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BRUTAL MAVERICK WHO SAVED THE SAS

Its first sortie behind enemy lines ended in disaster. But, as the latest nerve-jangling instalment of our series reveals, the breathtaki­ng — and bloodthirs­ty — heroics of one man redeemed the regiment . . .

- By Ben Macintyre

ON SATURDAY, the SAS regiment’s official historian Ben Macintyre revealed its disastrous beginnings as a bunch of misfits, outsiders and reprobates led by buccaneeri­ng aristocrat, Captain David Stirling — and how their first mission in the North African desert was a fiasco with the loss of many men. Today, in the second gripping extract from his book on the SAS, he shows how Stirling and his survivors dramatical­ly redeemed themselves . . .

WRAPPED up against the cold in his distinctiv­e duffle coat, SAS founder Captain David Stirling scoured the desert horizon for two long nights hoping to see stragglers from his unit’s first ever mission. He waited in vain. Just days before, 55 men of his new detachment had parachuted into the desert behind enemy lines to sneak up on German and Italian airfields on the North African coast and blow them to smithereen­s. But only 21 returned, and not a single enemy plane was destroyed.

It had been a total disaster, and now the unit’s entire future hung in the balance.

Stirling’s unconventi­onal method of waging war had many detractors in the British Army, who argued that an undiscipli­ned rabble like his flouted every accepted military notion.

This abject failure would only confirm them in their belief that the very notion of a private, undercover army was beyond the pale

and Stirling Analysings­hould realisedbe what squashed.the had problemgon­e wrong,had been the weather. Strong winds wrecked the parachute jump, then torrents of rain washed out any chance of reaching their targets.

But what if next time he and his men went in overland, taken to their targets in trucks of the Long Range Desert Group, a deeppenetr­ation reconnaiss­ance unit?

The LRDG had managed to get the survivors of the first mission out of the desert without difficulty, so there was no reason why they shouldn’t drive them in as well.

It was a glaringly obvious conclusion. The only question was whether he would get another chance to put into action his daring but unorthodox scheme. Or whether the very idea of special forces sneaking behind enemy lines and causing havoc would be consigned to history.

What came to Stirling’s rescue was the desperate plight of the British Army in that winter of 1941, with the German field marshal Rommel’s tanks on the move from Libya into Egypt and a major defeat on the cards. Some sort of strike-back was urgently needed.

The bigwigs of the Eighth Army decided on balance that the SAS would be given the opportunit­y to redeem itself.

BUT first it needed a base in the desert. The chosen spot was Jalo, a fly- blown, roastingly-hot oasis with a wooden fort deep in the vast Libyan desert, but within striking distance of the Mediterran­ean coast, where the German and Italian airfields were.

On December 5, 1941, the SAS took up residence, and Stirling gathered his officers to prepare for the second operation in the knowledge that, if it failed again, it would definitely be the last.

Their target would be the enemy airfields strung out along the Mediterran­ean coast of North Africa. Once these had been sleepy tuna-fishing villages. Now they were vital aerodromes from which fighters and bombers harried British lines and attacked convoys sailing to and from strategica­llyimporta­nt Malta.

But intelligen­ce suggested they were so far from the main battlefiel­d they were lightly defended, with a perimeter fence, a handful of sentries and perhaps a few land mines. Juicy targets — if only raiders could get there.

Two days later, 14 SAS recruits climbed into trucks driven by the LRDG and set off for Sirte, the largest airfield, 350 miles away. It was a nightmare journey. For three days, the convoy rattled and jolted its way through oceans of sand and rock. Sleep was impossible, while the heat and monotony induced a state of sweaty semi-consciousn­ess.

The trucks broke down, and tyres burst frequently. It was freezing at night, broiling by day.

On the fourth day, with still 70 miles to go, they were spotted by Italian planes, which blasted them with gunfire and bombs as they hid in camel-thorn scrub. No lives or vehicles were lost, but the element of surprise had gone.

That night they rumbled on, without lights and reliant on compass, until, by some miracle of navigation, they were just four miles from their target. It was time to go into action.

Stirling and two of his men groped their way towards Sirte airfield, carrying large rucksacks and submachine guns, wearing stocking caps and, as one recalled, looking particular­ly ‘villainous’. The silhouette of a plane loomed up ahead, and then another.

They were working their way around the aircraft, when a scream erupted beneath their feet. Stirling had trodden on a sleeping Italian soldier. A gun went off, and the intruders ran for their lives until safely back behind a ridge.

As dawn rose, Stirling peered over the crest and his heart warmed as he counted at least 30 Italian bombers. The men dug in to wait for an attack at nightfall.

But as the hot day wore on, they noticed planes were taking off and not returning. By nightfall, they had all gone. The Italians had been spooked into an evacuation.

A deeply disconsola­te Stirling headed back to his rendezvous point with the LRDG. He had failed again. The SAS was as good as dead and buried.

But he had reckoned without his second-in-command, the redoubt- able Paddy Mayne, a brilliant soldier but a troubled soul with a very short fuse. He had driven with the rest of the team, a dozen men in all, to Tamet, a different airfield 28 miles away.

Dozens of planes were lined up. In single file the raiders slipped onto the airfield undetected and came across a large hut, from which a light shone and sounds of merriment could be heard. A party was going on.

Mayne and two of his men crept up to the door, guns drawn. Mayne recalled kicking open the door and seeing about 30 men inside: ‘I stood there with my Colt .45, the others at my side with a Tommy gun and another automatic. The Germans stared at us. We were a peculiar and frightenin­g sight, bearded and with unkempt hair.

‘For what seemed like an age we just stood there looking at each other in complete silence, until I said: “Good evening.”

‘At that, a young German arose and moved slowly backwards. I shot him, turned and fired at another some six feet away. Then the submachine-gunners opened up. The room was by now in pandemoniu­m.’ Ordering four of his men to keep the Germans and Italians pinned down inside the mess hut, Mayne raced with the remaining six to attack the stationary planes.

In 15 minutes, they planted Lewes bombs with time fuses on 14 planes, and then climbed into the cockpits of ten more and shot up the dashboard controls. Mayne even tore out one cockpit panel with his hands.

Bombs were also planted on petrol bowsers, telephone poles and an ammunition dump. There was time for a final volley of gunfire and grenades into the hut, silencing all resistance, before Mayne gave the signal to fall back.

‘We had not gone 50 yards, when the first plane went up. We stopped to look but the second one went up near us and we began to run.’ Planes exploded in quick succession and the petrol dump blew up with a shattering roar.

A few minutes later, Mayne and his men arrived at the trucks, elated. The drivers started their engines, and the convoy steered south through the darkness, the sky flashing and rippling behind them like the Northern Lights.

‘What lovely work,’ murmured one of the men. But was it really? Mayne’s assault on the officers’ mess was certainly daring — but it was also reckless, because it alerted the enemy to the attack before the first bomb had been planted.

KILLING highly- trained pilots was, arguably, an even more effective way of crippling enemy airpower than destroying the planes themselves, but it veered away from sabotage and close to assassinat­ion.

Faced with the chance to kill at close quarters, it seems Mayne had been unable to stop himself.

Stirling was shocked when the scale of the carnage was reported back to him. ‘It was necessary to be ruthless,’ he later wrote, ‘but Paddy had oversteppe­d the mark. I was obliged to rebuke him for over- callous execution in cold blood of the enemy.’

Back at Jalo Oasis in the Libyan desert, however, the success of the mission built a new team spirit. Men who had been wary of and even antagonist­ic to each

other became firm comrades-inarms, bonded together by the adrenalin rush of danger and a new self-respect. They hadn’t let each other down. A special camaraderi­e, that distinctiv­e SAS spirit, was forming.

The same was happening among the other teams who went into action that night. One arrived at their designated airfield to find it empty of planes. So instead they hijacked a lorry and made their way nine miles to a military truck stop and roadhouse canteen.

There they found 27 vehicles parked, their drivers dozing or eating inside the roadhouse. The men moved quietly around the parking lot, planting bombs with short time fuses.

They were soon spotted. One of the raiders opened the door of a truck to toss in a bomb, and a bullet flashed by his head, missing him by inches. He fired back and an Italian fell dead.

The SAS men laced the roadhouse with bullets and the enemy returned fire. They battled it out for 20 minutes before the raiders pulled out in their trucks, leaving 20 enemy dead or wounded behind them from what they later described as a ‘bash out’, a ‘shoot out’ and a ‘bit of fun’.

On the road, they emptied a last volley into a brightly painted vehicle with blacked-out windows as they sped past. It turned out to be a mobile Italian military brothel.

The SAS had made its mark. In just one week, its four active teams racked up an astonishin­g tally of destructio­n: more than 60 planes, at least 50 enemy killed or wounded including a number of pilots, dozens of vehicles, several miles of telephone line, petrol dumps, a bomb depot and a brothel.

And they had suffered not a single casualty. Stirling had made his case. The founding theory of the SAS was surely vindicated. It was making a dramatic and demonstrab­le contributi­on to the war. He noted the ‘enormous selfconfid­ence and exhilarati­on’ that swept over his men.

In that same spirit of optimism, he paid a visit to British Army headquarte­rs in Cairo, where the Commander- in- Chief, General Claude Auchinleck, congratula­ted him, promoted him to major and authorised him to recruit an additional six officers and 40 men.

He also gave Stirling the sort of latitude denied to other commanders in the field in the planning and execution of operations. Contact with headquarte­rs was to be maintained by radio, but the commanding officer neither demanded nor expected to be told exactly what Stirling was doing until after he had done it. Which was exactly the way Stirling wanted it.

He set up an advance camp even deeper in the desert, from which he and his troops could harry and raid for weeks at a time without needing to return to base.

Over the next six months, he and his men raided all the more important German and Italian aerodromes within 300 miles at least once and some of them as many as four times.

It helped enormously that Stirling had managed to acquire 12 brand-new four-wheel- drive American Jeeps, which his engineers transforme­d into perfect all-terrain combat vehicles — light, sturdy, versatile and lethal.

With the addition of a bullet- proof windscreen from a Hurricane, an armourplat­ed radiator, camouflage paint, reinforced suspension and extra fuel tanks, they became the nimblest desert vehicles which enabled his men to approach a target over almost any country.

He added one more crucial modificati­on — the powerful Vickers K machine gun, originally intended for use on bombers to defend against fighter aircraft. A cache of them was found in an Alexandria warehouse and fitted to three Jeeps as an experiment.

They fired 1,200 rounds a minute, and the recoil caused the vehicle to shudder and buck like a spooked horse. But the destructiv­e effect was dramatic and terrifying, laying down a solid curtain of fire.

The Jeeps meant Stirling no longer needed his ‘taxi service’ — the trucks of the LRDG. By now the desert was familiar terrain, and the SAS sufficient­ly expert in navigation to operate on its own.

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lit littleS Such to distinctio­nsthe layman, may but meanin a sm small unit like the SAS they were he held in almost spiritual reveren ence, the emblems of a private br brotherhoo­d. Technicall­y, as a de detachment rather than a reg regiment, the unit was not entitle tled to them — but this was the sor sort of rule Stirling liked to flout. A And they were making waves. Wit With each successful action, tales of B British soldiers slipping behind the lines and inflicting devastatin­g damage before flitting back into the desert began to spread on both sides of the front line.

British censorship (and good sense) precluded reporting on SAS operations, but stories of the unit’s derring-do became a staple of bar-room chat in the ranks of the Eighth Army and a most effective recruiting tool.

The men were under orders never to brag of their achievemen­ts, but others boasted for them. Stirling was soon being spoken of as ‘the

romantic figure of war in the Middle East’. His exploits and legend became a mainstay of British military morale.

The Germans had a nickname for him, too. Their radio stations called him ‘The Phantom Major’ (though this may have been an invention of British propaganda).

His activities certainly came to the attention of Rommel, who wrote in his diary: ‘These commandos caused considerab­le havoc and seriously disquieted the Italians.’

The men themselves were not slow to live up to their image. They looked, dressed and to some extent played the part of swashbuckl­ing desert fighters.

Some adopted Arab headdresse­s or bandanas; few wore regulation uniform; almost all often sported bushy beards. Few in the unit were conscious of it, but theirs was a psychologi­cal, even a theatrical role, as well as a military one. At the most grinding, colourless and perilous period of the desert war when Rommel appeared to be winning, Stirling’s raiders added a dash of exotic adventure and a reputation for indomitabi­lity.

Stirling professed to be baffled by all the bar-room ‘nonsense’ talked about him and his unit: but in truth, he revelled in the attention.

But notoriety came with a price. The Axis forces had been bitten hard, and were taking counter-measures: erecting wire perimeter fences with lights around aerodromes and mounting additional guards. Raids would be even harder.

And there were still enemies among British ranks, with military high-ups more than ever determined to bring down the SAS. Among the traditiona­lists in the Army, there remained a deep suspicion, not entirely unfounded, that Stirling was fighting his own war, by self-made rules.

The infant SAS might have been growing in strength and confidence, but it was still in constant danger of being axed. It needed help in high places if it was to survive, which was when Stirling had a brainwave . . .

Why not take a Churchill on his next mission!

AdApted from SAS: Rogue Heroes — the Authorised Wartime History by Ben Macintyre, published by Viking at £8.99. © Ben Macintyre 2017. to buy a copy for £7.19 (offer valid until August 14) call 0844 571 0640 or visit mailbooksh­op.co.uk. p&p is free on orders over £15.

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Ruthless: PaddyMayne­Paddy Mayne with canine friend and inset,inset SAS fighters
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