Greatest Battles
The Normandy landing stutters at Villers-bocage
As one of the largest cities in Normandy, Caen was a communications hub at the centre of a major road network, connected to the English Channel through a canal. Its seizure after D-day would anchor the left flank of the Allied perimeter and deny the Nazis the advantage of the river and canal, which would otherwise be major obstacles to the inland advance.
General Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of Allied ground forces in Normandy, envisioned the capture of Caen within hours of British forces storming ashore. However, stiff German resistance from the veteran 21st Panzer Division, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend and the 716th Infantry Division had stymied progress towards the city.
A week after the Normandy landings, Allied troops were slugging their way inland against fierce
German opposition, but Caen remained firmly under enemy control despite numerous efforts by British forces to take the city in a direct assault.
For Montgomery, though, an opportunity had developed as the US 1st Infantry Division pushed southward from Omaha Beach, compelling German forces to retreat and opening a gap west of Caen between the 352nd Infantry Division and Panzer Lehr, a crack German armoured division.
OPERATION PERCH
Montgomery’s staff altered Operation Perch – its plan for the early ground phase of the Normandy Campaign – hoping to take advantage of the recent development in the enemy’s front line. A pincer movement might outflank Panzer Lehr and envelop Caen, forcing its stubborn German defenders to retreat or risk being surrounded. While the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division attacked in the east, the 7th Armoured Division – the ‘Desert Rats’ – was to swing south-eastward and capture the town of Villers-bocage, just over 27km southwest of Caen, along with nearby high ground identified on maps as Point 213.
On 10 June, the refocused Operation Perch commenced with the advance of the 7th Armoured Division. Although some initial gains were made east of Caen, a counterattack from 21st Panzer stopped that British thrust. Still, the prospects for the western pincer’s success remained.
As the 7th Armoured Division advanced, Major General Fritz Bayerlein realised the predicament his division faced and ordered a ferocious counterattack that bogged down the western drive around the village of Tilly-sur-seulles. On the morning of 12 June, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, travelled to 7th Armoured headquarters to meet with Major General George ‘Bobby’ Erskine, the division commander, who suggested that Panzer Lehr might still be outflanked if 7th Armoured disengaged from the fight at Tilly-sur-seulles and struck toward Villers-bocage from further west.
ROLLING TOWARDS VILLERS-BOCAGE
Within hours, the 22nd Armoured Brigade – the vanguard of the Desert Rats – was on the move toward Villers-bocage. As darkness fell around them, Brigadier Robert ‘Looney’ Hinde called a halt to the advance just eight kilometres from his objective. Early on the morning of 13 June,
of the 4th County of London Yeomanry and troops of Company A, 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, rolled into Villers-bocage against only token resistance.
Wary of a German counterattack, Brigadier Hinde ordered the tanks of A Squadron, County of London Yeomanry and Company A, The Rifle Brigade, to occupy Point 213. German reconnaissance vehicles had been spotted and enemy soldiers were seen making a hasty getaway in a staff car. Soon enough, the enemy would be coming back, and occupying Point 213 would invite a counterattack against the exposed position. Just after 9am, the leading elements of the 4th County of London Yeomanry and the accompanying infantry reached Point 213. Sentries were posted but their field of vision was limited due to the terrain and thick woods.
TIGERS UNLEASHED
On the morning of D-day, two companies of Tigers from SS Heavy Tank Battalion 101 had reached the vicinity of Villers-bocage. The 1st Company was under SS Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Rolf Möbius, and the 2nd Company was led by Obersturmführer (First Lieutenant) Michael Wittmann. Already a leading panzer ace and holder of the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves, Wittmann had well over 100 kills on the Eastern Front to his credit. The ensuing battle contributed to the growing legend that was Obersturmführer Wittmann.
Three Tiger tanks, those of Wittmann, SS Oberscharführer (Company Sergeant Major) Jürgen Brandt and SS Untersturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) Georg Hantusch, were seen advancing parallel to the British column along a path adjacent to the highway but screened by a tall hedgerow. As the other two Tigers attacked the British armour at
Point 213, Wittmann emerged from a wooded area onto National Highway 175, where he destroyed a Cromwell at close range and then blasted a Sherman Firefly, its blazing hulk blocking the British column. In short order, the Tiger’s 88mm gun and its two 7.92mm MG 34 machine guns destroyed eight halftracks and four troop carriers.
STRUGGLE IN THE STREETS
Wittmann then rolled down the Rue Georges Clémenceau towards the eastern edge of Villerstanks Bocage. Three M5 Stuart light tanks of the 4th County of London Yeomanry Reconnaissance Troop, their 37mm guns no match for the thick armour protecting the Tiger, were stationed at the intersection with the road to Tilly-sur-seulles.
Lieutenant Rex Ingram ordered the driver of his 15-ton Stuart into the road – directly in the path of Wittmann’s oncoming Tiger – in an attempt to delay the German tank’s advance into the town. A single 88mm round caused the British tank to erupt in flames. The Tiger shunted the blazing wreck aside and blasted at least one more of the light tanks.
Wittmann then directed his Tiger down the main thoroughfare where four Cromwells of the regimental headquarters came into view. The first Cromwell, commanded by the regimental executive officer, Major Arthur Carr, was damaged and attempted to back out of the line of fire. Two more British tanks, under Lieutenant John L Cloudsleythompson and Regimental Sergeant Major Gerald Holloway, were both destroyed.
As Cloudsley-thompson’s crew bailed out of its burning Cromwell, Captain Pat Dyas, the regimental adjutant, reversed his tank and backed ponderously into a garden, obscured from Wittmann’s view. The action had developed so rapidly that Dyas’s gunner, away from the vehicle on a nature call, had no time to return to the tank. Positioned for a killing shot, Dyas was powerless to act as the big Tiger rumbled past, its broadside completely exposed to him.
Continuing down the Rue Georges Clémenceau, Wittmann spotted two observation post tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery as they tried to avoid contact, backing around a corner into the Rue Pasteur. The Sherman commanded by Major Dennis Wells was quite defenceless, mounting a wooden decoy gun rather than a real main weapon. Captain
Paddy Victory continued backing his Cromwell into a side street behind the Sherman at the rear entrance to the Hotel du Bras d’or. A moment later, Wells’s tank was blown up by an 88mm shell from Wittmann’s Tiger. Captain Victory tried to escape, but his transmission gears locked up. As Wittmann passed by, the Cromwell crew grasped a fleeting hope that they had remained unseen. But the Tiger stopped, reversed for a moment, then pumped a round into the British tank just below its turret. The crew bailed out, but Captain Victory returned to the disabled Cromwell and destroyed its interior.
While Wittmann shot up these British tanks and moved steadily westward towards the centre of Villers-bocage, Lieutenant Charles Pearce escaped from the area in a scout car and alerted B Squadron to the presence of the marauding Tiger on the other side of the town. After winning a momentary reprieve, Captain Dyas began tracking Wittmann through the streets of Villers-bocage.
Lockwood was the first British tanker to hear Lieutenant Pearce’s alarm; he turned his Firefly from the Place Jeanne d’arc onto the Rue Georges Clémenceau and got the drop on Wittmann, firing a 17-pounder shell that inflicted slight damage on the Tiger. In turn, Wittmann swerved into a brick wall causing it to collapse onto Lockwood’s Sherman.
Wittmann knew that other B Squadron tanks were closing in and proceeded only a few yards before the crash of a shell caused the Tiger to lurch to a halt in front of the Huet-godefroy clothing store. Fired from an alley between the Rue Jeanne Bacon and Boulevard Joffre, the anti-tank round disabled a drive sprocket. Wittmann and his crew abandoned their Tiger, expecting that it might be recovered later.
CHAOS AT POINT 213
While Wittmann was devastating the British armour in Villers-bocage, Brandt and Hantusch drove on to Point 213 and added to the carnage. Within the hour, a third Tiger, commanded by Unterscharführer Kurt Sowa, joined the assault and by 10am reconnaissance troops and armoured vehicles of the 4th Panzer Company, SS Heavy Tank Battalion 101 reached the one-sided battle. Half an hour later, the Germans were rounding up scores of prisoners and consolidating their hold on National Highway 175 between Villers-bocage and Point 213.
A short time after Wittmann’s arrival at Chateau d’orbois, Captain Helmut Ritgen was moving to block potential British routes of advance north of Villers-bocage. Ritgen soon ran into some intense fire from concealed anti-tank guns, lost one Pzkpfw IV and was ordered to regroup near Villers-bocage. Subsequently, he sent four tanks roaring in from the south, while ten more renewed their advance along Rue Georges Clémenceau. The British claimed a pair of Pzkpfw IVS. Around 1pm, Panzer Lehr’s armour tried to take the town again, losing two more Pzkpfw IVS in the process.
British and German infantrymen fought street-to-street and house-to-house, before the defenders
pulled back to positions along the edge of town. A British roadblock in the centre of Villers-bocage concealed several six-pounder anti-tank guns, at least one Sherman Firefly and several Cromwells, which lay in wait for any German tanks advancing towards the town square.
While the initial Panzer Lehr forays into Villersbocage were rebuffed, Wittmann sped back towards Point 213 and conferred with Möbius prior to a renewed effort against the town. Möbius then moved his Tigers into Villers-bocage along the Rue d’evrecy and linked up with the remaining Pzkpfw IVS of Panzer Lehr near the town.
The German commanders distributed their tanks to attack from multiple directions, but by the time the combined assault commenced, the British were waiting in ambush. As the lead Tiger trundled down National Highway 175 into the town, a nearby Firefly unleashed a 17-pounder shell that missed. Quickly after, a six-pounder gun found the mark and knocked out the big tank.
Immediately, three more Tigers came into view, veering away in an attempt to outflank the British positions and the fight developed into a bushwhacking melee reminiscent of something from the Wild West.
By 6pm the enemy had advanced close to the 1/7th Battalion headquarters and reluctantly, the decision was made to withdraw from the town. Under a covering barrage from the 5th Royal Horse Artillery and the heavy guns of the US V Corps, the British pulled back. The Germans harassed their movement until well after dark.
Artillery of the US 1st Infantry Division helped to beat back the initial German thrusts, but simultaneous attacks in the afternoon succeeded in breaching the defensive box and rendering artillery support useless. Just as the German assault threatened the 22nd Armoured Brigade headquarters, it was finally beaten back. The
22nd Armoured Brigade was pulled back and consolidated with the Allied line to the north and west, effectively ending the British bid for Villers-bocage.
In the aftermath of the battle, the capabilities of the British field commanders, including Brigadier Hinde, Major General Erskine and Lieutenant General GC Bucknall commanding XXX Corps, were debated. The tactical deployment of the
22nd Armoured Brigade was questioned and the troops of the 50th Division were not the only potential reinforcements available. None of these commanders made a formal request for support from the 50th Division or any other units that might have intervened.
Equally, Dempsey and Montgomery cannot escape some responsibility. Both senior commanders seemed uncharacteristically detached, failing to assert strong leadership and decisionmaking during the fight. Within weeks of the disastrous failed offensive, Hinde, Erskine, and Bucknall were relieved of command. Dempsey later admitted that “the whole handling of the battle was a disgrace”.