France’s military budget bases itself on old strategies in a dangerous new world
On April 4, Sebastien Lecornu, France’s Minister of the Armed Forces, released a new “Military Programming Law” meant to provide the framework for the country’s defence expenditure during the 2024-2030 period. The government of President Emmanuel Macron has talked of a “historic” budget meant to “transform” its armed forces.
In light of the war in Ukraine and its long-term impact on European security policies, France is adamant to remind everyone that since Brexit it remains the de-facto biggest military power of the EU. It follows announcements by Germany’s government last February to ramp up its own annual defence budget by €10 billion ($11 billion).
At first sight, the new bill submitted by the French government evidences its ambitions: estimated at €413 billion, the law represents an increase of more than €100 billion from the previous one for the 20192025 period. But the numbers hide a more complex reality. Less than a post-Ukraine military revolution, the bill reflects a compromise that takes stock of several constraints at the strategic, political and economic levels.
First, defence commentators in Paris were quick to point out that the new law does not actually increase the capabilities of French armed forces. Be it for the quantity of its fighter jets, tanks or warships, the government’s decision indicates a status quo if not sometimes a reduction of those items. This may be partly explained by the economic environment – more specifically the inflation rate, which is expected to consume approximately 7 per cent of the total budget (equivalent to about €30 billion). Although the government talks of a “war economy” mind-set, some claim this is in reality a lowcost war economy.
A second aspect is that the new law is less about building a new military model than about catching up with shortcomings that undermined the readiness of French armed forces for a long time. The French armed forces have faced budget cuts in the past two decades, leaving officers frustrated with the feeling that they are constantly asked to do more with less.
The most important of those shortcomings relates to ammunition stockpiling. Like most European countries, France has seen its ammunition supplies declining since the end of the Cold War. However, the war in Ukraine with its relentless flow of offensives and counter-offensives reminds us of the need to maintain sufficient resources for the long haul.
Given the pledges made by European governments to arm Ukrainian soldiers, the conflict has put unprecedented pressure on the continent’s industries to deliver the weapon stocks needed on the battlefield. The issue goes beyond Europe’s support to Kyiv. A recent parliamentary report in France concluded that the slow pace of production cycles for military supplies would prove untenable were the country to face a high-intensity conflict. To that end, the new bill also announces €16 billion dedicated to the replenishment of its supplies.
But another reason why the military programming law does not reveal any spectacular increase is that the most important area of investment will still be France’s nuclear deterrence. With an annual budget ranging between €5 billion and €7 billion, the nuclear complex remains the biggest component of France’s military strategy. It is unlikely to change with the ongoing development of a new ballistic missile and a new generation of nuclear ballistic missile submarines, all expected to enter service some time in the next decade.
In addition to these operational and financial considerations, this new bill also comes at a difficult time, politically, for the centrist government of Mr Macron. A year after a difficult re-election, the Mr Macron has failed to find a modus operandi with the parliament. In absence of an absolute majority, his party, Renaissance, has tried to build ad-hoc coalitions but faced stiff resistance from all oppositions. This was most recently on display during the contentious debates on Mr Macron’s pension reform, opposed by both the left and right as well as the majority of the public.
In March, the reform was eventually imposed on French legislators by using an article of the country’s constitution that allows the government to submit a law without a vote by the National Assembly.
In that environment, far-left opponents of Mr Macron are likely to challenge any new project pushed by his government. Even the right-wing party, the Republicans, argued in the Parliament that the financing of the bill presented by the government was unconvincing. This all suggests that defence expenditure will not be immune to the current climate of partisan politics in Paris.
But beyond the issues related to the economic and political constraints, this new military programming law is also a revealing document on how France sees its future security strategy. In fact, the bill tends to nuance the centrality of the Ukraine war in Paris’s thinking. The scenario of a conventional war is mentioned as the first threat but transnational terrorism is next.
Nonetheless, for French strategists, a ground invasion does not represent a scenario that could apply to France. Even then, French forces are trained to operate under the assumption that European and American allies would join them.
The military model emerging from the document is one that still relies on nuclear deterrence as well as new means to project power beyond France’s borders. In particular, new investments allocated to patrol vessels tasked to defend French territories in the Indo-Pacific reflect the enduring desire of Paris to play a role in the region. These were priorities well before the war in Ukraine. In other words, the conflict may change the way Europeans think about using their armed forces, but not so much how they would use them.
Defence commentators in Paris were quick to point out that the new law does not actually increase the armed forces’ capabilities