Kursk-kromi
The anti-bolsheviks gamble on a move to advance and take Moscow
The White Guard forces gambled on a plan to circle and capture Moscow
By August 1919 General A.I. Denikin’s Armed Forces of South Russia (AFSR) constituted the major threat to the Bolshevik regime. The Red Army was facing a circle of enemies: to the west, Poland occupied Minsk; to the northwest another ‘White Guard’ force threatened Petrograd; to the east the armies of Admiral A.V. Kolchak were heading towards Moscow, the Bolshevik capital of Russia since the summer of 1918. However, the AFSR was also marching from southeastern Ukraine and was by far the most likely to take Moscow.
The Moscow Directive
In late June 1919 the AFSR had taken Tsaritsyn, (later better known as Stalingrad) and this led to Denikin issuing his order to take Moscow – the Moscow Directive – on 3 July 1919. The plan was simple: as the Red Army’s Southern Front (under A.I. Egorov), facing the AFSR, was in almost complete disarray, the proposed advance was timed to take advantage of its weakness. Denikin envisaged the AFSR marching on Moscow from three directions. One group, Wrangel’s Caucasian Army, would follow the Volga and Don rivers to Saratov then push to the west and Moscow. The Don Cossack Army (General V.I. Sidorin) would move towards Voronezh in support of Wrangel.
The Volunteer Army (VA), led by General V.I. Mai-maievsky, was tasked with advancing from its base in Kharkov towards Kiev, then swinging east to Kursk, Orel and to Moscow via Tula. The VA contained the cream of the AFSR, the socalled ‘Colourful Regiments’ (due to their style of dress), which, by October 1919, had grown into four divisions of three regiments named after dead heroes of the anti-bolshevik struggle – Kornilov, Markov, Drozdovsky and Alekseyev. These formations, numbering just over 22,000 men, were highly motivated, experienced, battle-hardened veterans.
The Bolshevik response
Facing them was Southern Front’s 13th and 14th armies – roughly 60,000 men that were demoralised, poorly trained, suffering from a high rate of desertion and weak in cavalry. Despite the speed of Denikin’s advance and Kiev’s fall on 30 August, Moscow seemed oblivious to the looming danger.
It was not until the loss of Kursk on 20 September that alarm bells began to ring. During the next few days the Red Army’s Commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev issued orders to reinforce the Southern Front with dedicated Bolshevik Party members, for the withdrawal and redeployment of reliable units, such as the Latvian Rifles, from quieter areas,
and the formation of a large cavalry striking force to counter the AFSR’S mounted units. However, it would take time for these troops to reach the front, and meanwhile the VA was preparing to march on Orel.
Luckily for the Red Army it could rely on a functioning railway system, and by mid-october most of the ‘shock’ force was taking up positions 60 kilometres (37 miles) southwest of Orel. The first units in place were the nine infantry regiments of the famed Latvian Rifles and the Eighth Cavalry Division (a formation of Ukrainian Cossacks) around the hamlet of Turishchevo 60 kilometres southwest of Orel, from where they struck at Kromi in the rear of the Kornilov Division’s position in Orel, which the Whites had captured on 14 October.
The fall of Orel had caused jubilation far to the south in Taganrog at the AFSR headquarters. A telegram was received at the Kornilov headquarters in Orel: “Anticipating a quick end to the civil war and our forthcoming entry into Moscow,” it began, before going on to ask where the division would prefer to be billeted in the capital. The division’s staff were aware of the Latvians in their rear but underestimated their numbers and purpose.
They were also not aware of the concentration of I Cavalry Corps under Commander S.M. Budenny that was taking place 180 kilometres (112 miles) southeast of Orel at Kastornoye, threatening the connection between the VA’S right flank and the Don Army’s left flank. Nevertheless, the VA’S divisions on the right continued to advance as Budenny’s units took their places. The Red Army’s plan was simply to march into the gaps between the VA’S formations and encircle them.
The VA counters
The VA was spread wide. To the left the Drozdovsky Division was over 65 kilometres
(40 miles) away from the Kornilov Division, which was some 60 kilometres to the left of the Alekseyevs, who in turn were 80 kilometres (50 miles) from the Markov Division, which was on the right advancing north towards Yelets.
It appeared that Tula was the convergence point for these four divisions. The advance looked like four fingers laid on a map, at first widespread but slowly closing in. Unfortunately, none of the divisions were in a position to support each other. Each division was therefore left to its own devices, as a result of which the Kornilov Division was allowed to dispatch its Second Regiment to secure Kromi’s vital river bridge on 15 October, while its First Regiment proceeded to Mtsensk 20 kilometres (12 miles) from Orel on the Tula road. However, Kromi was already in Bolshevik hands, and the heavy fighting that ensued forced the Kornilov Division to halt its advance on Tula.
To the east the Markov and Alexeyev divisions were both stopped by reinforcements brought in to bolster 13th Army. Despite furious attacks the VA could make no progress in this sector. Slowly the initiative was passing to the Red Army.
Retreat
As the situation developed the VA’S leaders decided that a temporary withdrawal from Orel would be prudent, and this was carried out by 20 October, with the Kornilovs moving back down the road and railway towards Kromi. To the west the Drozdovsky Division was ordered to attack the Bolshevik positions near Kromi and relieve the pressure on the Kornilovs.
This was successful and they passed through the town, which fell to the Latvian Rifles on 26 October. Denikin ordered the VA to defend a line just north of Kursk, but the Bolshevik counter-offensive was in full swing. The VA was driven back and on 3 November the Latvian Rifles broke the line at Dmitrovsk, 60 kilometres northwest of Kursk.
Through this gap poured men of the Eighth Cavalry Division, while to the east I Cavalry Corps was performing a similar move. By now the weather was deteriorating – snow and frost alternated with thaw and rain, hampering the movements of both sides. Lacking reinforcements, the VA began to pull further back to avoid the increasing possibility of encirclement from east and west. When Kursk fell on 17 November the retreat of the VA and the right flank of Don Army rapidly began to descend into a rout, as rear area units jostled for space on the evacuation trains heading south. Covered by the exhausted men of the Colourful Regiments, the VA fell back to Kharkov. The opportunity to take Moscow and topple the Bolsheviks had passed.
“THESE FORMATIONS, NUMBERING JUST OVER 22,000 MEN, WERE HIGHLY MOTIVATED, EXPERIENCED, BATTLE-HARDENED VETERANS”