The March to the Sea
On 15 November 1864 a Union army set forth from Atlanta on what became one of the most controversial military campaigns ever staged
Sherman’s Union force moves into Georgia
The struggle for Atlanta had been a cagey, cat-and-mouse affair, dragging on through the summer of 1864. Confederate forces under General Joseph E. Johnston had repeatedly withdrawn in the face of William Tecumseh Sherman’s Union army, and frustration was growing on both sides.
War-weariness was a genuine concern in the North. The procession of costly battles – names like Shiloh, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and Chickamauga still resonate today – showed no signs of coming to an end. Half a million men had died in the fighting so far.
As well as the drawn-out campaign against Atlanta, Ulysses S. Grant was bogged down in trench warfare at Petersburg, Virginia. The war seemed to be dragging on with no end in sight. Adding pressure was a presidential campaign, with Abraham Lincoln seeking re-election. Democratic candidate George Brinton Mcclellan, a former commander-in-chief of Union forces, was running against Lincoln on a so-called ‘peace-platform’ and there was real fear that Lincoln might be defeated and a negotiated settlement reached.
The Confederate armies had their own worries to contend with. Johnston seemed unwilling to stand and fight and it looked as if he might eventually give up Atlanta without a battle. Despite his success in dragging out the campaign at this critical juncture, the Confederate leadership could not stomach a seemingly endless defensive. Johnston was replaced as commander of the Army of Tennessee by the firebrand John Bell Hood, who immediately embarked on a series of costly and unsuccessful offensives. The battered Confederate army was forced to evacuate Atlanta, providing a shot in the arm for Lincoln’s campaign. “Atlanta is ours” Sherman telegraphed the president, “and fairly won”.
With tension eased by the capture of Atlanta, Sherman pondered his next move.
The following campaign would win him fame or infamy, depending on your viewpoint.
The hard hand of war
Sherman’s idea was to march his army through Georgia. It was to be a deliberate and calculated act to cow the state and destroy its war-making capabilities. In a telegram to Grant, he wrote of his plan for the “utter destruction
“AS WELL AS THE DRAWN-OUT CAMPAIGN AGAINST ATLANTA, ULYSSES S. GRANT WAS BOGGED DOWN IN TRENCH WARFARE AT PETERSBURG. THE WAR SEEMED TO BE DRAGGING ON WITH NO END IN SIGHT”
of its roads, houses, and people,” and how this would “cripple their military resources”.
Much has been written of Sherman’s decision to confront civilians with the realities of war, but he was willing to consider less oppressive methods to achieve his goal. Writing to Governor Joseph Brown, he offered to march peacefully through the state if Georgia would withdraw from the rebellion. If it did not, then Sherman would “be compelled to go ahead, devastating the State in its whole length and breadth”.
Sherman was still waiting for permission from Grant to begin his march, and Hood had 40,000 soldiers in the vicinity to contest his progress. On 21 September Hood took the imaginative decision to attack Sherman’s supply lines, forcing plans for the march to be shelved, as Union troops backtracked through the state to counter Hood’s move. Sherman, seething with frustration, persuaded Grant that chasing Hood was pointless.
On 2 November he was granted permission to abandon the pursuit of Hood and march to the coast. It resulted in a peculiar spectacle, as Sherman himself fully appreciated: “Two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war.”
Forces in Georgia
The prospect of marching hundreds of kilometres through hostile territory, with no communications, no supply line and no chance of rescue appeared daunting. Some envisioned an apocalyptic scenario in which the Union army would be whittled down by guerrilla actions, starved and harried and destroyed entirely by swarming militia. It was not a prospect for the faint-hearted. Nor was it one for the infirm or injured – a thorough medical examination weeded out almost 800 weak and sickly men before the march even started.
The army was organised into two wings, each of two corps – XIV and XX Corps for the left wing, XV and XVII Corps for the right. Sherman knew that Confederate resistance would be limited and he intended to make it even less effective through deception. Each wing would threaten a town or city, but if Confederate forces massed to resist, the wings would shift course to a different destination. With limited manpower, the Confederates could not hope to protect every potential target along the Union march.
Each wing of the army numbered more than 27,000 men, and there was also a 5,000-strong cavalry division, commanded by the hot-headed Hugh Judson Kilpatrick,
“THE CONFEDERATES COULD NOT HOPE TO PROTECT EVERY POTENTIAL TARGET ALONG THE UNION MARCH”
known as ‘kill-cavalry’ thanks to his excessively aggressive nature.
With Hood taking out of the picture the only major Confederate army available to protect Georgia, defence was left to whatever units could be scraped together. A cavalry force of 3,500 under ‘Fighting Joe’ Wheeler was potentially the biggest problem, if it could avoid the superior numbers of Union cavalry protecting Sherman’s army. There was also state militia, some line regiments, a little artillery and a selection of largely untrained cadets. Scattered around the state, they were unable to do much other than fall back in the face of an overwhelming enemy.
The march begins
Sherman’s men travelled light. Only 20 days’ worth of rations were carried in the long wagon trains that followed the roads out of Atlanta in the middle of November, heading southeast. Only five days’ worth of forage was carried for the thousands of animals used to haul those wagons – six mules for each one of the 2,500 wagons, and two horses for each of the 600 ambulances. One gun was taken for every 1,000 men, but Sherman was not envisioning any major pitched battles.
Before leaving, Atlanta was destroyed, with a fire adding to the devastation on the night of 14 November. Sherman’s men then began to cut a swathe of destruction through Georgia. The railroad was a prime target. Sleepers were
ripped up, piled into a bonfire and set on fire. The rails themselves were then heated on the fires until they softened, at which point they were twisted or bent beyond hope of repair. At the same time crops, livestock and other supplies were commandeered or destroyed and slaves were freed.
The Confederate response was mainly a futile call for the civilian population to rise up, and a hope that somehow faith would save them. The first serious fighting of the march took place on 22 November, when a mixed bag of around 3,000 Confederates, including state militia, stumbled upon a Union force half its size. Perhaps encouraged by this disparity in numbers, the Confederates chose to attack in what is known as the Battle of Griswoldville, but which was in fact little more than a slaughter. The untested southern troops, many of them boys or old men, had no business launching a frontal assault against trained and entrenched troops, and the Union soldiers were also armed with Spencer repeating rifles. The battle was onesided, resulting in around 600 Confederate casualties, against less than 100 for the Union troops. It had been a show of resistance at least, but it achieved nothing.
The ‘bummers’
Sherman’s orders to his men were to “forage liberally on the country”, but he could not risk letting loose his entire army of 60,000 men. Foraging parties were instead organised by each brigade. These usually numbered between 30 and 50 men, with a single officer to retain some sort of order. Private property was not
“THE CONFEDERATES CHOSE TO ATTACK IN WHAT IS KNOWN AS THE BATTLE OF GRISWOLDVILLE, BUT WHICH WAS IN FACT LITTLE MORE THAN A SLAUGHTER”
supposed to be entered, and civilians were to be left with enough food to get them through the winter, but the men were also to destroy most of what they could not carry back to the marching columns.
Known as ‘bummers’, Sherman’s foragers earned a dark reputation among the southern population. The general would later claim to have heard of only two rapes during the entire march, but the true toll was vastly higher. Private properties were also routinely ransacked and possessions stolen or destroyed.
Whether Sherman turned a deaf ear to reports of such activity, or whether he thought it was nothing more than the South deserved for starting the war, he tended to speak with approval of the foraging parties. They would set out in the morning on foot and invariably return in the evening riding requisitioned animals.
The idea of the march becoming another retreat from Moscow soon began to seem ludicrous. In fact there was just too much for the army to take, and massive amounts of provisions were left behind or simply destroyed. Sherman would later estimate that his army had done $100 million worth of damage to the state, with only 20 per cent of that actually used by the Union troops. “The remainder”, he admitted, “is simple waste and destruction”.
“WHETHER OR NOT HOOD’S MEN WOULD HAVE BEEN STRONG ENOUGH TO OPPOSE SHERMAN’S MARCH IS DEBATABLE, BUT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OFFER MORE RESISTANCE”
The Battle of Nashville
As Sherman’s men made progress, calls for Hood to return with the Army of Tennessee grew desperate, but he had other ideas. With just over 40,000 men, he intended to take on Union forces in Tennessee, capturing Nashville and moving northwards. He hoped this would force Sherman to reverse course.
The chance of success was slim, and they were not helped by Hood’s reckless handling of his army. At Franklin on 30 November, he launched a suicidal frontal assault against prepared defences, taking 7,000 casualties, including 12 generals. Greatly weakened, his army was then overwhelmed and shattered during two days of fierce fighting at the Battle of Nashville on 15-16 December.
Whether or not Hood’s men would have been strong enough to oppose Sherman’s march is debatable, but they would certainly have been able to offer more resistance. As it was, most of the Union troops marching through Georgia had little more to worry about than covering their 24 kilometres (15 miles) a day.
The second stage
It had taken just ten days to cover half the distance to Savannah, and one Union captain commented that it was “the most gigantic pleasure excursion ever planned”. Even the men in the foraging parties, the most obvious targets for Confederate resistance, were largely unscathed. Only 64 of them were killed during the march.
Still, there was trepidation in the North. With Sherman out of contact there was no way of knowing if he was making smooth progress or getting bogged down in guerrilla actions. There would be no firm news until Sherman reached the coast and re-established communication.
The second stage of the march began with a feint towards Augusta. Once more, this was just a ruse to draw Confederate defenders, and Union cavalry under Kilpatrick moved towards the town to strengthen the deception. In clashes with defending Confederate cavalry, Kilpatrick’s men were forced into a series of retreats. It was the most effective resistance of the entire march, but it changed nothing. A corridor was being swept through the state, with infrastructure being destroyed. Tellingly, the Union troops also targeted any building that could be “easily converted” to military use.
By late November the excursion atmosphere was starting to fade. The land was turning marshy, with pine forests proliferating.
Sherman later wrote about the invigorating scent of pine wood on the campfires at night, but his men were not impressed: “I never saw such a lonesome place,” an Illinois captain remarked, “Not a bird, not a sign of animal life, but the shrill notes of the tree frog... no vegetable life but just grass and pitch pine.”
Kilpatrick’s cavalry clashed once more with their Confederate counterparts at the Battle of Waynesborough, driving them away. Kilpatrick then hoped to rescue captive Union soldiers at the notorious prison at Millen, but the inmates had already been moved by the time he arrived. The Union troops noted the appalling conditions of the camp and a mass-burial pit holding 650 bodies, and the mood of the march soured.
The fall of Savannah
Military actions remained rare. On 1 December a captain noted that he had not heard enemy
gunfire for the previous nine days. Thoughts were turning to Savannah, where a garrison of around 10,000 was expected to offer at least some resistance. Before getting there, communications needed to be reopened, and that required the capture of Fort Mcallister.
Originally developed to defend the coast from Union shipping, Fort Mcallister had not been designed to withstand an assault from the land and was manned by just 150 Confederates, but it still represented an obstacle. On 13 December nine Union regiments stormed the fort and took it in 15 minutes. Sherman was then able to converse with the captain of the Union steamer Dandelion, re-establishing communications with the North.
Savannah now waited, and its fall was inevitable. Despite an extensive series of defensive works, including 81 pieces of artillery, there was no hope of holding out for long. Only the need to bring up heavy guns (his army had marched with only field pieces) delayed Sherman’s assault, and Confederate forces took the opportunity to quietly evacuate the city on the night of 20 December. In a light-hearted, almost giddy telegram, Sherman offered Savannah to the president as a Christmas gift. Lincoln replied with heartfelt thanks.
The ‘March to the Sea’ had been completed, at a cost of just 1,888 men killed, wounded in action, captured or missing. Only 32 deaths had been suffered due to disease, testimony to the wisdom of undertaking a health check of the men before starting the march, and also to the benefits of outdoor life and regular exercise. Sherman, however, was far from done, and controversy over his epic march was just beginning.
Sherman marches on
Progress through Georgia had been so easy, the Union general determined to repeat the process in South Carolina. Regarded as the seat of secessionism, antipathy towards South Carolina was far greater than it had been towards Georgia. This second march began on 1 February 1865, and the message to the Confederate states was clear. In case it needed underlining, Lincoln made a speech to Congress in which he stated, “We are gaining strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely.”
The South, on the other hand, was losing men, supplies and war-making infrastructure. In South Carolina, the destruction wrought by Sherman’s men was even worse. An unusually harsh winter barely slowed them as they bridged rivers and trudged through mud at a remorseless 16 kilometres (ten miles) a day. The march then continued into North Carolina, but much of its fury had abated as the war stumbled to its close. The ultimate aim, that of linking up with Grant’s men besieging Petersburg, was never realised, as Grant achieved victory before Sherman could arrive.
The American Civil War was effectively over, but resentment would linger for years, much of it stoked by the harsh treatment of Confederate states by Sherman’s men. There was concern that an interminable guerrilla war might break out, with small pockets of still-committed Confederates engaging in resistance-style sabotage and ambushes. Such a dire prospect was embraced by the Confederate cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest, who took part in Hood’s disastrous Tennessee campaign. “Be not allured by the siren song of peace,” he implored the South. “You can never again unite with those who have murdered your sons, outraged your helpless families, and with demonic malice wantonly destroyed your property, and now seek to make slaves of you.”
Forrest’s exhortations were in vain, but anger over the March to the Sea would last for decades.
The verdict
History has not viewed Sherman kindly. His marches have been condemned by some as war crimes, although events in the 20th century have cast new light on his actions. The march through Georgia now seems positively tame when compared to the deliberate targeting of civilian populations in World War
II, and unleashing foragers on the countryside seems mild compared to the dropping of atomic bombs.
Sherman had no doubt that he was actually waging a more humane form of warfare. Destroying the ability of a region to support an army was better, in his mind, than fighting that army and inflicting 15,000 casualties. While marching through South Carolina, he made this clear, commenting to one lady that he was destroying her plantation so that he wouldn’t have to kill her husband on the battlefield.
He was also acting within the law, under the terms of the Lieber Code, framed by the legal scholar Franz Lieber and established in 1863. The code stipulated that “to save the country is paramount to all other considerations” and this allowed for acts such as the destruction of civilian property. Sherman, in any case, believed the war itself was an illegal act and needed to be terminated as quickly and as ruthlessly as possible.
Many will never be convinced, and there is no doubt that Sherman intended to inflict suffering on the civilian population of the South. He had left no doubt on that score when he lobbied Grant for permission to start his march, back in October 1864. “I can make the march,” he had written to Grant in a telegram, “and make Georgia howl”.