A diversionary tactic to obscure Iraqi Kurdistan’s real problems

Massoud Barzani has become almost synonymous with Kurdish patriotism in Iraq

The sea of flags filling the stadiums of the cities in Iraqi Kurdistan are an impressive, and an unusual, sight.

Such mass demonstrations of popular will have not been witnessed in the autonomous region in a while, and it took the anticipation of a very special occasion to get the Kurds to gather in such numbers.

Today, everyone living in areas controlled by Kurdish security forces, with the exception of Arabs displaced to Kurdish territory by ISIL, will get to answer a simple question: “Do you want an independent Kurdistan?”

Few Kurds in Iraq, or in Syria, Iran or Turkey, would tick the “no” option on the voting slip. Regarding themselves as the largest nation without a state, Kurds feel cheated out of their own country by devious machinations dating to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the carve-up of the region by the British and the French.

The Kurds have suffered discrimination and worse in the four countries that took a chunk out of the territories they inhabit. To outside observers, it is easy to be sympathetic to their aspirations. After all, the idea of the nation state was pursued by patriots in 19th-century Europe, and in the postwar Middle East.

But things are rarely that simple, especially in Iraq. By stirring this passion, Kurdish president Massoud Barzani has resorted to one of the oldest tricks in the political book.

Mr Barzani, who comes from the most prominent political clan in Iraqi Kurdistan, is the architect of the referendum. He knows it will result in an overwhelming “yes”, such is the enthusiasm for independence among Kurds.

It is this fervour, in fact, that counts more than the outcome of the vote. As it has been throughout the ages, nationalism is being used as a smokescreen to hide his mountain of problems and to maintain the legitimacy of a president who has lost his legal mandate.

The Kurdistan Regional Government is facing tough times. Its economy has nosedived, ostensibly a result of the war against ISIL, but in reality because of inept decision-making. A reliance on oil exports for state revenue turned into disaster when the global oil price fell. Kurdish stocks turned out to be less than predicted and a dispute with the Iraqi government over oil receipts was not resolved.

Those waiting for real democracy have been disappointed. Mr Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and another powerful party in the KRG, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, continue to rule with a mix of cronyism and intimidation.

Nothing exemplifies this more than Mr Barzani himself.

The president’s tenure ran out in 2013. He was granted a controversial extension by the Kurdish parliament, but when this expired, Mr Barzani ruled on, relying on his status as wartime leader. But with the war on ISIL as good as over, Mr Barzani needs another cause to rally the country behind him.

While most Kurds support independence with vigour, the Arabs and minorities in the socalled disputed territories are less enthusiastic. Some have decided that throwing in their lot with the Kurds offers their best hope of a secure future.

Others, such as the Yazidis, want nothing to do with Kurdistan. They were abandoned by the Kurdish peshmerga in 2014, allowing genocide at the hands of ISIL. The Yazidis have not forgotten this, and are loth to vote yes in the referendum, which equates to approval for their homelands in Sinjar falling under Kurdish control.

In Kirkuk, where the Kurdish governor Najmaldin Karim has decided the vote will be held, the Arab and Turkmen population is also hostile to the idea of falling to Kurdistan. Kirkuk is already under Kurdish control after the peshmerga seized the city to prevent ISIL from taking it in 2014.

There is concern that the vote in the disputed territories, which run from Sinjar in the west to the Iranian border, will not reflect the wishes of its population of Arabs, Yazidis, Turkmen, Christians and other minorities, but that of the Kurdish security forces that control parts of these areas.

In the end, it does not really matter. A “yes” vote does not give Mr Barzani carte blanche to declare independence, it merely gives him a stronger hand with the Iraqi central government on the issue.

Or so goes the theory. In practice, Baghdad and militia aligned with the government might be a little too impressed with Mr Barzani’s bravado. By making an aggressive push for sensitive areas rich in oil and claimed by both sides, the Kurdish president risks a military conflict between the peshmerga and Iraqi forces.

Coming so soon after the war against ISIL, another conflict would be disastrous for Iraq. But it could be even more damaging for the Kurdish region, which benefited hugely by being a comparatively safe part of Iraq. If this image is shattered, any meaningful investment from abroad or within Iraq will remain a pipe dream for years to come.

Fighting against battle-hardened Iraqi troops and militias, and without the coalition air support they received when fighting ISIL, the peshmerga could be in for a bloody nose.

These would be seriously troublesome developments for the Kurds, and for Mr Barzani, who has become almost synonymous with Kurdish patriotism in Iraq. What will the future hold for him if his bold move backfires?

Having whipped up the storm, Mr Barzani might well reap a whirlwind.