Firefighters stopped from going in:
FIRE crews desperate to help victims of the Manchester Arena bombing were held back by their bosses for two hours amid mistakes that brought the service ‘to the brink of failure.’
While paramedics and armed police were on the scene of last May’s attack within 10 minutes, the fire service was in ‘paralysis,’ according to Lord Bob Kerslake’s report into the atrocity.
Frustrated crews - many of whom had heard the blast from their city centre post - were instead sent to a station in Beswick, three miles away, only to later be sent back into town again amid confusion.
Lord Kerslake’s review concludes the actions of then-chief officer Peter O’Reilly ‘played a key role’ in the delays, while concluding ‘poor communication and poor procedures’ within the service were more broadly at fault.
The review also finds that Vodafone, which holds the national Home Office contract for emergency post-disaster hotlines, experienced a ‘catastrophic’ technical failure on the night that meant no fullyfunctioning phone number could be set up for desperate people in search of information.
Some relatives were forced to drive around hospitals in search of loved ones instead.
His review also criticises Greater Manchester Police for a breakdown in communication with other agencies that saw key officers overloaded with responsibilities and the fire service struggling to get key updates.
Nevertheless, the story of the response on the night was overall ‘overwhelmingly positive,’ it finds. The review praises GMP’s duty officer, who made a ‘life or death’ decision to keep first responders at the scene rather than evacuate in the face of a possible further attack.
It paints a picture of extraordinary heroism, including from British Transport Police, rail staff, Arena security, paramedics and members of the public, who ran straight into danger despite not yet knowing whether the Arena’s foyer was safe to enter.
And it depicts in detail the experiences of victims and families - many of whom spoke directly to the review about the painful hours, days and weeks that followed the atrocity, which claimed the lives of 22 people.
Their experiences include frustrations with delayed mental health treatment and press intrusion, set alongside praise for the way Manchester as a city rallied round in the bomb’s aftermath.
“The people of Manchester did a fantastic job of boosting the morale of those affected,” one relative told the review, “making us feel as though we were not alone.”
The report, set up by Greater Manchester mayor Andy Burnham in the wake of the bomb, seeks to identify both the strengths and weaknesses in how the disaster was tackled. The review, however, said it could make ‘no comment’ on whether the presence of fire crews at the scene earlier on the night ‘would have affected any casualty’s ‘survivability,’ saying it would be a matter for a coroner at inquest. Inquest hearings have been adjourned until June. But the report said that had fire crews been deployed to rendezvous points ‘at the earliest opportunity,’ the evacuation of casualties ‘could have been achieved more efficiently and possibly more rapidly.’ The report only focused on the response to the attack in the nine days that followed. Here are the key findings on each aspect of the response to the Manchester Arena attack:
THE FIRE SERVICE
AFTER months of speculation about its role in the attack’s response, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue service is singled out for stinging criticism in the report.
It finds the service provided ‘no meaningful role in the response to the attack for nearly two hours,’ despite usually attending incidents within little over five-and-a-half minutes. As a result, crews and control room staff felt ‘they had let down the people of Greater Manchester and other visitors to the city that night,’ it says, adding that ‘a valuable resource was not available to assist on the scene’ because the service was ‘out of the loop.’
Following the bomb’s detonation at 10.31pm, the report finds communication between fire and police was patchy, with the fire service’s designated liaison officer – who lived 22 miles away – struggling to reach the police’s duty officer for key information about the situation on the ground.
As a result, the fire service liaison officer decided relocating crews from the city centre to Philips Park station in Beswick, three miles from the Arena, was the safest option in case a marauding terrorist proved to be on the loose.
However, the review found that having failed to get through to GMP command on the phone, for reasons that were ‘obvious’ due to the unfolding situation, he did little else to find out the precise picture.
“The...liaison officer appears to have acted as though he had no other options available to him through which to gain situational awareness himself or for others to get it for him,” it finds.
“It has been disappointing for the panel to learn that, in this instance, specialist ‘inter-agency liaison’ appeared to count for nothing other than telephoning the GMP force duty officer and when this failed, the whole GMFRS response to the scene was effectively brought to a point of paralysis, which was to last until 00.21hrs when pumps were finally deployed forward.”
Meanwhile then-county fire officer Peter O’Reilly - the most senior officer in the service - ‘played a key role in delaying opportunities’ to coordinate with other services, such as the police, finds the report.
He did not arrive at fire command in Swinton until nearly midnight, having chosen not to go to the joint ‘gold command’ unit set up for all agencies at police HQ, where senior ambulance, health, council and transport officials had all gathered.
Asked why that was the case, he told the panel that his previous experience suggested gold command to be ‘chaos.’ But the review remains unconvinced, finding his reasons ‘insufficient.’
It finds the behaviour of senior officers ‘surprising’ and concludes that, when combined, the lack of their understanding of events on the ground - combined with the failure to deploy crews - demonstrates ‘an organisation brought to the point of failure by a reversion, under pressure, to a state of single-agency thinking.’
“It is the panel’s belief that this was underpinned by the service’s culture,” it adds, later stating that it must review the way it works with other agencies.
The chief fire officer eventually took direct control of deploying crews just as his colleagues - now on the ground - were starting to get a grasp of the situation and were about to order in the brigade’s ‘special response teams,’ firefighters trained and equipped to deal with
The whole GMFRS response to the scene was effectively brought to a point of paralysis Kerslake Report
terrorist attacks. But this was stopped by the chief, who held them back and instead ordered three regular pumps to move to the scene.
“This order caused the special response teams considerable concern,” says the report.
It adds: “The panel believes the chief fire officer was frustrated that he had not been informed about the incident earlier by North West Fire Control. This led him to believe that he should intervene with tactical decision making at this point.”
When the regular crews finally arrived at the Arena, nearly two hours after the blast, they suffered a further delay entering the building itself because the officer on the ground now had to await the chief officer’s permission for them to go in.
Officials from other blue-light services ‘could see the immense frustration on the firefighters’ faces at their still being restrained from helping the other responders, who were clearly visible to them all treating the casualties within the station building,’ it adds.
Crews eventually entered the Arena two hours and six minutes after the bomb went off.
The report makes more than a dozen recommendations to the fire service, including around the role of liaison officers and joint working with other agencies.
At the time of writing Mr O’Reilly, who took early retirement last month, had not yet been contacted for comment.
THE POLICE
GREATER Manchester Police are praised for deploying armed officers to the scene ‘remarkably fast,’ with the first arriving within 10 minutes.
With little concrete information available in the early stages of the attack about further threats, the force duty officer – the inspector in charge of initially coordinating the response – had to make a judgement call as to whether first responders should stay in the foyer helping casualties.
In the end he made a ‘life or death’ decision to keep them there.
“The force duty officer decided that to tell these responders to evacuate would have been unconscionable,” says the report, adding that it fully supports the decision.
Shortly after the attack GMP were also dealing with the lockdown of Piccadilly Station amid fears of a further atrocity, a suspicious package at North Manchester General Hospital, a possible gunman on the loose at the cathedral and the lockdown of the National Football Museum following an additional security alert. The report finds that both the force duty officer and gold command – the officer in charge of strategic decisions on the night – were having to juggle too much, however, leaving too much hinging on a couple of individuals. That led to a ‘shortfall’ in communication with other agencies such as the fire service over whether or not there was a continued terror threat, leading to ‘confusion’ - meaning a ‘critical’ opportunity to share vital information was lost. It also concludes that police IT systems nationally need updating, since GMP could not electronically track the whereabouts of officers from other forces brought in as part of the immediate emergency response. But ‘selfless willingness’ of police officers on the ground, along with ambulance staff, British Transport Police, and Arena staff, meant the lack of fire service
The force duty officer decided that to tell these responders to evacuate would have been unconscionable Kerslake Report
attendance did not throw the situation into chaos, it finds.
The report also heaps praise on GMP’s family liaison officers, the key point of contact for families in the aftermath of the attack.
Described as a ‘vital source of support and comfort to many of the families which went well beyond their formal roles,’ the review says it heard many examples of how the officers helped the shocked and bereaved.
“This is just one example of the way in which families were put first by the different agencies involved in responding to the attack,” it says.
THE AMBULANCE SERVICE
THE first advanced paramedic was inside the Arena within 11 minutes and on learning that the incident was a ‘suicide bomber,’ walked straight up the stairs from the concourse and into the foyer, where he started triaging casualties.
In the immediate aftermath two technicians also went into the foyer without bulletproof vests, ‘despite the fact it hadn’t been declared safe,’ says the report. Advertising placards, metal poles and other improvised bits and