How the emergency News services struggled at Arena atrocity

TRANSPORT POLICE HAD NO OFFICERS IN FOYER, TERROR COPS HAD NO DETAILS ON ABEDI, WHILE GMP’S DUTY OFFICER DECIDED NOT TO TELL OTHER AGENCIES

THE struggles of the emergency and security services to cope with the Manchester Arena terror attack were detailed at the public inquiry into the outrage - including that terror cops had no information about Salman Abedi before he struck.

As it resumed on Tuesday, the public inquiry into the atrocity heard opening statements on behalf of counter terror cops, Greater Manchester Police (GMP), British Transport Police (BTP), North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) as well as the venue operator SMG and the security and stewarding contractor Showsec.

As the hearing resumed in Manchester, Matthew Butt QC, representing National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, admitted the organisation ‘was not aware of Abedi or any of the intelligence that relates to him before the attack’.

He explained that the organisation would only be informed of intelligence about a suspect if there was the ‘possibility of imminent public threat’ which required the ‘senior national coordinator’ at NCTPHQ to be informed.

Lisa Roberts QC, representing NWAS revealed 75 ambulances were ‘signed on duty’ across Greater Manchester but only eight were available to be deployed immediately.

None of the available ambulances was stationed in the city centre, the inquiry heard.

“This is not unusual for ambulance services. At any given time, the majority of ambulances are actively engaged in responding to a wide range of incidents 24 hours a day. Despite this, NWAS were able to rapidly deploy multiple resources from across the North West in response to this incident,” said Miss Roberts. An ‘advanced paramedic’ was inside the City Room, the foyer where Abedi detonated the device, 21 minutes after the bomb went off, the inquiry was told.

Police officers at the scene made the decision to move casualties from the ‘chaotic and distressing’ scene at the City Room to the railway station concourse before the advanced paramedic had arrived, said the QC, who added that there were concerns about the bomb-damaged ceiling and a continuing ‘marauding’ terror attack.

Miss Roberts conceded that, with hindsight, more specialists in dealing with hazardous environments could have been deployed. The primary responsibility for securing public spaces like the City Room from terrorism fell on the security services and the police, insisted John Laidlaw QC, representing Showsec.

The QC questioned whether a police presence in that area would have helped Showsec staff that night, and pointed to BTP ‘shortcomings’: no documented risk-assessments; co counter terrorism briefing; no structured approach to deployment of officers; a lack of proper instruction for officers on the ground.

He went on that individual BTP officers had shown great courage that night but he said that not a single officer was in or close to the City Room at the time of the bombing.

Patrick Gibbs QC, representing BTP, said the four officers on duty that night were stationed near the war memorial as this had ‘the best vantage point’ of people heading towards trains and trams.

He said the Abedi brothers, although he pointedly did not name them, must have been helped by others in their plot and that those people were still at large.

The QC praised the courage of BTP officers.

He said: “It would take months to acknowledge the acts of kindness and selfless courage that were performed that night and so many, even at the end of this process, remain unremarked, but they know what they did.”

Within five minutes of the detonation 18 BTP officers were at the scene and by 11.30pm that number rose to 50, he said. Richard Horwell, representing GMP, said the force did not accept criticism that there had been a ‘command vacuum’ that night.

The QC described how the force duty officer (FDO) ‘made a deliberate decision not to follow his training and not to implement the procedures he had been taught to use’.

The officer decided that he would not inform the other agencies that Plato had been declared and when he had the opportunity to bring the Fire Service to the scene, he declined to do so, the inquiry was told.

Mr Horwell said: “No training exercise or manual could ever have contemplated that such decisions would be made and this abandonment of protocol had a significant impact on what followed.”

Chief Inspector Dale Sexton, had said he had not followed the policy because he believed it would have caused loss of life as it would have caused those at the scene to ‘abandon the casualties’, the inquiry heard.