Options for Trump as Iran nuclear deal deadline looms
▶ The US president has kept many people guessing on his decision ahead of May 12, writes Joyce Karam
President Donald Trump will next week make one of his most consequential policy decisions on the Middle East by determining whether Washington will remain part of the 2015 international agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Mr Trump has kept many people guessing on what his decision will be as the May 12 deadline approaches.
The National has gathered a list of Mr Trump’s options on the deal and ranked their likelihood based on insights from diplomatic sources and expert opinions in Washington.
1. Most likely: Trump does not certify the deal but waits before imposing new sanctions
Under this option, Mr Trump will not certify the deal by refraining to send Congress a letter to waive US sanctions imposed on Iran prior to 2015. Technically, this would mean that the Trump administration took its first step to pull out of the agreement.
However, this option does not mean that the US has completely withdrawn from the deal, which does not offer provisions for leaving it.
The agreement is based on implementation, which for Washington pertains to waiving sanctions under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act every six months.
In this case, Mr Trump would have allowed Congress 60 days to decide on whether to impose new sanctions.
During this time, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, the president’s National Security Adviser, could negotiate with the Europeans a new framework or use the threat of sanctions to bring Iran to the negotiating table – something Tehran has so far rejected.
This option would allow Mr Trump to rally his base and fulfil his campaign promise not to certify what he called an insane and ridiculous deal but without completely upending negotiations with the Europeans, who still endorse the agreement.
2. Possible: US withdraws from deal and imposes limited sanctions
This option would mean that the Trump administration announces it is leaving the accord and that it intends to impose sanctions that target Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
It would not go as far as imposing secondary sanctions that would target European banks doing business with Iran, as that could fracture the transatlantic alliance.
3. Also possible: US remains part of deal temporarily While most people in Washington, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, believe Mr Trump will withdraw from the nuclear agreement, the US leader may still prove them wrong.
Congressman Mark Meadows, a Republican close to Mr Trump, told The Daily Beast in an interview published on Friday that he “would not necessarily draw a foregone conclusion that we’re out this month”.
“To suggest that it’s a foregone conclusion that we’ll be out in weeks would be inaccurate based on my conversations with some of my colleagues on Capitol Hill, both Democrat and Republican,” Mr Meadows said.
The White House has insisted that Mr Trump has not yet made a decision. Agreeing to temporarily stay part of the deal would depend on the fixes that Europeans offer.
This option would allow Mr Trump to temporarily preserve the alliance with France and Germany on Iran and seek better reinforcement or renegotiate the deal.
4. Less likely: Trump abandons deal and slaps sanctions that target European companies
This option would mean that the US completely withdraws from the Iran deal, as it did with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement. It would also mean that Congress would be authorised to approve secondary sanctions, which pertain to foreign institutions, including European ones, doing business with Tehran.
This would inflict the most damage on the Iranian regime, but it would also fracture US-European relations and hurt business ties.
5. Not likely: Trump commits to deal and enforces it
This would mean that Mr Trump had made a 180-degree shift and accepted the nuclear agreement even if the negotiations with the Europeans fail to reach a new framework. It would force the US to commit to the implementation of the deal as a non-proliferation measure, while seeking a different framework at a later stage.
But this option remains highly unlikely given Mr Trump’s long-standing opposition to the deal and that he is seeking a reversal from the Obama era rather than continuity.
6. Least likely: Trump withdraws from deal and threatens military action This option would mean that not only did the US withdraw from the deal, but it has also threatened military action against Iran if it pursues enrichment of uranium.
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has threatened that Tehran would resume “vigorous” enrichment if the US left the deal. Mr Trump, in response, said that Iran “will have bigger problems than they have ever had before” if it did so.
Hardliners in the Trump government, including Mr Bolton and Mr Pompeo, may see a benefit in bringing back a military threat against Tehran, but they will probably face a pushback from the Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis, Congress and Washington’s European allies.
This makes a military threat less likely, yet possible.
The US president is expected to make a final decision by next Saturday.
After Sunday’s elections in Lebanon, there won’t be a sea change in the country’s political landscape. The sectarian system is deeply entrenched; the dismal electoral law it has produced has only rekindled more sectarianism and engendered selfish and opportunistic alliances and platforms.
So-called civil society lost a golden opportunity after fragmenting due to a combination of narcissism, self-seeking ambition and inexperience.
Many civil society interlopers have proven to be no less corrupt than the traditional politicians they seek to displace. The ruling classes, meanwhile, have engaged in feudal-like tactics, trying to bequeath power to their children and bullying outsiders who pose a risk to the status quo.
Political parties and civil society groups have called for a large turnout in the first general election in nine years, during which parliament extended its own term three times. However, these elections are likely to make the country more sectarian, exclusive and aggressive because the electoral law, allegedly proportional, is a blueprint for sedition in a state vulnerable to the geopolitical disturbances taking place in its immediate neighbourhood.
The all-male architects of the electoral law also deliberately sidelined women, snubbing all calls to include a mandatory quota, instead choosing to prevent women from fully participating in decision-making in a country that claims to enshrine equality and modernity.
The elections in Lebanon would have been a comedy, were it not for the damage it could inflict on the democratic process there and its likely disappointing outcome by reproducing an even more sectarian and dynastical parliament.
Geopolitically, the elections are taking place amid major developments in the Israeli-Iranian dynamic in Syria, which has left the Lebanese holding their breath due to the implications for Lebanon. Indeed, Hezbollah, which is fighting alongside Iran and Bashar Al Assad in Syria, is also fighting the election in Lebanon with a view to gaining a stranglehold on parliament and the country by extension.
Hezbollah is a key part of the Israeli-Iranian dynamic and an essential component of Tehran’s project in the region. It can either keep things in check or trigger an escalation that could change the rules of the game between the two sides.
In recent years, despite the belligerent rhetoric, Israel and Iran have generally kept to the truce some believe has existed between Persians and Hebrews since ancient times, the two sides having never fought a direct war. In modern times, there has been what can be described as a natural armistice between Iran and Israel and mutual hostility to Sunni Arabs.
In the past few years, Israel did not object forcefully to Iran’s intervention in Syria alongside the regime. In Lebanon, a de-facto truce has been accepted with Hezbollah through UN resolution 1701, in the aftermath of the July 2006 war.
Nearly two weeks ago, Israel conducted a major strike against Iranian military assets in Syria, signaling it will no longer tolerate the expansion of Iran’s bases there. That marked a notable departure from that trucelike dynamic that governed their direct engagement, in conjunction with the US adopting a sharper tack against Iranian expansion in the Arab region. Even the Europeans are waking up to Iran’s incursions, despite their keenness to preserve the nuclear deal under pressure from Donald Trump. Next Saturday, Mr Trump will reveal his decision regarding the deal.
Recall that the nuclear deal was signed by his predecessor Barack Obama with Iran, opening a new chapter in the US relationship with the mullah regime that has reigned in Tehran since 1979. This shook the foundations of the strategic US relationship with the Arab Gulf nations and Egypt, which Mr Obama sought to substitute with new and improved relations with Tehran.
Mr Trump has instead resolved to reset the traditional alliance with the Arab countries and end the policy of appeasement of Iran.
These shifts will undoubtedly have implications for the Iranian project in the Arab region, from Yemen and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon.
Either Iran will get the message that the US honeymoon under Mr Obama is over, that the time has come to rein in the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Or it will decide that its project for regional domination is too precious to be sacrificed.
The first path, to reform, de-escalate and repair relations with the Arab world, would spare it from looming sanctions that would drain its economy and stir up internal unrest.
The second path, meanwhile, to wager on Mr Trump backing down and on European powers refusing to endorse new sanctions, brings many risks for Iran. But any reading of Mr Trump’s policy as empty threats would be mistaken.
He might not tear apart the deal but if he sticks to it, it would result in an implicit agreement with European signatories on new strict sanctions on Tehran designed to address the flaws in the agreement and curb Iran’s expansionism.
Either way, this and the Israeli decision to contain Iran’s military presence in Syria will have implications for Lebanon and Hezbollah. The Lebanese no doubt understand this ahead of their elections.
However, the dismal electoral law drafted by powerful bosses to undermine democracy and distract people from real issues through sectarian mobilisation, by cementing sectarianism and corruption, could have a heavy price and bring risks no less serious than the geopolitical ones looming over the country.