THE END OF EMPIRES
Imperial War Musuems’ Alan Jeffreys, explains how conflict in South-east Asia raged on after 1945
By August 1945 the great struggle with the Axis powers had come to an end but the world was far from peaceful, particularly in South East Asia. Here, Imperial War Museums’ Senior Curator Alan Jeffreys discusses how violent tensions in the region continued in the aftermath of the war
The defeat of the British, Indian and Australian forces in Malaya (Malaysia) and Singapore by the Imperial Japanese Army in February 1942 foreshadowed the eventual end of the British Empire in South East and South Asia. The invading Japanese forces of two divisions (reinforced later by the Guards Division), crushed the defending Indian corps of two divisions, one Australian division and the very unlucky British 18th Division, who practically embarked straight away into prisoner of war camps and endured the very harsh conditions of the camps on the Burma-thailand Railway. The subsequent loss of prestige of the British Empire permeated across Asia, as the defeat’s ramifications perceivably included the eventual end of the Indian Army as the protector of British rule in South East and South Asia.
Like the Fall of Singapore – which was the largest surrender in British military history
– the equally disastrous retreat from Burma (Myanmar) went down in history as the longest. The Japanese forces had invaded to protect the advances in South East Asia as well as to prevent American supplies getting to China over the Himalayas. The Japanese defeated the defending British, Indian and Chinese armed forces. The real problem was the rapid expansion of the Indian Army (who made up the majority of the defending troops) both in Burma and Malaya as well as the lack of training, particularly for jungle warfare, prior to the Japanese invasion. The expanded Allied forces were under-equipped, under-trained and the long retreat became inevitable.
The next encounter with the Japanese in the Burma campaign was even more disastrous. The ill-fated First Arakan campaign was undertaken with under-trained and demoralised troops presided over by an inefficient command structure. Morale was also undermined by the huge numbers of soldiers affected by malaria and other tropical diseases, with the ensuing problems of evacuating the sick and wounded back to base hospitals.
The lack of experience of fighting in the jungles of South East Asia, together with the rapid expansion of the army, was largely responsible for the disastrous defeats in Malaya, Burma and the First Arakan. Prime Minister Winston Churchill instigated change at the highest level. The Commander-in-chief India, Field Marshal Wavell, was appointed Viceroy of India. He was replaced by General Claude Auchinleck in June 1943. Operational control now came under South East Asia Command, commanded by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. Later that year General ‘Bill’
Slim was appointed 14th Army commander and a number of experienced divisional commanders were also appointed. The senior officers were all from the Indian Army, rather than British service, and understood the ways of the army. They were all part of a generation who fought in the First World War, came through the ranks of the Indian Army in the 1930s and were instrumental in adapting the army to be more effective throughout the Second World War in all theatres.
In India, the Infantry Committee convened by Wavell in June 1943 established training divisions where recruits undertook two months’ training in jungle warfare after their basic training at the Regimental Training Centres. Jungle Warfare Schools were also established to train units and instructors. For the first time, a comprehensive doctrine was available for fighting the Japanese, the jungle and combating disease. This was encapsulated in the training pamphlet produced by GHQ India entitled ‘The Jungle Book’. General Auchinleck ensured that jungle warfare training was the main focus of all training in India.
By 1944 the 14th Army and the Indian Army generally was well-trained – and capable of defeating the Japanese in the jungle – by the time the Imperial Japanese Army made its main attack, Operation U-GO, in spring 1944. The prime objective was the speedy capture of Imphal by the Japanese 15th Army, commanded by General Renya Mutaguchi, to forestall the imminent Allied invasion of Burma.
The 14th Army commander, General William ‘Bill’ Slim, and IV Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones, decided to fight a defensive battle at Imphal due to the terrain and the all-weather airfields at Imphal and Palel. During the battles of Imphal-kohima, British and Indian soldiers inflicted a crushing defeat on the Imperial Japanese Army. There were 53,505 casualties in the Japanese 15th Army whose overall strength had been 84,280 in contrast to 16,700 casualties in the 14th Army. The fighting bore out the importance of jungle warfare training as well as air superiority, organised logistics and good leadership. It showed what resolute jungle-trained troops, with confidence in themselves and their leaders, could achieve in battle.
The 14th Army prepared for the next phase of the fighting. Slim’s plan, Operation Capital, was to defeat the Japanese Burma Army on the Shwebo plain, but it was clear that the Japanese were not of the same mind, and withdrew their forces over the Irrawaddy River. Thus the plan was revised, forming Operation Extended Capital, with IV Corps to cross the river at Nyaungu and XXXIII Corps to cross the river north of Mandalay. The defending Japanese would engage what they thought was the main force at Mandalay while IV Corps would sandwich the Japanese at Meiktila using the hammer and anvil tactics that Slim
“THE EXPANDED ALLIED FORCES WERE UNDEREQUIPPED, UNDER-TRAINED AND THE LONG RETREAT BECAME INEVITABLE”
envisaged. The plan worked and 14th Army was able to advance through central Burma and retake the capital, Rangoon (Yangon), on 2 May.
Traditionally Indian Army divisions comprised three brigades of two Indian army battalions and one British army battalion. This changed by 1944-45 due to manpower problems in the British Army. For instance, the 23rd Indian Division by the time of the battle of Imphal only had one British Army infantry battalion and one artillery unit in the whole of the division. Similarly in 1939 the Indian Army was largely officered by British officers. This also changed throughout the Second World War, for example in 1939 there were about 400 Indian officers which had increased to over 15,000 by the end of the war, although none above the rank of Brigadier. In 1945, the Indian Army was a well-trained army that could adapt to changing tactical circumstances. Over two million personnel served in the Indian Armed Forces. All Indian forces, including those who had co-operated with the British Empire, those who chose nonco-operation and those who openly opposed the regime such as the Indian National Army, all combined in ending British rule in India as Britain could no longer sustain the Raj. Thus India’s war experience paved the way for eventual independence in 1947.
At the Potsdam conference in July 1945 it was decided that South East Asia Command would be responsible for occupation duties across the region. Indian Army formations helped restore colonial empires in Saigon in French Indo-china (Vietnam) and on Java and Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), as well as contributing to the occupation forces in Japan and the British colonies such as Burma and Malaya. Major General Douglas Gracey, as Chief of the Control Commission and Commander-in-chief Allied Land Forces French Indo-china, and 20th Indian Division arrived in Saigon in early September 1945. The division had fought throughout the Burma campaign in 1944-45, adapting from jungle warfare to open warfare on the plains of Burma and crossing the Irrawaddy River. Gracey commanded the formation from its establishment in 1942 and throughout the campaign. This continuity of command and adaptation to different forms of warfare meant the division was continually learning the lessons from operations which helped the division adapt to its latest task. By the end of the war it was an all Indian Army composition division with the exception of one British Army artillery. Operation Python, initiated in February 1945, saw the release and repatriation of all British soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers who had already undertaken three years and eight months service, which was extended to three years and four months in June 1945.
The British area of occupation was the area south of the 16th parallel – Southern Vietnam, Cambodia and some of Laos. The Chinese Nationalist Army was responsible for northern Vietnam. The division’s new role in Saigon, Operation Masterdom, was to establish control, provide support for the French authorities and disarm the Imperial Japanese Army. However the division had minimal intelligence about the Japanese Army in the area let alone the
Viet Minh, the resistance movement called the League for the Independence of Vietnam. Until March 1945 the Vichy French had worked alongside the Japanese authorities but Ho Chi Minh had declared independence from the returning French on 2 September 1945.
The 80th Indian Infantry Brigade was the first to arrive in country on 8 September. Gracey imposed martial law on 19 September for which he has been much criticised by historians, even by some people at the time, but it was an impossible situation that 20th Indian Division had been sent to rectify, with the French viewing them as peace enforcers and the Viet Minh seeing them as aiding the French colonial oppressors. In reality, there were insufficient troops which effectively amounted to two battalions in Saigon. Numbers increased when former French prisoners of war were released but they fought those Viet Minh who had guarded them, with the retaliation escalating.
Atrocities included the death of over 300 French and Eurasian families in north Saigon on 25 September. These incidents led to the use of Japanese troops, sometimes under British command, to take on more offensive roles in containing the violence, until the two remaining brigades in 20th Indian Division arrived in Saigon throughout October and November, along with French forces under General Philippe Leclerc. A smaller number of Japanese soldiers even joined the Viet Minh as military advisors. The division established control in Saigon as well as providing support for the French. By November the soldiers were able to return to their original objective of disarming the Japanese as the French army largely took over internal security roles. Indeed the French officers and men were criticised by Gracey for their colonial and racist attitude towards Indian soldiers.
The battle-hardened 20th Indian Division was able to build on their experience in the Burma campaign on operations against the Viet Minh. For example on the night of 2/3 January 1946 a Viet Minh battalion on a five-pronged well-supported attack tried to take the patrol base of the 14/13 Frontier Force Rifles at Bien Hoa. The Indian and Japanese defenders, however, held them off for no casualties as compared to an estimated 100 Viet Minh killed. This type of fighting was described by the historian of the 9th/14th Punjab Regiment as “an unsatisfactory sort of fighting. The enemy wore no uniform and usually did not carry arms visibly”. Between October 1945 and January 1946, the division suffered more than a hundred casualties, 40 soldiers died and 54,000 Japanese troops were disarmed with an estimated 2,000 Viet Minh deaths. The division began to leave Saigon in early February, with effectively the last remaining units gone by the end of March 1946.
The Viet Minh associated the British and Indian troops with the French colonial government and some historians view this as the beginning of the first Indo-china war.
“HE REALISED THE RISK HE WAS TAKING AND ACTED IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO SAVE THE COMPANY OF INFANTRY IN THIS AREA, BUT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF AT LEAST A SECTION OF THE MOB, HIS TASK WAS IMPOSSIBLE”
Historian Daniel Marston has concluded the British government was unclear what role British and Indian Armies should undertake in the restoration of the colonial empires of their European allies. Indeed as he states, “The other irony is that the new Labour Government, in haste to end the British presence in India, nevertheless saw the Indian Army as an imperial reserve with unlimited abilities to project British power and support for allies, with the added benefit of few casualties to trouble the British electorate.”
There were similarities with the situation in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) with a lack of clear direction from both South East Asia Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten and the British government. The role included maintaining control of the main cities until the return of the Dutch even though Dr Sukarno had declared independence on Java on 17 August 1945. Ultimately three Indian divisions were deployed under the command of General Sir Philip Christison as Commander-in-chief, NEI. He met Jack Lawson, the Secretary of State for War before taking up his post who told him, “Mr Bevin [Foreign Secretary] has asked me to make it quite clear to you that HM Government are determined that nothing should be done to suggest your troops are going to reimpose Dutch Colonial rule. You must not take sides. Carry out your role; it may take up to six
months before Dutch troops can be trained and sent out from Holland.”
However the operations included some violent fighting, particularly at Sourabaya (Surabaya) on 28 October 1945 where 49th Indian Infantry Brigade (c. 4,000 largely Indian troops) faced about 20,000 Tentara Keamana Rakyat (Indonesian Republican Army – trained and equipped by the Japanese) and 100,000 armed civilians resulting in the capture, torture and killing of several British and Indian officers – 16 officers and 217 other ranks died, including the brigade commander Brigadier Mallaby. According to the of the Brigade’s actions at Sourabya, “Brigadier Mallaby was murdered by a mob after being deserted by Indonesian officials when endeavouring to stop trouble, where a large mob were insisting that the English had surrendered and must lay down their arms. He realised the risk he was taking and acted in an endeavour to save the company of infantry in this area, but without the support of a least a section of the mob, his task was impossible.”
The 5th Indian Division, commanded by Major General Robert Mansergh, was drafted in to quell the situation: an assignment he achieved by the end of November. Even with the impending independence of India and Pakistan, the Indian Army was still considered by the British government and Mountbatten as the strategic reserve in South East Asia. Only four of the thirty battalions were British.
Auchinleck suggested that 2nd British Division be sent to the NEI but was overridden by Mountbatten with 5th Indian Division backing up 23rd and 26th Indian Divisions. In fact, when Christison had to get his plan approved for the clearing up of Batavia, he commented in his memoir, “Mountbatten and Alanbrooke [Chief of Imperial General Staff] then approved the plan and Mountbatten said to see Indian troops were used; he did not want British troops widowed at this time so long after the war. This angered Bill [Lieutenant Colonel Bill Ridley] who bravely said ‘Sir, do you really think it is different if Mrs Poop Singh is made a widow?’ ‘Tell your commander his plan is approved’ said Alanbrooke.”
Indian Army troops were also deployed as a brigade of the occupation forces in Japan, in Burma (Myanmar), Hong Kong, Siam (Thailand), Borneo and Malaya (Malaysia).
The army continued to adapt to their new roles. For instance in Malaya, Indian troops became more like administrators. Although the corruption and behaviour of British and Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore undermined public confidence even further in 1945 and at least as much as 1942.
In his appraisal of the situation in November 1945, General Auchinleck stated that the Indian Armed Forces were currently capable of dealing with communal and anti-government disturbances but this situation would not necessarily last until the following year due to demobilisation, the Indian National Army trials, the nationalism of most Indian officers and the Congress campaign against Indian soldiers propping up European empires in French Indochina and the NEI. He concluded, “Our action in Java and French Indo-china is already being represented as European repression of national risings of Eastern peoples. If this is made a major political issue as is likely, it may have a serious effect upon the loyalty of the Indian Armed Forces. It is certainly very undesirable that any further Indian troops should be sent to these or other similar countries.”
Indian troops remained in Saigon, Java and Sumatra until 1946. They had to deal with many issues ranging from repatriating prisoners of war and civilian internees, disarming Japanese soldiers and counterinsurgency operations against nationalist guerrillas. By the withdrawal of the Indian divisions from NEI at the end of November 1946, over 600 men and officers had been killed on Java and Sumatra. Between June and November 1946, 180,000 British and Indian troops returned to India including: HQ 15 Indian Corps, 26th Indian Division, 50th Indian Tank Brigade, 80th Indian Infantry Brigade (all from NEI), 7th Indian Division from Malaya, and 32nd Indian Infantry Bridge from Borneo. In addition 23rd Indian Division was moved from NEI to Malaya and 17th Indian Division remained in Burma.
This demonstrates that not only the end of the Second World War is contested, particularly in Asia, but that British and Indian troops were still involved in conflict zones after Victory over Japan Day on 15 August 1945.