Iran’s self-created roadblocks in its new strategic vision to be a global influencer

As Iran seeks to consolidate its position regionally and internationally, its strategic visions are intersecting with negotiations, threats and diktats adopted by the Iranian leadership. At the same time, the Iranian regime is exhibiting anxiety as well as triumphalism.

Iran’s neighbours are drawing strategies for economic growth, tourism, investment and coherent domestic change. As some of them seek to exit wars and launch regional dialogue, such as the Saudi-Iranian talks, Iran’s priority remains its nuclear programme and expansionist vision. This is why Iran’s rulers are furious when elections in a country like Iraq produce results undesirable to Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps – given Iraq’s crucial status in Iran’s regional expansionist project.

Likewise, Iran’s leaders will never allow Lebanon to fall outside the control of its partner Hezbollah, because Lebanon is an indispensable instrument in Iran’s strategy vis-à-vis Israel. After all, Syria has been taken off Iran’s hands and can no longer serve as a front with Israel, thanks to a Russian and American decision.

This has been a source of great chagrin to Iran, not because Iran is serious about launching a military battle with Israel – which would be by proxy, anyway – but because Iran and Hezbollah’s huge military investments in Syria cannot be leveraged to use the latter as a front in the Iranian strategy. Rather, Syria has been leveraged to further Russia’s strategy. As a result, Lebanon has become more important to the Iranian project.

One of Iran’s objectives is to domesticate Lebanon and confiscate its sovereignty. Yet, for different reasons, the US, Europe, Russia, China and some Arab nations have chosen not to comprehend the implications of this, amid full collusion or ignorance by Lebanon’s corrupt ruling cabal.

The fate of Lebanon has thus become more complicated than the fate of Yemen, for example, given the priority of the latter in the Saudi-Iranian accords, should they come to fruition. But what then are the features of the emerging strategy of major regional powers, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran? And what are the prospects for destruction and construction in the capitals of these powers and the capitals of their satellite nations, like Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus?

First, it is crucial to understand the emerging strategic vision of Iran, following the elections and years of sanctions and isolation.

Here, “Iran for Iran” is the broad title of a revival project sought after by Iran’s rulers, whereby a new Iran is envisaged as a major military power, backed by multi-layered instruments of influence. The basis of this vision is an attempt to enhance Iranian identity domestically and develop it abroad so that Iran becomes a respected power, one that can wield influence far beyond the region.

This vision, however, clashes with policies that the Iranian regime often deploys against its own people, who are divided into two groups: one that is angry because of their living conditions as compared to those of other peoples, especially in the Gulf, where Saudis, Emiratis and Qataris reap the fruits of their countries’ resources to invest in a high-tech future; and a second group, proud of their nation’s nuclear capabilities and ideological defiance of the West. It is the latter’s wish for Persian revivalism that the rulers of Iran want to capitalise on, if only to contain and divert it from challenging the ruling theocratical doctrine.

At the level of foreign policy, the ruling establishment in Iran perceives its interests as crucially dependent on Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq – in this order – remaining part of a pro-Iranian eco-system to guarantee loyalty to Iran’s interests. According to the Iranian strategic vision, constructing this ecosystem is Iran’s responsibility and must use all channels and instruments, with inducements here and threats there, and by empowering local loyalist forces.

Iran is determined to never relinquish under any circumstances the trinity of its regional project: Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Whether there is a setback here, or a victory there, the strategic decision is to “stabilise” Lebanon in the framework of Iranian dominance as a priority, followed by Iraq and Syria, all three of which countries are assigned a tailored strategy by the IRGC.

Israel also has its own strategy. From the view of Iranian leadership, Israel must remain an enemy, to mobilise Muslim emotional support and justify Iran’s presence in the anti-Israel camp. Iran wants to also work with European countries to partially isolate Israel, leveraging their positions vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue.

As Iran’s relations with Europe grow deeper, Tehran believes it may be able to influence European policies on Israel, through nuclear inducements – the magic wand to enchant Europe.

The cyber war being waged by Israel on Iran may not come out to the public. Neither Iran nor Israel wants direct military confrontation, and both prefer proxy wars using Arab territories.

The second priority in the Iranian foreign policy strategy, after Lebanon, Syria and Iraq is the Gulf region. The first mission for Iran is to protect its presence there and control strategically the Gulf’s vital routes. Iran’s vision for the region is based on seeking mutual dependence with the Gulf countries instead of open confrontations.

Iran’s rulers understand well that their country is not yet a global player, but they want Iran to be a global influencer. In the meantime, Iran’s rulers believe regional infiltration is more important. Therefore, they believe it will be crucial to produce a positive impression of a new Iran that adopts a quiet strategy of “soft control”, while building a comprehensive mechanism for influence. In Iran’s view, this requires expanding the circle of friends to include moderates, and not just Russia and China, to propel Iran’s strategy forward.

The good news is that Iran’s new strategy is not full of explicit threats, yet the Iranian policy vis-à-vis countries like Lebanon and Iraq are anything but “soft”. Rather, it is a policy of full subjugation of these two countries to use them in the Iranian security belt.

Perhaps a new chapter with Saudi Arabia will lead to new accords on Yemen, where the war is being fuelled by the IRGC and Hezbollah. The Saudi-Iranian talks are dominated by military and security priorities. Yet the talks are crucial for the Gulf as well as Yemen, and perhaps later Lebanon.

Regional and international bargaining is at a peak these days, from the Vienna talks seeking to revive the nuclear deal with Iran, to regional negotiations. For now, the fate of the polarisation and the outcome remain unknown.

But what is happening in the Arab Gulf states suggest their leaders are resolved not to be stuck in yesterday’s confrontations. The major development projects for the Saudi capital Riyadh and those of Abu Dhabi, are examples of the priorities of these powerhouse nations, who have achieved something worthy of pause, by adopting a policy of economic and technological growth seeking to spread confidence and well-being among citizens.

By contrast, the misery felt in Beirut, Baghdad and Damascus is proof of the failure of the Iranian doctrine. But Tehran’s rulers do not care about the happiness of the Iranian people in Iran’s magnificent cities, or the happiness of people in Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus. Still, one can only hope that the new strategy in Iran will prompt them to peek at the development of its neighbours. Nuclear weapons will not restore Iran’s magnificence, and destruction can never be a sustainable policy.

Iran is determined to never relinquish the trinity of its regional project: Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, in that order