The Bomb Load
The internal bomb load capacity of the Dornier 217 was up to 4,000 kg, but on the night of 7/8 March 1943 it was recorded by RAF intelligence that the subject aircraft was carrying two x 500 kg and eight 50 kg bombs.
At the time of the crash, the West Sussex Police reported that bombs associated with the crashed Dornier 217 had been found as follows:
“8 March 1943, 01.00 hours: 3 x UXBS, 1 ‘Firepot’*, and 100 incendiary bombs. Reekes Wood, Cartref Farm.
8 March 1943, 01.00 hours: 4 x HE bombs and 200 incendiary bombs. No damage caused. Meadow to the east of and adjoining Amos Copse.”
These bombs had all presumably fallen from the stricken Dornier 217 shortly before it had crashed, or else been ejected from the disintegrating airframe as the aircraft descended.
(*Note: the ‘Firepot’ bomb would have been a Sprengbrandbombe, or Explosive-incendiary Bomb)
Given that the wreckage recovered in 1989 was found to contain fi vex 50 kg bomb sand tw ox 500 kg bombs, then the addition of eight more 50 kg weapons would bring the known payload of the Fernhurst Dornier 217 to 13 x 50 kg bombs, two 500 kg bombs, and at least 300 x 1 kg incendiary bombs.
Of the bombs recovered in 1989, the RAF’S EOD team reported thus: 2 x 50 kg SC bombs with No. 25 fuzes.
3 x 50 kg C50 Sprengbrand Incendiaries, two with No 28 fuzes which were removed and had no picric rings and one unidentified fuze which was also virtually certain to be a No.28 too.
“2 x 500 kg SC bombs, one with two No.25 fuzes (both immunised) and one with one No.50 and one No.17 fuze, both immunised. Additionally, the No.17 fuze was checked with a microphone stethoscope.”
Because of the situation of the crash site, a remote location away from habitation needed to be found to deal with the UXBS, and these were transported covertly by vehicle convoy to a field at Dawes Farm, Fernhurst, where the bomb fuzes were trepanned, and the explosives steamed out across a period between 20 and 25 August 1989.
All bombs were deemed safe to be moved because they had not been electrically charged on release from the aircraft as would have been necessary to arm them. However, because of concerns over the clockwork mechanism on the No.17 fuze – and although this had been jammed by EOD intervention – a stethoscope watch had been maintained on the bomb at all stages of its movement. The minimum delay of No.17 fuze is given as, +/- 10%, 1.5 hours.