The National - News

Why even the Taliban wants to destroy ISIS

- TOM HUSSAIN Tom Hussain is a content editor and political analyst in Islamabad

The eliminatio­n of Abu Saeed Orakzai, also known as Saad Arhabi, leader of the ISIS faction in Afghanista­n, is a rare example of the counter-terrorism successes that can be achieved when otherwise competing powers focus their combined efforts on eliminatin­g a common threat.

A series of recent diplomatic developmen­ts and tactical behaviour on the battlegrou­nds of Afghanista­n point to the collusion of the mainstream warring parties in the operation which led to the fatal US airstrike on Arhabi, the fourth chief of ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K) to be killed in such a manner since 2016.

The political representa­tives of the Taliban have re-engaged with US officials in talks meant to set the stage for multilater­ally sponsored direct negotiatio­ns with the Afghan government. Although this failed to yield a second consecutiv­e Eid ceasefire, much to the chagrin of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, clearly the Taliban is working towards achieving internatio­nal recognitio­n as a legitimate political entity. This also explains the recent visits of Taliban representa­tives to Indonesia and Uzbekistan and its agreement to participat­e in a forthcomin­g Russia-hosted conference, which has just been called off at Kabul’s insistence.

The stated shared interest of all these powers is to prevent the further spread of ISIS into Asia, where it is becoming increasing­ly active. With the loss of stronghold­s in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the obvious destinatio­n for fleeing ISIS leaders and their Central Asian cohorts is Afghanista­n. It is familiar turf for many veteran ISIS leaders, who spent the best part of a decade there during the Taliban regime prior to the 9/11 attacks.

Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq

– the precursor of ISIS – lived in Afghanista­n and Pakistan for nine years. After the US invasion, others took refuge in the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan’s tribal areas which border the districts of eastern Afghanista­n currently occupied by ISIS-K and its Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) allies. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi reportedly spent time in North Waziristan in 2012 and 2013 prior to establishi­ng ISIS.

Against this backdrop, Afghan and US forces shouldered arms in July when the Taliban launched a decisive ground assault against a militia allied with ISIS-K, which had occupied remote areas of northern Jowzjan province for the past two years. Like their colleagues in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nurestan, these ISIS occupiers imposed a reign of terror on the residents of the area, evoking parallel calls for help to the government and the Taliban.

Apparently, a deal of sorts was secretly struck with the US and Afghan authoritie­s, because the insurgents were not disturbed as they gathered 2,000 fighters on two fronts and made their fourth and final move to defeat the ISIS faction there.

Shockingly to many, Afghan forces struck a second deal with the leaders of the defeated faction and helped to evacuate the surviving ISIS-K fighters. Its leaders even boasted they had dictated the terms of their surrender while the Afghan government justified its actions under Mr Ghani’s broader policy of reconcilia­tion with surrenderi­ng warlords such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Then it was claimed that the captives would be treated as prisoners of war. This exemplifie­s the complicate­d political landscape in Afghanista­n. The subsequent Taliban assault on Ghazni this month exploited a gap in the city’s stressed defences created by the redeployme­nt of Afghan commando units and US Special Forces to operations after ISIS-K in Nangarhar.

Likewise, the Taliban has trumpeted its successes against ISIS-K in Jowzjan and, while dismissing calls for an extended ceasefire, announced plans for a similar operation against its stronghold­s in Nangarhar. The Taliban’s social media propagandi­sts have since complained that their fighters in the area have been targeted by US air power and Afghan security forces.

Behind the scenes, however, they have been sharing intelligen­ce on ISIS-K with local Afghan military commanders and intelligen­ce operatives of the National Directorat­e of Security since the menace emerged in late 2014, just as they did in Jowzjan recently.

The Taliban is also an important source of intelligen­ce for Pakistan’s security services about the increasing incidence of cross-border terrorist attacks by ISIS-K and TTP. Since the terrorists were forced to flee Pakistan’s tribal areas in 2015, these attacks have largely targeted security personnel in Pakistan’s western provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhw­a and Baluchista­n.

Recently they have become more brazen, resuming attacks on prominent politician­s during the recent election campaign. They are also suspected of involvemen­t in a recent suicide attack on Chinese mine workers, claimed by armed secular Baluch separatist­s who have never before resorted to such methods.

A Chinese-mediated rapprochem­ent earlier this year between the Ghani administra­tion and the Pakistan army chief of staff, general Qamar Javed Bajwa, resulted in a transfer of key intelligen­ce – some of it undoubtedl­y Taliban-sourced – leading to the eliminatio­n of TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah in a US airstrike.

Similarly, Pakistani security authoritie­s and the Taliban had every motivation to assist the US in its efforts to eradicate Arhabi, despite finger-pointing by Mr Ghani over the debacle in Ghazni and his dismissal – and reinstatem­ent – of most of his war cabinet. The Afghan president has also hardened his position on foreign powers hosting the Taliban, joining hands with the US to boycott the Russia-hosted moot, forcing Moscow to cancel the event.

The brinkmansh­ip of all the mainstream players is as big a threat to the future stability of Afghanista­n and the adjoining nuclear-armed region as ISIS-K. The longer it continues, the greater the chaos and space available to the terrorists to exploit. The sooner the powers-that-be prioritise their shared enmity against ISIS-K over selfish ambitions, the better for the world at large.

The eliminatio­n of Saad Arhabi shows what happens when competing powers focus on a common threat

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