What is pseudoscience?

Ross MacFarlane finds a study of “fringe science” to be illuminating, though it misses the importance of both personal experience and social media

On the Fringe

Where Science Meets Pseudoscience

Michael D Gordin

Oxford University Press 2021

Hb, 120pp, £14.99, ISBN 9780197555767

“Pseudoscience is not a real thing.” As opening lines go, that’s quite a provocation. With eye-catching flair, historian of science Michael D Gordin is establishing a definition that pseudoscience is a negative category, not a term anyone would identify with themselves. To Gordin it is a term completely interlinked with science, so much so that one cannot exist without the other. In On the Fringe, he explores their intertwining, attempting to define what a pseudoscience is (and was) and how a history of pseudoscience brings out a history of science, too.

The book starts with a search for clear definitions. Gordin first discusses “falsification”, philosopher Karl Popper’s approach to what he described as the “demarcation problem”: if your scientific theory cannot be falsified by experiment, then you are a pseudoscientist. So, in Popper’s terms, science is not about proving something “true”, but showing that things have “not yet been proven false”.

However, Gordin finds falsification unconvincing, following the lead of recent philosophers of science who have shown its problems: for instance, several have asked how falsifiable discoveries in disciplines like geology and cosmology – made incrementally over time, rather than confirmed in a laboratory – might be. According to a strictly Popperian approach, their findings should be treated as “pseudoscience”, and struck from the scientific record, an idea Gordin finds preposterous.

Instead of a one-size-fits-all method to divide pseudoscience from science, the author suggests trying to group fringe doctrines together to spot similarities. For the rest of the book, he explores this approach, looking at groupings he classifies as vestigial sciences, hyperpoliticised sciences, counterestablishment sciences and “mind over matter”.

For vestigial sciences, Gordin looks at alchemy and astrology: concepts that held sway for centuries but fell out of fashion over time. The chapter serves as a reminder of how science is not a stable entity but something in constant flux: change over time is at the heart of how science works. Astrology and alchemy were both establishment disciplines but “fringed out” as thinking changed. He also allows the reader to ponder how some beliefs may still be held after scientific thinking moves on: I cannot be the only person to still think of Pluto as a planet even, as Gordin notes, it was downgraded from that status in 2006.

In his grouping of hyperpoliticised sciences, Gordin brings together ideas tied to ideological concepts. He describes the attempts to create an anti-Semitic Aryan Physics in Nazi Germany, Lysenko’s version of genetics under Stalinism and the rise and fall of notions of eugenics before the Second World War.

In his notion of counterestab

The gold standard of scientific testing came from methods used by the SPR to test Spiritualists

lishment sciences, Gordin groups together beliefs that he suggests seek to demonstrate their legitimacy by borrowing from the techniques and structures of science, such as topic-specific journals, membership bodies and conferences. By doing so they are positioning themselves as the real scientists, acting against what they perceive as a closed-shop establishment ignoring their discoveries. Here we encounter a range of subjects ranging from phrenology to Creationism. FT readers may be particularly interested in Gordin’s brief takes on ufology and cryptozoology.

In his last grouping, Gordin brings together studies of parapsychological phenomena, moving from the Mesmeric salons in 18th-century France to Spiritualists in Victorian parlours and investigations in ESP in 20thcentury university settings (and the rise of debunkers dismissing this work). Also notable is his reminder that the forms of scientific testing now held to be the “gold standard” – eg double blind randomised trials – emerged from methods used to test Spiritualists by early members of the Society for Psychical Research.

He concludes with a chapter framed around the questions “Who is to blame?” and “What is to be done?” Here he discusses notions of science denialism and links to corporations, showing how the playbook first created by cigarette companies who funded their own research streams to argue for “scientific” legitimacy has been drawn on by other businesses. We end with our current fractious times with anti-vax movements, for which Gordin provides historical context.

However, the book seems to end with a slight shrug of the shoulders. To Gordin, so emmeshed is pseudoscience with science that the only way to get rid of pseudoscience would be to do away with science. The book is only 100 pages long, so his pen portraits of disciplines have to be brief – though it does have an excellent bibliography for those who want more detail. It is often focused on America and slightly betrays the research specialisms of its author. It is also surprising, particularly in his concluding chapter, that there is no mention of the role of social media in these debates.

In wondering why people may become attracted to a particular fringe group, Gordin offers reasons such as a sense of community and a genuine wish for the truth. What is missing are those who base their interest on personal experience and a consideration of why that can be a defining factor for a change of viewpoint. It is an omission that also makes me wonder what Charles Fort would make of the demarcation problem. His belief that “One measures a circle beginning anywhere” suggests a fortean viewpoint would be able to encompass both science and pseudoscience and view them both with a wink and a raised eyebrow. Perhaps the most fortean place to begin measuring that circle would be on the fringe Gordin traverses in his illuminating book.

★★★★