Star letter

I have some objections to Joe Soap’s protests that Barry Collins’ statistical analysis of terrorist threats ( see issue 274, p28) shows a “lack of insight to understand the human consequences of terrorism”. Joe says that Barry fails to account for the “grief, pain and loss” suffered by terrorism victims’ families, but he ignores the grief, pain and loss of families of those killed in other tragic events, such as traffic accidents. The “decades of pain, loss and grief” caused by terrorism are just as lamentable, yes, but drastically fewer than those caused by other factors.

Would back doors in encrypted communications help thwart terrorism? Only if used effectively, by which I mean all means of communication available to each suspect must be sifted, live, with suspicious content passed to the relevant authorities. This assumes attacks are planned using technology in clear-text, not by culprits talking in person.

We used to eavesdrop on suspects’ real-life conversations, so what’s the difference? Simple: third parties couldn’t use those same eavesdroppers to spy on other people. Yet if cryptographic protocols incorporated back doors for the security services, what would stop other determined individuals also using the same back doors to access “secure” communication?

The same thing applies to not using cryptography at all; either communication is secure or it isn’t. Giving only the government access to cryptographic mechanisms is impossible, and any attempt to do so would make it less secure for us all.

It would be ironic if the same back door was used by terrorists to release data originally designed to help prevent terrorism.