Syria’s north-east set for test in social engineering
Aproposed buffer zone in northern Syria could cause renewed socio-economic upheaval in a major oil and farming region whose Kurdish militia rulers used social engineering methods similar to the Syrian regime that had oppressed their people.
From Hafez Al Assad and his son Bashar to Al Qaeda, ISIS and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces militia, conquerors of the region along the Euphrates River Valley have altered social structures and neutralised established figures.
They expelled or forcibly transferred populations to solidify their power and install their frontmen, tactics Ankara may not hesitate to employ as it seeks to weaken its Kurdish foes and reduce its Syrian refugee population.
On Friday, Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar announced the formation of a joint operations centre with the US to manage a buffer zone
along the Turkish border. Turkey cites concern at the influence of Syrian Kurdish forces, which Ankara considers an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and argues the proposed zone will allow Syrian refugees to return home.
When the US reduced its military presence in Syria this year, it limited Washington’s ability to prevent an expanding Turkish sphere of influence in northern Syria. It also dealt a further blow to the goal of Syrian Kurdish forces to create a continuous territory along the Turkish border.
Starting in 2012, Kurdish forces took over large areas in Syria’s north-east, first as the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and later as the Syrian Democratic Forces as Kurdish leaders recruited Syrian Arabs into their ranks.
Syria’s north-east is the site of the country’s biggest oilfield and its breadbasket. The area’s population is mixed and is significantly tribal, although Kurds make up the majority in several cities. Before the 2011 uprising, Kurds were an estimated 10 per cent of Syria’s population of 22 million but were disenfranchised, with hundreds of thousands denied citizenship and not allowed to teach their own language, although the late Hafez Al Assad armed the PKK as a proxy against Turkey.
The Syrian regime had rewarded YPG leaders for helping the regime to crush the initially peaceful uprising against the Assad family rule. Later the SDF became the loyal local ally of the US in the coalition’s war against ISIS.
As it expanded, Kurdish forces appointed cadres and their associates as new power brokers in the northeast, diminishing many established Arab and Kurdish families. Ultimate authority is mostly held by “Apogis”, the ideologically fervent believers in the personality cult of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader imprisoned in Turkey.
The new figures solidified their influence by selling wheat and oil to the Syrian regime. Sociopolitical arrangements imposed by the YPG have resembled the Alawite-dominated Syrian regime structures under which the behind-the-scenes viceroys in the north-east were security agents, while local council structures were erected to give the appearance of grass-roots democracy.
But without US support, Syrian Kurds would not have been able to sustain many of their clients.
Radeef Mustafa, a prominent Syrian Kurdish lawyer opposed to the YPG, said the group has worsened the situation by “acting as a control-obsessed militia not interested in mending society or in the development
of communities”. Mr Mustafa led peaceful protests against the Syrian regime early in the uprising in Ain Al Arab, which later became known to the world by its Kurdish name Kobani when Kurdish forces defended the border town against ISIS.
But the same force that kept ISIS at bay also forced Mr Mustafa into exile in Turkey for his criticism of the YPG.
Since then, Mr Mustafa has been leading dialogue efforts between Arabs and Kurdish figures from the north-east in event of a YPG withdrawal from the proposed safe zone.
Syrian refugees might head to the proposed safe zone, if they regard it as a better alternative than narrowing options in Turkey. Mr Mustafa proposes elections in the zone within six months as a step towards building a self-government until a larger political compromise for Syria is reached.
But Turkey has not been interested in pursuing such a scenario in areas under control of its rebel proxies in Idlib and northern Aleppo. These areas include the mostly Kurdish enclave of Afrin, from which the YPG withdrew last year, prompting an exodus of the area’s Kurdish population to regime-held Aleppo and remaining YPG areas in northeast Syria.