Don’t blame us for Galahad tragedy
AS COMMANDING Officer of the Welsh Guards at the time of the Galahad tragedy in the Falklands in 1982, I was angered by the recent letter from Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken, who at the time was Captain of HMS Fearless.
He implies that any talk about a cover-up of erroneous planning is wrong. Here are the facts.
First, to send the unescorted RFA Sir Galahad to arrive in broad daylight in full view of Argentine positions, with no planned air defence, beggars belief. Secondly, to say it was a risk worth taking to set sail with a large number of soldiers on board is farcical. And thirdly, it is not true that Welsh Guardsmen were ordered to disembark on arrival at Fitzroy, as no plans had been made for rapid disembarkation on arrival. There was only one LCU (landing craft) on station, which was engaged in unloading RFA Sir Tristram, which had arrived earlier. Other LCUs had been deployed elsewhere. Captain Larken fails to acknowledge that Falklands Task Force commander Admiral Woodward is on record as admitting the error of the sail order. The foundation of the Galahad plan on June 7/8 was undermined by the failure of HMS Fearless to rendezvous with the two LCUs off elephant Island on the night of June 6/7, which, together with the two LCUs in the dock of Fearless, were essential to enable my battalion to be landed at Bluff Cove in one lift.
This caused COMAW (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare) to decide that half the battalion should be landed at Bluff Cove in Fearless’s LCUs, with the remainder being brought up the following night. I had severe misgivings about leaving the greater part of my fighting strength behind; General Moore assured me they would be brought up to Bluff Cove the following night. I had to accept the plan; I gave orders to my two company commanders, left on Fearless, to join us at Bluff Cove with all possible speed. They and I assumed, quite properly, that they would be taken there by sea, it being the quickest way to get to Bluff Cove. COMAW failed to alert HQ 5 Brigade of this plan, so nobody knew why the Galahad was lying off Fitzroy on the morning of June 8. This series of events, coupled with flawed planning, led to the disaster at Fitzroy.
The Parliamentary Under Secretary (MoD), in answer to a question in the House recently, said: ‘The Board of Inquiry is quite clear about the attribution of blame and the Welsh Guards were absolutely exonerated.’ I and my regiment are sick and tired of totally misplaced criticism from certain senior officers that has been heaped on us. I hope this ill-founded rancour will cease.
JOHNNY RICKETT, Brigadier (rtd); commanding officer, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, 1982.