capital giving the federal government only a limited co-ordinating and harmonising role and leaving most economic and monetary powers with the two republics.
Kurdistan and Iraq will have separate currencies, central banks and fiscal policies. Most importantly, the confederation agreement must allow either state, or both, to withdraw from the union after a fixed period and after a referendum, if there was no referendum before the agreement was made.
Such an agreement will help both sides come to terms with dramatic change and help them deal with it in a more planned and practical manner.
Past experience shows it is highly doubtful that any deal with Baghdad will ever last more than a few months