The world’s become a dangerous place, and I fear Britain is now in the last-chance saloon...

DURING the Cold War years, the defence budget of the United Kingdom was around 5 per cent of GDP. This bought us a Royal Navy with three aircraft carriers, a surface fleet of around 50 frigates and destroyers and an effective submarine fleet.

The Royal Air Force contributed to Nato’s 2nd Tactical Air Force from four bases in Germany while the Army could field four war-fighting divisions as part of 1st British Corps.

That level of defence expenditure produced a military capability that was a major component in the overall strength of Nato – a strength that played a significant role in the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

In the hope of drawing Russia back into the family of European nations, that demise was not hailed as a victory but, without firing a single shot, the prospect of a lasting peace had been secured for Europe. The American political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, even went as far as to declare the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to be the end of history. Successful deterrence had produced peace, but what a lot has changed in the last 35 years.

Today, at less than 2.3 per cent of GDP, the UK’s defence budget is far too small for our international obligations and defence commitments – too many peace dividends have been taken while the world has once again become a very dangerous place.

We may feel a little smug that we exceed the Nato figure of 2 per cent of GDP to be spent on defence by member nations but that figure is a minimum not a goal to be achieved. There is a legacy of under-funding defence across Europe and in this country, which represents an increasing level of security risk. The chickens look as if they are coming home to roost.

A glance around the world illuminates the gravity of the present challenges to our security – a conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza that threatens a wider war in the Middle East, tension between the US and China over Taiwan and a brutal war between Ukraine and Russia to name but three.

But of those three, what really matters to us in the UK is the security of Europe, now once again threatened by Russia – a Russia not defined by a hostile ideology as before but in the grip of a demagogic dictator.

For now, Russia is being contained at great expense in blood and treasure by Ukraine, although even that is hanging in the balance. If Russia were not perceived as an existential threat, why would Sweden and Finland have bid to join Nato, and Poland be hugely boosting its defence capability and on its way to having the largest army in Europe?

SOME see parallels with the 1930s as an historical indulgence but there are urgent lessons to be learnt. In the face of Hitler’s threats, we chose appeasement, did not re-arm and war was the consequence. To prevent war, you have to pay the price of deterrence. A bully exploits weakness but respects strength.

Theodore Roosevelt. US president at the beginning of the 20th century, stated that successful international diplomacy was achieved when one spoke quietly but carried a big stick. At Munich, Neville Chamberlain spoke loudly but only carried an umbrella. Neither Britain nor France carried a big stick.

However, as we discovered during the Cold War years deterrence is expensive, but the lesson of history is that the cost of fighting a war is disastrous. In 1935 while pursuing appeasement not deterrence, we spent less than 3 per cent on defence but in 1939 after war had broken out the figure shot up to 18 per cent and in 1940 when we were fighting for our very survival, it was 46 per cent.

Today, we spend less than 2.3 per cent. Are we doomed to let history repeat itself? Had we possessed a credible trained army corps of four to six divisions in the late 1930s and been prepared to deploy it to France when Hitler was threatening Czechoslovakia after reoccupying the Rhineland, it is conceivable that the Second World War could have been prevented and the Holocaust never have happened.

Then, as now, our army is considered to be a utilitarian organisation, good at fighting small wars in faraway places and helping at home when floods, pandemics or strikes threaten – but not seen as a strategic asset that can exert major influence.

Today, in the face of a resurgent and aggressive Russia, there is a growing case to significantly increase our defence expenditure and to rebuild our land war-fighting capability. In the 1930s, commentators agonised that we could not deploy a single corps (up to 45,000 men), today we cannot deploy a single division (up to 15,000).

We are in an election year. It is commonly held that there are no votes in defence. At the forthcoming General Election, it is just possible that it will get more than its customary cursory treatment.

For it is not only the usual suspects, of which I would consider myself one, who are arguing that the UK is not prepared for a war nor our Armed Forces capable of conducting high intensity operations for an extended period.

Some of our closest allies and Nato partners have expressed their doubts about our readiness and capability, while the national media has given front page coverage to our inadequacies and the House of Commons defence committee has been explicit in its criticisms of the state of our Armed Forces.

This should not be a party-political issue but is fast becoming a national emergency. of course, there are conflicting spending priorities for the current Government and whichever party wins the next election but the first duty of any government to the people of this country is the proper provision for their security.

THE immediate defence challenge is to boost our support to Ukraine and to bolster our own defence capabilities. We are proud to say that we have donated £5billion to Ukraine over the last two years but as the country fighting on the front line today for our security that figure should be doubled at least.

Ukraine is buying us the time to rebuild our own Armed Forces. A bloody land war in Europe underlines the need for us to be able to field an army that can play a key role in the deterrence of future Russian aggression. The numeric trained strength of the Regular Army should return to nearer 100,000 soldiers for us to be able to sustain forward deployments in support of our allies on the Russian border.

As well as increased expenditure on the new ways of warfare, the bitter fighting in Ukraine shows that the day of the main battle tank is far from over. We should double our plans to upgrade our Challenger tank fleet to around 300 and look again at the decision not to upgrade our Warrior infantry fighting vehicles. And our industrial base must be incentivised to produce the ammunition and missiles that Ukraine needs today and we might need tomorrow.

It may be dramatic to say that we are in the last chance saloon, but if we are, I do not want to take my last drink there.

General The Lord Dannatt is a former chief of the general staff and co-author of Victory to Defeat – The British Army 1918 to 1940, published last year by Bloomsbury.