Pakistan is pursuing peace deals with domestic extremists, but it won’t be easy
Pakistan’s government is attempting to negotiate a permanent ceasefire with the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist group that has killed thousands over the past decade. The same government also negotiated an agreement in October with a religious political party, the Tehrik-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), which paralysed life in Islamabad with violent demonstrations over statements made by French President Emmanuel Macron regarding cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed.
Following the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, questions have arisen as to why Islamabad is opting for a more conciliatory path with its own militants.
Although it reflects pressure felt by the ruling establishment, it does not mean that the state is losing its nerve, or that an extremist revolution is around the corner.
Many people, even in Pakistan, would struggle to tell the TTP and TLP apart; both invoke similar slogans about extreme interpretations of Islam and threatening violence against the state and the public. But the reality is that they are deadly rivals with very different supporters, different goals and different tactics.
The militant TTP is also known as the Pakistani Taliban. Like the Afghan Taliban, it is an extremist fringe of the Deobandi religious movement. Today it is strongest in Pakistan’s provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, on the border with Afghanistan.
The TLP, on the other hand, adheres to the Barelvi religious movemen. Its strongholds are in Punjab and Sindh, where most of the country’s population and wealth are concentrated. Although it has historically been associated with the pluralistic traditions of Sufism, an assertive and radical movement has emerged within Barelvism in response to mass-casualty attacks on the community by militant Deobandis. The TLP is at the forefront of this wave.
And while they oppose each other, they also antagonise the Pakistani government from different angles.
The Pakistani Taliban’s deeper issue with the state is about territory and autonomy. Its roots are in a part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa known until 2018 as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). The semi-autonomous nature of FATA was, for many decades, exploited by Pakistan’s military to stage operations there to support jihad in Afghanistan. This allowed a large array of militant networks, built from local Deobandi and foreign recruits, to spring up. That served the military well until 9/11, when the US pressured Islamabad, often against its own will, to assert more control.
FATA’s militants, chief among them the Pakistani Taliban, have never reconciled themselves to the loss of autonomy that followed. The TTP wants to inflict enough pain and embarrassment to make Pakistan’s military reconsider its heavy presence in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and revert to the old model.
The TLP’s struggle is different. It is less violent, but more ideological. Shrewdly, its mobilisation efforts do not focus its followers’ anger against its Taliban rivals, but on strawman targets like offensive cartoons overseas. It is pure religious populism. Unfortunately, it also creates serious collateral damage, including an increasingly dangerous and intolerant society.
Although it exploits religion, the TLP’s real strength is the rapid urbanisation of Punjab. Economic development in Pakistan has brought millions into towns and cities from the countryside, but failed to give them adequate social belonging or political representation. The TLP’s willingness to challenge the state riles up its target audience.
There is an economic and political dimension to the Pakistani Taliban challenge, too. The government is in difficult economic straits, and the military is as keen as civilians to draw international investors and tourists. China, the largest foreign investor, has made clear that militant violence does not make for a conducive investment environment.
But the political challenge posed by the TLP is far tougher. The TLP did well in the last Pakistani elections. There is a real risk that its protest movements could broaden to dissatisfaction with the ruling party’s economic performance. The government’s response has often been to appease the TLP on the ideological front, but this has been counterproductive, as it makes the party even more difficult to oppose.
Islamabad’s long-term strategy is what will matter most. Recent ceasefires and temporary agreements are not enough, but they provide space for something more permanent.
One longer-term approach that could be forced by the stand-off with the TLP may be for the state to commit to a more consistent, moderate ideological line. In fact, the military has already used that strategy in countering the Pakistani Taliban; it asserted control in FATA after 9/11 by reminding soldiers who had previously worked closely with the militants that the word “jihad” in the army’s own motto means something different to the Taliban.
The challenge with the TLP is similar, but one that civilian politicians and clerics, rather than generals, will have to take on. A public space free of threats from the Taliban will help. And Prime Minister Imran Khan is well placed to convincingly articulate a positive vision of what inclusive pride in faith could look like. It remains to be seen whether he will get the encouragement and support needed to do it.
While the TTP and TLP oppose each other, they antagonise the Pakistani government from different angles